THE EXCEPTIONALISM NORM IN ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION

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The standard narrative envisions administrative law as a quasi-constitutional field with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) as its superstatute backbone. In rulemaking and judicial review, this narrative is compelling and has facilitated judicial and scholarly rejection of agency claims to “exceptionalism,” i.e., exception from uniform, cross-cutting administrative law principles. This Article argues that there is a significant omission from the standard narrative: adjudication. Here, Congress, the courts, agencies, and scholars have embraced the use of unique institutional structures and procedural rules tailored to suit the needs of individual agencies and regulatory programs. As a consequence, most adjudication is conducted outside of the APA, which has little role in defining “adjudication” or specifying its minimum procedures. In adjudication, this Article argues, exceptionalism is the norm. On the level of theory, this undermines administrative law’s standard narrative. More practically, although exceptionalism may benefit individual programs, it threatens system-wide harms—to transparency, fairness, and quality procedural design—that escape program-specific evaluation.

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INTRODUCTION

Over the past decade or so, scholars have developed a normative account of administrative law as a quasi-constitutional field with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) as its “superstatute” backbone. This narrative not only explains the nature and operation of administrative law, but for many it helps to legitimize the administrative state. In this narrative, administrative law is quasi-constitutional because it defines and determines the powers and placement of the administrative state, a component of the federal government that is both essential to modern governance and largely absent from the written constitution.¹ At the core of this small-c constitution is the APA, which has been widely identified as a “superstatute”² because it was “enacted ‘after lengthy normative debate’” and has become “entrenched” in the sense that it has “prove[n] robust as a solution, a standard, or a norm over time.”³ Enacted in 1946, the APA has provided a durable foundation for the administrative state, offering uniform, cross-cutting norms that the courts have fleshed out through a significant body of administrative common law.

Pitching against this standard narrative of administrative law, a few agencies have claimed to be so unique, so exceptional, that the traditional principles of administrative law do not apply to them.⁴ The


⁴ See, e.g., Kristin E. Hickman, Administrative Law’s Growing Influence on U.S. Tax Administration, 3 J. TAX ADMIN. 82, 83 (2017) [hereinafter Hickman, Growing Influence] (discussing the Department of Justice’s efforts to limit the
agencies making these claims do so in an effort to be exempted from ordinary standards of judicial review and the procedural requirements that generally apply in rulemaking. Courts and scholars have increasingly rejected these claims to “administrative law exceptionalism,” thereby defending and extending the standard narrative of administrative law as a body of uniform, quasi-constitutional norms, often grounded in the APA, that apply to all federal administrative agencies.

But is the standard narrative of administrative law as sound as this account suggests? As noted, the examples offered in support of the narrative typically involve rulemaking and judicial review. And it is in these areas that claims to administrative exceptionalism have most often been made—and rejected. This is no coincidence. In rulemaking and judicial review, there is ample evidence that the APA successfully operates as a superstatute, supplying enduring, quasi-constitutional principles that have long applied to all agencies, regardless of their structure, position, purpose, or jurisdiction. In these most high profile, salient areas of administrative law, the standard narrative finds strong support. And it is generally assumed that the reality of rulemaking and judicial review not only supports the normative vision in those contexts, but within administrative law more broadly.

Absent from the standard narrative of administrative law is adjudication—an important area of administration within which a radically different reality prevails. Agencies rarely adjudicate under the APA’s so-called “formal” adjudication provisions. Congress and individual agencies have repeatedly ignored these provisions, preferring instead to create unique adjudicatory proceedings designed to meet the individual needs of different administrative agencies and programs. For their part, the courts have acquiesced in—and even supported—the proliferation of non-uniform adjudicatory procedures by deferring to agency procedural design choices and suppressing the APA’s role in defining adjudicative formality. Although most adjudication is thus “informal,” the APA contains no provision establishing minimum application of ordinary administrative law principles to the Department of the Treasury and the Internal Revenue Service. Beyond the tax context, see infra at note 96 (citing other articles contributing to the substantial literature on tax exceptionalism), claims of administrative exceptionalism have been made in the areas of patent law, see infra at note 97, and immigration, see infra at note 98.

5. Some scholars have rejected “administrative law exceptionalism” so strongly as to describe it as “the misperception that a particular regulatory field is so different from the rest of the regulatory state that general administrative law principles do not apply.” Christopher J. Walker, Chevron Deference and Patent Exceptionalism, 65 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 149, 149 (2016) [hereinafter Walker, Patent Exceptionalism].

procedural requirements for “informal” adjudication. Without the legal foundation that such a provision would provide, the courts have not developed a body of administrative common law fleshing out minimum procedural requirements for informal adjudicatory hearings. Scholars have identified some common procedures observed in informal hearings, but these are neither legally required nor consistently observed.

This Article brings this adjudicative reality to life—and assesses its implications for administrative law and theory—through a case study of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA). This high-profile statute created several different proceedings through which the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) adjudicates challenges to issued patents. These proceedings are conducted by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB), an entity newly formed by the AIA. The statute established several different kinds of PTAB proceedings, including inter partes review, covered business method review, and post-grant review. All three of these proceedings are designed to facilitate reexamination of previously issued patents. Congress provided detailed procedural requirements for each of these proceedings. Following the AIA’s enactment, the PTO adopted regulations further specifying the applicable procedures. Inter partes review is a quintessential example of the tailored adjudicatory schemes that long ago became the norm in administrative adjudication.

This Article first evaluates whether inter partes review proceedings before the PTAB are “formal” adjudications. The question is important because, if the proceedings are properly characterized as “formal,” it is more likely that courts will give maximum deference to the PTAB’s decisions. This could have significant consequences for

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7. But see 5 U.S.C. § 555 (addressing “ancillary matters” that may arise in adjudication, among other kinds of agency proceedings).


the balance of power in patent law between the PTO and the federal courts, particularly the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Patent scholars have disagreed about whether the AIA’s new proceedings are “formal” adjudications. The disagreement stems partly from different views about the historical role of the PTO, the AIA’s intent and importance, and the normative value and proper goals of patent law. The Federal Circuit has characterized inter partes review proceedings as “formal” adjudications, but with relatively little analysis and not for the purpose of giving any deference to the PTAB’s substantive patent law decisions. Did the court get it right?

The analysis reveals profound uncertainty and a general absence of uniform principles in the administrative law of adjudication. Administrative law offers four distinct approaches to determining whether inter partes review proceedings are “formal” adjudications. The APA’s adjudication provisions have a different role in each of these four approaches. Importantly, they do not always operate as the source of law, as would be expected for a superstatute. In some instances, the APA merely identifies or describes the necessary procedural elements of formality, which the agency may voluntarily impose upon itself through its procedural regulations. The most familiar and consequential approach to defining adjudicative formality is found within the broader standard for determining whether an agency’s decisions are entitled to judicial deference under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. Here, “formality” is defined amorphously and not necessarily in reference to the APA’s adjudication provisions. In this approach, the APA is not the source of law, and although the statute may be useful as a descriptive benchmark, it may also have little or no relevance. Stranger still, the various approaches to adjudicative formality yield at least three different answers to the question of whether inter partes review proceedings are formal adjudications. Finally, if inter partes review proceedings are

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informal” adjudications, they do not have all of the elements that have been identified as common to such hearings.\textsuperscript{17}

This analysis may be useful for patent experts, but it also offers a broader lesson for administrative law and theory. \textit{Inter partes} review proceedings provide a vivid case study in the modern, fractured reality of administrative adjudication. This case study reveals that, in adjudication, exceptionalism \textit{is} the norm. That a norm-defying characteristic could be the prevailing norm suggests that that, in the context of adjudication, the APA does not operate as a superstatute. Moreover, it suggests that in the realm of adjudication, the unwritten administrative constitution, if not absent, is exceedingly weak. Moving from theory to practice, exceptionalism in administrative adjudication has benefits—but it also has underappreciated costs. The benefits of exceptionalism flow from the opportunity it provides to tailor adjudicatory procedures to fit the specific needs of a particular agency and regulatory program. The costs are to uniformity, transparency, and sound institutional and procedural design. These system-wide harms are underappreciated in the program-specific treatment that Congress, the courts, and scholars typically afford to the study of adjudication.

This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I frames the inquiry by explaining the standard narrative of administrative law as a quasi-constitutional field with the APA as its superstatute backbone. It explains why this narrative appears to be sound in the contexts of rulemaking and judicial review and explains how the narrative has facilitated ready rejection of individual agency claims to exceptionalism. Adjudication, however, is conspicuously absent from this story. To illuminate the reasons for adjudication’s omission, Part II offers the new patent adjudication procedures created by the America Invents Act of 2011, and particularly \textit{inter partes} review, as a case study. This part briefly situates \textit{inter partes} review in historical context before exploring the AIA’s new framework for joint congressional-administrative design of \textit{inter partes} review procedures. It examines these procedures in detail, arguing that Congress and the PTO did not even consider the APA as the relevant touchstone of procedural design. District court patent litigation was instead used as the default model that was tailored to serve the substantive regulatory goals of administrative patent adjudication. The law’s accommodation of this exceptionalism has upstream doctrinal consequences. It has contributed to the development of four different approaches to the question of whether an adjudication is “formal,” each of which yields a different conclusion as applied to \textit{inter partes} review proceedings. In this analysis, the APA has only a limited and variable role. The statute fares little better if

\textsuperscript{17} See Asimow Report, supra note 8, at 35, 77.
inter partes review is classified as “informal” adjudication. Part III reflects on what the inter partes review analysis suggests about administrative law and theory. It argues that, unlike judicial review and rulemaking, adjudication is ruled by a norm of exceptionalism. This presents a challenge to the standard narrative of administrative law and also has practical implications that warrant greater attention and concern.

I. THE STANDARD NARRATIVE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

A. Administrative Law’s Quasi-Constitutional Status

Administrative law is increasingly conceptualized as a quasi-constitutional field. There are various definitions of what “constitutional” means in this context, although those definitions sometimes overlap and are often complementary. In one formulation, “administrative constitutionalism” refers to the many ways in which federal agencies act “to interpret and implement the U.S. Constitution.” 18 As a practical matter, an administrative agency is often the first—and sometimes the last—to consider the constitutional implications of or limitations on its own action. 19 For example, when the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) decides how to regulate broadcasters, it is called upon in the first instance to consider the First Amendment limitations upon its own action. 20 To take another example, when an agency is designing its own procedures for administering a new or modified regulatory program, it must consider what minimum requirements are “imposed by the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.” 21 Other examples of administrative constitutionalism arise in connection with other constitutional provisions. 22 Some aspects of administrative constitutionalism, such as the appropriate degree of judicial deference to an agency’s

21. Bremer & Jacobs, supra note 19, at 531–32; see U.S. Const. amend. V, § 4. Although such programs are created by statute, agencies typically have broad discretion to flesh out the procedures they will observe. See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 519, 524 (1978); see generally infra Part II.B. (explaining how the PTO has exercised its discretion to complete the procedural design of inter partes review).
constitutional determination, have long been the subject of scholarly examination. But only in the last decade have scholars sought to take account of how administrative agencies, through the phenomenon of administrative constitutionalism, contribute to the interpretation of the U.S. Constitution.

Another sense in which administrative law is “constitutional” is that it performs constitutional functions in an important area in which the U.S. Constitution has little or no application. Generally speaking, the U.S. Constitution neither acknowledges nor addresses the administrative state. As Professor Jerry Mashaw has put it, “there is a hole in the Constitution where administration might have been.” Ordinary administrative law helps to fill this hole by serving many of the functions traditionally associated with constitutions: “creating and ordering important political institutions, authorizing and limiting the exercise of government power, and defining relationships both among government institutions and between the government and citizens.” The APA, which is widely regarded as a quasi-constitutional framework statute, is the backbone of this unwritten administrative constitution. But other cross-cutting statutes, a significant body of administrative common law, and various executive policy directives also contribute to it. These laws are rarely mandated by the Constitution, but they are animated by familiar constitutional concerns.


26. Mashaw, supra note 1, at 660.

27. Bremer, Unwritten, supra note 1, at 1219.


29. See Bremer, Unwritten, supra note 1, at 1235–37.
such as the separation of powers. 30 Thus, as Professor Gillian Metzger has argued, “a fair amount of ordinary administrative law qualifies as constitutional common law.” 31

Within this broader realm of administrative constitutionalism lies a conception of the APA as a “superstatute.” 32 “Superstatutes” are “enacted only ‘after lengthy normative debate’ [and] ‘prove robust as a solution, a standard, or a norm over time.’” 33 Although superstatutes are often described as being “entrenched,” 34 it is perhaps more accurate to say that, as a descriptive matter, they enjoy extraordinary stability by virtue of their widespread acceptance. 35 Despite this and other disagreement regarding discrete aspects of superstatute theory, there appears to be widespread agreement that the APA is a key example of a superstatute. 36

30. See id. at 1249–53; Gillian E. Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law as Constitutional Common Law, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 479, 484 (2010) [hereinafter Metzger, Constitutional Common Law].

31. Metzger, Constitutional Common Law, supra note 30, at 484.

32. See Kovacs, supra note 2; Adrian Vermeule, Superstatutes, The New Republic (Oct. 26, 2010), https://newrepublic.com/article/78604/superstatutes [https://perma.cc/Y555-RXJ3]; see also Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 3. Other statutes that have been identified as superstatutes include the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, see generally Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 1737 (2007), and the Social Security Act, see Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 Yale L.J. 408, 417, 424–27, 452–53 (2007).

33. Kovacs, supra note 2, at 1209 (quoting Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 3, at 1216).

34. See, e.g., Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 3, at 7; Ackerman, supra note 32, at 1757–93; Daryl Levinson & Benjamin Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 125 Yale L.J. 400, 426–29 (2015); Young, supra note 32, at 426.

35. See Bremer, Unwritten, supra note 1, at 1229–34; Mathew D. McCubbins & Daniel B. Rodriguez, Superstatutory Entrenchment: A Positive and Normative Interrogatory, 120 Yale L.J. Online 387 (2011), https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/superstatutory-entrenchment-a-positive-and-normative-interrogatory [https://perma.cc/F7MP-P2Q2]. In contrast, an entrenched rule is one that is legally protected against change through ordinary legislative processes. Thus, the U.S. Constitution is entrenched by virtue of its provisions requiring extraordinary measures for amendment. See U.S. Const. art. V.

36. See Kovacs, supra note 2, at 1223–37. This is not entirely new. In 1978, then-Professor Antonin Scalia explained that, by the early 1970s, “it became obvious even to the obtuse—that the Supreme Court regarded the APA as a sort of superstatute, or subconstitution, in the field of administrative process: a basic framework that was not lightly to be supplanted or embellished.” Antonin Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court, 1978 Sup. Ct. Rev. 345, 363.
government. Although Congress can amend the APA through ordinary legislative processes, its core provisions have proven seemingly impervious to amendment. Thus, for nearly three-quarters of a century, the APA has operated as a source of uniform, default rules governing administrative agencies. The statute’s constitutional character and cross-cutting application lends it the significant “normative weight” associated with a superstatute.

Taken together, the literature on administrative constitutionalism, the small-c constitutional character of ordinary administrative law, and the APA’s superstatute status offer what has become the standard narrative of administrative law. There are deep interconnections between these three facially distinct literatures. Read together, they present a powerful narrative of the origins and contours of administrative law as a quasi-constitutional field governing the operation of the administrative state and its placement among the other branches of the federal government. Within this narrative, the APA is an indispensable protagonist. As a framework statute, however, the APA is relatively skeletal, leaving ample room for judicial elaboration of its requirements. As a consequence, “[a]dministrative law is infused with common law.” This administrative common law is controversial but essential to administrative law’s constitutional character.

As will become evident as the discussion continues below, the examples that best support this account of administrative law are drawn from the areas of rulemaking and judicial review of agency action. This Article will focus predominately on the former because it involves the matter of minimum procedural requirements for agency action, and is thus more relevant to this Article’s subject. In any event, the ubiquity

38. Bremer, Unwritten, supra note 1, at 1233; see also Christopher J. Walker, Modernizing the Administrative Procedure Act, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 629, 630–31 (2017) [hereinafter Walker, Modernizing] (explaining recent interest in bipartisan legislative reform to modernize the APA).
39. This narrative is controversial in its own right. See, e.g., McCubbins & Rodriguez, supra note 35. It is also interesting that it has emerged during the same period an apparent renaissance of sentiment against the administrative state. See Gillian E. Metzger, 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2017). It may be worth asking whether these phenomena are related.
40. Kovacs, supra note 2, at 1213.
41. There is accordingly a large and growing literature examining, critiquing, and defending the phenomenon of administrative common law. See, e.g., Jack M. Beermann, Common Law and Statute Law in Administrative Law, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2011); Bremer, Unwritten, supra note 1; John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L. REV. 113, 115 (1998); Kovacs, supra note 2; Gillian E. Metzger, Embracing Administrative Common Law, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1293, 1295 (2012).
of examples from the rulemaking context raises the question at the heart of this Article: what about adjudication? Before turning to this question, it is worth examining the relationships between, first, constitutionalism and uniformity and, next, between uniformity and the rejection of administrative exceptionalism.

B. Constitutionalism and Uniformity

One beneficial characteristic of administrative law that is intimately connected to its constitutional character is that it provides uniform principles that apply across all federal administrative agencies. Indeed, administrative law’s ability to perform constitutional functions requires this uniform, cross-cutting application. For example, determining the place of the administrative state within the federal government requires separation of powers norms that apply generally to the administrative state, i.e., to all individual agencies. This relationship between constitutional status, cross-cutting effect, and uniformity will become clear through a discussion of the law governing rulemaking and judicial review of agency action.

In keeping with its superstatute status, the APA plays a key role in supplying the foundation for the uniform norms that prevail in rulemaking and judicial review. In the rulemaking context, the APA imposes minimum procedural requirements on agencies. These requirements are fleshed out by the courts through administrative common law. In the judicial review context, the APA also operates as the legal foundation of judicial authority to review agency decision-making. But here, the common law does not merely embellish upon the APA’s minimal requirements, but instead provides detailed rules that are in tension if not outright conflict with the statutory text. Others have considered the validity of administrative common law that is, or appears to be, inconsistent with the APA’s text. Setting this important question to one side, what matters for purposes of this Article is how the APA has successfully seeded the development of uniform, cross-cutting principles of administrative law in the areas of rulemaking and judicial review.

42. The benefits of uniformity are explored infra Part I.C.
43. Cf. Margaret B. Kwoka, First-Person FOIA, 127 Yale L.J. 2204, 2257 (2018) (explaining that the APA “provides a baseline set of procedures that apply to all agency proceedings”).
45. See Metzger, supra note 41.
46. See, e.g., Kovacs, supra note 2, at 1208–09.
Administrative rulemaking across the federal government is governed by a cross-institutional consensus on a set of uniform principles and procedural requirements. One uniformly recognized norm is that agencies may create legally binding regulations using “informal” instead of “formal” rulemaking. 47 In the rulemaking context, these terms have a clear meaning. “Formal” rulemaking, which is almost never used today, is a trial-like proceeding conducted under sections 553, 556, and 557 of the APA. 48 In contrast, “informal” rulemaking is conducted according to the minimum procedural requirements established by Section 553 of the APA. 49 Reflecting the core attributes of the Section 553 process, informal rulemaking is commonly referred to as “notice-and-comment” rulemaking. As formal rulemaking has been rendered irrelevant, nearly all agency regulations today are adopted through notice-and-comment rulemaking. 50

Section 553 provides the minimum procedural elements of informal rulemaking and has served as the focal point for the development of other cross-cutting requirements that do not appear in the APA’s text. The statutory requirements themselves are often described as “minimal” or even “skeletal.” 51 Under Section 553, the agency is required to publish a notice of proposed rulemaking, accept public comment on the proposal, and publish a final rule. 52 Over time, however, the APA’s facially undemanding requirements have been embellished by the courts, the Congress, and the President. 53 This

48. See Kent H. Barnett, How the Supreme Court Derailed Formal Rulemaking, 85 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. Arguendo 1, 1 (2017). As discussed infra Part II.B.1.d., “informal rulemaking” is considered sufficiently “formal” for the courts to give Chevron deference to the resulting agency decision. The detailed, uniform procedural norms established by Section 553 of the APA make this possible. Thus, for judicial deference purposes “informal” rulemaking is always sufficiently formal to warrant Chevron deference, but “informal” adjudication is only sometimes sufficiently formal to warrant Chevron deference. Because there is no adjudicatory analogue to Section 553, and therefore no set of clearly identifiable procedural minimums that apply to informal adjudication, the determination of formality for deference purposes must be made on an agency- and program-specific basis.
50. See, e.g., Stuart Shapiro, Agency Oversight as “Whac-A-Mole”: The Challenge of Restricting Agency Use of Nonlegislative Rules, 37 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 523, 523 (2014) (“Formal rulemaking, requiring a quasi-judicial proceeding, is rarely used by agencies. It is extremely burdensome for them and, after a period of initial experimentation with the approach, agencies have largely abandoned it altogether.”).
52. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b), (c), & (d).
phenomenon, which is controversial for reasons not directly relevant to this Article, is referred to as the “ossification” of the rulemaking process.\textsuperscript{54} The key point for purposes of this Article is that ossification provides powerful evidence of a consensus among the three branches of government that Section 553 is the fundamental procedural baseline that defines “rulemaking.”\textsuperscript{55}

The judiciary’s acceptance of Section 553 as the sine qua non of rulemaking is evinced by the substantial body of administrative common law that fleshes out the statute’s skeletal requirements.\textsuperscript{56} This administrative common law has been criticized as violating the Supreme Court’s admonition in \textit{Vermont Yankee} that courts should not impose additional requirements on agencies beyond those contained in the APA.\textsuperscript{57} One response to this criticism, however, is that most if not all of the common law principles are consistent with and in furtherance of the APA’s requirements. For example, the judicial requirement that an


\textsuperscript{55} Of course, the APA also includes express definitions of “rule” and “rule making,” which have been criticized. 5 U.S.C. § 551(5) (2018) (defining “rule making”); Id. § 551(4) (defining “rule”); Ronald M. Levin, \textit{The Case for (Finally) Fixing the APA’s Definition of ‘Rule’}, 56 Admin. L. Rev. 1077, 1077 (2004). Scholars have also recently begun to study “unorthodox rulemaking,” which deviates from the traditional process. See Abee R. Gluck et al., \textit{Unorthodox Lawmaking, Unorthodox Rulemaking}, 115 Colum. L. Rev. 1789, 1789 (2015). Of course, even this may be viewed as evidence of the existence of a deeply rooted traditional process.

\textsuperscript{56} See, e.g., Metzger, supra note 41; Beermann, supra note 41, at 24–26; Duffy, supra note 41, at 189–90; Kenneth Culp Davis, \textit{Administrative Common Law and the Vermont Yankee Opinion}, 1980 Utah L. Rev. 3, 3.

\textsuperscript{57} See \textit{Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.}, 435 U.S. 519, 525 (1978); see also Jack M. Beermann & Gary Lawson, \textit{Reprocessing Vermont Yankee}, 75 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 856, 858–60 (identifying various judicial doctrines, including many that are part of the administrative common law of rulemaking, that are inconsistent with the APA and therefore should be overruled in a \textit{Vermont Yankee II}).
agency’s final rule be a “logical outgrowth” of its proposed rule is designed to ensure the proper functioning and integrity of the notice-and-comment process.58 After all, how can the public have a meaningful opportunity to comment on a proposal that is not written in such a way as to give fair notice as to what the agency might do in its final rule?59 The requirement that an agency provide to the public any information on which its proposal depends serves a similar function.60

Moving beyond the courts, it is also clear that the President and administrative agencies have embraced Section 553 as the legal and procedural foundation of rulemaking. For example, Executive Order 12866, requiring benefit-cost analysis and presidential review of rulemaking, is structured in a way that makes sense only if the relevant underlying procedure is that established by Section 553 of the APA.61 An agency’s responsibilities under E.O. 12866 are defined by reference to the relevant stage of the notice-and-comment rulemaking process, such as in connection with the publication of a notice of proposed rulemaking.62 Agency procedural innovation in the rulemaking context, such as that which has been necessary to facilitate electronic rulemaking, has likewise been consciously designed to further the norms and principles embodied in Section 553 and its attendant administrative common law.63 Agencies often voluntarily observe notice-and-comment procedures in circumstances in which the APA does not require it, suggesting profound internalization of and respect for notice-and-comment norms.64 The PTO’s AIA rulemakings are one example: the PTO used notice-and-comment rulemaking to develop its procedures under the AIA despite the APA’s exemption of procedural rules from notice-and-comment requirements.65 More broadly, when an agency is authorized or directed by Congress to enact substantive

59. See Beermann & Lawson, supra note 57, at 895.
60. See Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 392–93 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Beermann & Lawson, supra note 57, at 893.
regulations, questions about the appropriate procedure rarely arise. These questions are unnecessary because of the pervasive understanding that Section 553 of the APA, as interpreted through administrative common law, defines the rulemaking process.

Even Congress has internalized the constitutional, superstatute character of Section 553 of the APA. Like the President, Congress has created additional procedural requirements that fit atop those found in Section 553. For example, the Congressional Review Act, which allows Congress to block major rules developed by administrative agencies, is designed with Section 553 as the obvious procedural baseline. In addition, Congress has only infrequently deviated from the APA’s procedural defaults for rulemaking and, when it has created agency-specific rulemaking procedures, it has typically used the APA as the inspiration for its procedural design choices. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Congress briefly experimented with creating tailored rulemaking procedures for individual agencies. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) were the principal agencies subjected to these “hybrid” rulemaking procedures. As the name suggests, in these instances, Congress modified the APA’s default rules by designing rulemaking procedures that included some but not all of the trial-like components of the APA’s formal rulemaking procedures. In other words, hybrid rulemaking requirements typically add certain elements of the APA’s formal procedures on top of the process established by Section 553. These experiments generally were not well received and were infrequently replicated. Thus, although Congress has created a variety of cross-cutting requirements that are layered on top of Section 553, it has usually declined to create special rulemaking procedures to

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67. See infra notes 66–69 and accompanying text.
69. Indeed, the term “hybrid rulemaking” also has been used to refer to similar procedures created through administrative common law, particularly before the Supreme Court’s decision in Vermont Yankee. See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, Vermont Yankee and the Evolution of Administrative Procedure, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1805, 1814 (1978).
accommodate the unique needs of individual agencies or regulatory schemes. Instead, Congress typically directs or authorizes an agency to adopt regulations to implement a substantive statute, knowing that the language will be interpreted to require the agency to conduct a rulemaking proceeding under Section 553 of the APA. As we shall see, this is substantially in contrast to what Congress has done in the context of adjudication.

One might object that this paints too rosy a picture of administrative rulemaking, ignoring a variety of specialized processes that have evolved to meet certain, special needs that agencies sometimes encounter in rulemaking. It is indeed a fair point that there is a spectrum of agency processes that can be described as “rulemaking.” For example, the development of non-binding policy statements and other kinds of guidance may be classified as “rulemaking.” Most relevant to this Article’s procedural focus, however, are the various kinds of legally binding rules that are developed using a process that deviates from the prototypical notice-and-comment process. These include direct final rules, interim final rules, and other rules that fall within the “good cause” exception to Section 553. In a direct final rulemaking, an agency publishes a rule that becomes effective on a stated date if no adverse comments are filed within a specified comment period. An agency can use this approach effectively for minor or otherwise non-controversial regulatory

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71. The interpretive convention used to determine when Congress intends to convey rulemaking authority has shifted over time to accommodate a judicial preference for administrative policymaking through rulemaking instead of through adjudication. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, *Agency Rules with the Force of Law: The Original Convention*, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 467, 467–68 (2002).


73. *Id.* at 1464.


changes. If the agency receives even a single adverse comment, the agency withdraws the direct final rule and, if it wishes to proceed with the rulemaking, it must do so through an ordinary notice-and-comment proceeding. An interim final rule (which is sometimes also referred to as a temporary rule) is one that becomes effective without prior notice and public comment, and which may remain effective only for a limited period of time. Agencies typically use interim final rules to address exigent matters, inviting public comment on the rule only after the rule has become effective. Finally, agencies may adopt legally binding rules without prior notice and comment in other circumstances in which “the agency for good cause finds . . . that notice and public procedure [is] . . . impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.” This is the so-called “good cause” exception.

The key point is that these and other specialized rulemaking procedures are designed to operate within the APA’s statutory structure. Many of them have arisen in connection with actions that the APA exempts from notice-and-comment requirements, while others are designed to comply in a non-traditional way with those requirements. Thus, the courts have permitted interim-final rulemaking in instances where the agency qualifies for “the impracticability or public interest prongs of the APA’s ‘good cause’ exception.” Direct final rulemaking fits within the “unnecessary” prong of the good cause exception. To make an interim final rule final-final, an agency conducts a traditional notice-and-comment rulemaking, in compliance with Section 553. Similarly, an adverse comment submitted in response to a direct final rulemaking demonstrates that public procedure on the rule is necessary, thereby removing the action from the good cause exception and requiring the agency to comply with Section 553 if it wishes to proceed with the rule. Other types of specialized rulemaking actions likewise fit within the APA’s structure. Non-binding guidance documents may be adopted without notice and comment, but that is because they fall

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77. Levin, supra note 76, at 1.
78. See Asimow, supra note 75, at 704.
79. Id.
80. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B).
81. Asimow, Interim-Final, supra note 75, at 718 (footnotes omitted); see also Kristin Hickman, Unpacking the Force of Law, 66 Vand. L. Rev. 465, 485 (2013) [hereinafter Hickman, Force of Law].
82. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B); Levin, supra note 76, at 11.
84. E.g., Bremer, Incorporation by Reference, supra note 76, at 194 (explaining that direct-final rulemaking “permits an agency to lawfully truncate the rulemaking process”).
within an APA exemption. Finally, in the few instances in which Congress has created “hybrid” rulemaking procedures to suit the particular needs of an individual agency or regulatory program, it has used the APA as the touchstone of procedural design, combining Section 553’s notice-and-comment requirements with some aspects of the trial-like procedures found in Sections 556 and 557.

In sum, in the context of rulemaking at least, the APA operates as the *source of default procedural rules* that agencies must follow to enact regulations. The pervasive acceptance—by Congress, the President, the courts, and administrative agencies—of Section 553 as the authoritative source of rulemaking procedures obviates the need for Congress or agencies to design context-specific procedural rules. To put it another way: Section 553 defines “rulemaking.” And it does so in an active sense. It does not merely *describe* the kind of process that qualifies as “rulemaking.” Thus, it is never necessary to compare the procedures required by an agency’s organic statute to the procedural elements of Section 553 in order to determine whether the organic statute creates a “rulemaking” process. Instead, an organic statute can (and usually does) simply call for the agency to promulgate regulations, without specifying any procedure at all. In contrast to what occurs in adjudication, tailored rulemaking procedures are not created out of whole cloth, without reference to or consideration of the rulemaking procedures established in the APA. In the rulemaking context, then, the APA operates as one would expect a quasi-constitutional superstatute to operate: as a source of default procedural rules that apply uniformly across agencies. The APA appears to contemplate that it will operate in this way: Section 559 provides that a “[s]ubsequent statute may not be held to supersede or modify” the APA “except to the extent that it does so expressly.”

Judicial review principles are, in character and operation, fundamentally similar to rulemaking principles. First, administrative common law is as prevalent here as it is in the rulemaking context. In both rulemaking and judicial review, the APA serves as the foundation of the administrative common law, albeit in slightly different ways. In rulemaking, the APA operates as the source of the procedural minima that the courts have fleshed out through common law. In judicial

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86. There are, of course, other difficult definitional issues that arise in rulemaking, such as whether a rule is “binding” vs. “nonbinding,” or “interpretative” vs. “substantive.” Some of these issues can be traced to infirmities in the APA’s definition of a “rule,” which is related to, but distinct from, the question of how “rulemaking” is understood. *See* Levin, *infra* note 191.
88. 5 U.S.C. § 559. Another part of Section 559 creates an exception for “additional requirements . . . recognized by law” at the time the APA was adopted. *Id.*
review, in contrast, the APA’s role is more passive: its judicial review provisions are relevant predominantly because they facilitate judicial review of agency action.\(^\text{89}\) In judicial review, as several scholars have argued, there is greater apparent conflict between the statutory text and the prevailing judicial review doctrines.\(^\text{90}\) Despite this more complex relationship with the APA’s text, administrative common law doctrines that determine the scope of judicial deference to administrative agencies are cross-cutting. These doctrines thus successfully perform the constitutional function of fitting agencies into the separation of powers because they establish uniform principles that are applicable across all agencies. A second similarity between the rulemaking and judicial review contexts is that Congress, the President, and administrative agencies all appear to agree that the judicial review norms seeded by the APA and fleshed out in administrative common law are validly cross-cutting, uniform norms.\(^\text{91}\) Administrative agencies consider the judicial deference doctrines in structuring their own actions.\(^\text{92}\) Congress similarly appears to recognize the cross-cutting, constitutional character of these norms. One small indication of this is the recent legislative effort to abolish *Chevron* deference through the Separation of Powers Restoration Act of 2016.\(^\text{93}\)

### C. Uniformity and the Rejection of Administrative Exceptionalism

One thing that emerges from the preceding discussion is that affirming the uniformity of administrative law principles implicitly acknowledges that those principles apply across all administrative agencies. This relationship between uniformity and cross-cutting application may seem obvious, but several recent cases and a burgeoning literature on “administrative exceptionalism” suggests that it is not always so.\(^\text{94}\) “Administrative exceptionalism” refers to claims

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91. See Bremer, *Unwritten*, *supra* note 1, at 1217 (explaining administrative law stemming from “statutes, federal judicial decisions, and executive directives . . . establish crosscutting requirements that generally apply to all agencies”).


94. See *infra* notes 95–98 (collecting literature on “administrative exceptionalism” in tax, patent, and immigration contexts).
that traditional administrative law principles do not or cannot apply to
discrete and allegedly unique administrative agencies or regulatory
programs. In this context, the “traditional administrative law
principles” at issue generally include the uniform, cross-cutting rules
governing agency rulemaking and judicial review of agency action.
Claims to administrative exceptionalism have been made in the contexts
of tax, patent, and immigration law.

Recognizing the benefits of uniformity and the relationship
between uniformity and cross-cutting application, scholars and courts
have generally rejected administrative exceptionalism. Most relevant
to the patent law focus of this article is *Dickinson v. Zurko*, in which
the Supreme Court held that the APA’s standard for judicial review of


99. See, e.g., Justin (Gus) Hurwitz, *Administrative Antitrust*, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1191, 1210 (2014) (describing “the Court’s increasing hostility towards administrative exceptionalism”); but see Golden, supra note 13 (arguing that the PTO is not entitled to *Chevron* deference); Puckett, supra note 96, at 1068 (arguing that scholarly pronouncements of the death of exceptionalism are exaggerations); Zelenak, supra note 96 (defending some measure of tax exceptionalism).

100. 527 U.S. 150 (1999).
agency factual determinations applies to the PTO. In so holding, the Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s approach, according to which an admittedly ambiguous provision in a pre-APA statute governing the PTO was sufficient to override the APA. In explaining its decision, the Supreme Court explained that “[t]he APA was meant to bring uniformity to a field full of variation and diversity. It would frustrate that purpose to permit divergence on the basis of a requirement ‘recognized’ only as ambiguous.” Over a decade later, in Mayo Foundation for Medical Education and Research v. United States, the Court reaffirmed the importance of uniformity in administrative law when it held that “[t]he principles underlying our decision in Chevron apply with full force in the tax context.” Moving from the judicial review to the rulemaking context, a recent district court decision rejected the IRS’s claim that its temporary regulations interpreting the tax code are exempt from the APA’s notice-and-comment requirements.

The rejection of administrative exceptionalism is both proof and consequence of the quasi-constitutional character of the uniform norms that prevail in rulemaking and judicial review. As explained above, uniformity is an essential attribute of constitutional norms, and claims for administrative exceptionalism are, at bottom, claims of privilege against uniformity.

II. ADJUDICATION: A SIGNIFICANT, SLIGHTED OUTLIER

Throughout the discussion so far—of administrative constitutionalism, uniformity and cross-cutting application, and the rejection of administrative exceptionalism—adjudication has been conspicuously absent. Scholars have built these components of administrative law’s standard narrative primarily by drawing examples from the contexts of rulemaking and judicial review. In those contexts, the narrative is powerful. But the examples are offered not only to

101. Id. at 152.
102. Id. at 150.
103. Id. at 154
105. Id. at 55.
107. The tension between uniformity or “universality” and tailoring or “exceptionalism” is not unique to administrative law. See Peter Lee, The Supreme Assimilation of Patent Law, 114 Mich. L. Rev. 1413, 1418–21 (2016). “Although the law has long prized universalism and broad consistency, these values frequently clash with the sprawling, technical nature of law and a countervailing pull toward tailoring legal domains to their unique subject matter.” Id. at 1421.
prove something about rulemaking and judicial review: they are offered to support a vision of administrative law as a whole. Adjudication is a large and significant category of agency action. Its absence from the standard narrative of administrative law is curious and potentially problematic. Has adjudication simply been overlooked or has it been left out because it does not fit the standard narrative?

This Part investigates the curious case of the missing mode of agency action via a ground-up examination of agency adjudication. It begins by offering a deep dive into one of the many highly tailored adjudicatory schemes that exist throughout the federal government: the newly created inter partes review proceeding through which the PTO considers certain challenges to previously issued patents. The idiosyncratic qualities of this tailored adjudication scheme are drawn out through comparison to the procedures used in other adjudicatory programs. The broad diversity of agency adjudication is thrown into further relief through a discussion of several scholars’ recent efforts to chart the vast and formless world of agency adjudication. These efforts reveal that the commonly used term “informal adjudication” has little consistent or useful meaning. Moreover, a review of established case law reveals that “formal adjudication” is a similarly vacuous concept. The courts have created several different tests for “formal” adjudication. By applying these tests to inter partes proceedings, it emerges that not only are there multiple tests for “formal adjudication,” but those tests yield different results as applied to the same adjudicatory program. Overall, this analysis demonstrates that, in contrast to rulemaking and judicial review, adjudication is a field ruled by a prevailing norm of exceptionalism.

A. A Case Study in Patent Adjudication

To begin with a bit of institutional context, the PTO is the administrative agency that is tasked with carrying out Congress’s delegated constitutional authority “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” Although the patent system is nearly as old as the nation itself, Congress has modified its executive structure on multiple occasions.


In modern times, the PTO has generally exercised authority over initial patentability determinations, while courts have had a significant role in the development of substantive patent law, giving little deference to what has been viewed as a relatively weak agency. This structure has set the PTO apart from other agencies, such that patent law has been recognized as one of the more exceptional fields of administration. Indeed, it was not until 1999 that the Supreme Court held that the APA’s judicial review standards applied to the PTO, bringing the agency more into the mainstream of administrative law.

Congress’s most recent, significant reform of the administrative patent structure was accomplished in 2011 with the AIA’s enactment. The statute created the PTAB and authorized it to preside over several newly created processes for evaluating previously issued patents. One of these processes is inter partes review, which involves adjudicative reexamination of issued patents. The procedures used in inter partes review were jointly designed by Congress and the PTO according to a framework established by the AIA. The AIA provides a detailed procedural structure and expressly directed the PTO to adopt regulations to complete the procedural design. The agency fulfilled this statutory mandate by adopting detailed procedural regulations and issuing guidance designed to assist participants in trials before the PTAB.

As frequently occurs in adjudication, substantive policy concerns were a driving force behind the AIA’s procedural reforms. These concerns included a “widespread belief” that the PTO was issuing a high volume of low-quality patents and that its patentability determinations were highly inconsistent. Some argued that the PTO


112. See, e.g., Stephen Yelderman, Do Patent Challenges Increase Competition?, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1943, 1996 (2016) (“One of the most significant patent reforms in recent years was the expansion of postissuance review procedures in the Patent Office under the 2011 AIA.”).

113. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 6, 316(c) (2012); Cohen, supra note 11, at 1–2. The PTAB is composed of the PTO “Director, the Deputy Director, the Commissioner for Patents, the Commissioner for Trademarks, and the administrative patent judges.” 35 U.S.C. § 6(a).


117. See Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 97, at 1603.
issued so many bad patents because it lacked sufficient resources to efficiently and effectively carry out its responsibilities with respect to patent applications. Before the AIA, bad patents could be invalidated by the PTO through inter partes reexamination or by the federal district courts through patent infringement litigation. But these alternatives were costly and time-consuming. As a consequence, many argued that the system was not capable of weeding out the many bad patents that were issued.

The AIA addressed these concerns principally through procedural reforms designed to facilitate easier, less expensive, and more frequent invalidation and narrowing of issued patents. The statute is relatively lenient in allowing the PTAB to institute an inter partes review proceeding. Once review is instituted, the AIA provides that “the petitioner shall have the burden of providing a proposition of unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence,” a lower standard than the “clear and convincing” standard applied by federal courts in a civil action for patent infringement. To make invalidation less costly and time-consuming, the AIA requires that inter partes review proceedings be completed within one year of their institution. The statute also alleviates some of the burden on the PTO’s examination division by creating the PTAB to preside over the new, post-issuance proceedings, including inter partes review. The process was further streamlined via a statutory provision allowing appeals from the PTAB’s final, written decisions to be taken directly to the U.S.

118. See, e.g., id. at 1607–10 (explaining the harms attributed to the PTO’s issuance of invalid patents and inconsistent patentability decisions).
119. See Cohen, supra note 11, at 2.
121. Scholars have already begun to empirically evaluate how litigants are responding to the AIA’s procedural reforms. See, e.g., Saurabh Vishnubhat et al., Strategic Decision Making in Dual PTAB and District Court Proceedings, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 45, 45, 65–77 (2016).
122. A proceeding may be instituted when the information contained in an inter partes petition and the response thereto “shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2012).
123. Id. § 316(e).
Finally, the AIA “convert[ed] *inter partes* reexamination from an examinational to an adjudicative proceeding,” allowing Congress and the PTO to jointly design a more trial-like proceeding. These aspects of the statute were designed to make the administrative process more attractive and familiar to those who would otherwise litigate patent validity questions in federal district court.

Turning to the institutional components of the statutory design, the AIA constitutes the PTAB and tasks it with responsibility for presiding over the newly created, adjudicatory reexamination proceedings. The PTAB is composed of the PTO Director and Deputy Director, the Commissioners for Patents and Trademarks, and the administrative patent judges. The AIA defines the basic contours of the unique position of “administrative patent judge.” These adjudicating officials are not generalist Administrative Law Judges (ALJs), but rather “shall be persons of competent legal knowledge and scientific ability who are appointed by the Secretary [of Commerce], in consultation with the [PTO] Director.” The statute empowers the Secretary to grandfather in administrative patent judges who were appointed before

127. 35 U.S.C. § 141(c).
130. See sources cited supra note 113.
134. 35 U.S.C. § 6(a).
this standard took effect as part of the AIA’s enactment.¹³⁵ Meanwhile, the PTO Director is authorized to “fix the rate of basic pay for the administrative patent judges . . . at not greater than the rate of basic pay payable for level III of the Executive Schedule under section 5314 of title 5.”¹³⁶ Level III of the Executive Schedule has recently been set at $168,700 per year (as of January 2015)¹³⁷ and, more recently, at $170,400 per year (effective January 2016).¹³⁸ As of 2015, there were 225 administrative patent judges, each earning between $137,200 and $168,700 per year.¹³⁹

In addition to designing the unique identity of the presiding officials, the AIA provides detailed, trial-like procedures for inter partes review. The statute sets filing deadlines, specifies the required contents of a petition requesting inter partes review, and requires the Director to make such petitions publicly available.¹⁴⁰ It grants the patent owner the right to file a preliminary response to a petition¹⁴¹ and also addresses the timing,¹⁴² notice,¹⁴³ and non-appealability¹⁴⁴ of the PTAB’s decision of whether to institute a proceeding. Once inter partes review is instituted, the statute determines the relationship between that proceeding and other proceedings regarding the same patent(s), such as a civil action for infringement filed in federal district court.¹⁴⁵ The statute empowers the PTAB to join subsequent petitioners to an

¹³⁵. See id. § 6(d).
¹³⁶. Id. § 3(b)(6). “The powers and duties of the United States Patent and Trademark Office shall be vested in an Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office (in this title referred to as the ‘Director’).” § 3(a)(1). The Director must be a U.S. citizen, is appointed by the President with the Senate’s advice and consent, and “shall be a person who has a professional background and experience in patent or trademark law.” Id.
¹⁴¹. See id. § 313.
¹⁴². See id. § 314(b).
¹⁴³. See id. § 314(c).
¹⁴⁴. See id. § 314(d).
¹⁴⁵. See id. § 315(a)–(b).
instituted proceeding and to “stay, transfer, consolidate[e], or terminate[e]” an inter partes review proceeding or other related proceeding or matter in the event that multiple administrative proceedings involving the same patent arise. Delving even further into the details, the statute addresses settlement and estoppel based on previous administrative or judicial proceedings, requires PTAB decisions to be in writing, permits appeals, and creates a certification process to confirm the final consequences of a decision for an affected patent. 

Despite these many detailed provisions, the statute expressly contemplates that PTO regulations will further flesh out the inter partes procedural design. It provides that “[t]he Director shall prescribe regulations” to address thirteen enumerated subjects. These administratively determined procedural elements include, for example, rules “prescribing sanctions for abuse of discovery,” “providing either party with the right to an oral hearing as part of the proceeding,” and “setting a time period for requesting joinder.” The PTO Director is also mandated to “establish, by regulation, fees to be paid by the person requesting” inter partes review, “in such amounts as the Director determines to be reasonable, considering the aggregate costs of the review.” In addition to these specific directives, Congress articulated an overarching policy to guide the PTO’s development of its procedural regulations, instructing that “the Director shall consider the effect of any such regulation on the economy, the integrity of the patent system, the efficient administration of the Office, and the ability of the Office to timely complete [inter partes review proceedings].” Together, these various provisions contemplate a significant administrative role in the procedural design of inter partes review.

146. See id. § 315(c).
147. See id. § 315(d).
148. See id. § 317.
149. Id. § 315(e).
150. See id. § 318(a).
151. See id. § 319.
152. See id. § 318(b).
153. Id. §§ 316(a)(1)–(13).
154. Id. § 316(a)(6).
155. Id. § 316(a)(10).
156. Id. § 316(a)(12).
157. Id. § 311(a).
158. Id. § 316(b).
As directed by Congress, the PTO has implemented the AIA by adopting extensive procedural regulations and guidance documents that offer practical advice about how to understand and navigate the new processes. The PTO’s guidance, which is called a “Trial Guide,” has the flavor of court rules. In the various rulemaking and guidance documents, the PTO interprets the AIA as establishing minimum procedural requirements for each of the new post-issuance proceedings. The Trial Guide summarizes these statutory minima and then explains how the PTO has built upon the statute to complete the PTAB’s procedures.

The regulations the PTO adopted to complete the *inter partes* procedural design are detailed and substantially trial-like. Indeed, a lawyer with experience litigating in the federal courts will find much that is familiar in the *inter partes* review process. This similarity to federal practice is manifestly intentional. Following Congress’s lead, the PTO ignored the APA and instead used federal district court patent practice as the touchstone for its procedural design. The approach is apparent even in the smallest details, from the ministerial matters of electronic filing and discovery and the rules permitting licensed

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160. Office Patent Trial Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,756 (Aug. 14, 2012). Although apparently offered as non-binding guidance, the agency used a notice-and-comment process to develop the Trial Guide. The guide was also published in the “Rules and Regulations” section of the *Federal Register*, but it contains no regulatory text and was not codified in the CFR. An interpretative rule or guidance document is exempt from the APA’s notice-and-comment rulemaking requirements. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (2013). The PTO thus voluntarily observed the APA’s rulemaking requirements in this proceeding. Among the many who participated in the proceeding by commenting on the guide was a member of Congress who was a principal author of the AIA. See 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,756.


163. *Id.* at 48,756–58.

164. See *id.* at 48,758–59, 48,762.
counsel to be admitted pro hac vice before the PTAB,\textsuperscript{165} to the provisions contemplating the use of initial conference calls and scheduling orders,\textsuperscript{166} and requiring the submission of mandatory notices and disclosures at the outset of the proceeding,\textsuperscript{167} and in discovery.\textsuperscript{168}

The intention behind the design is evident in the many instances in which the regulations and Trial Practice Guide liberally draw on—and in some instances even embellish upon—the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,\textsuperscript{169} the Federal Rules of Evidence,\textsuperscript{170} Federal Circuit caselaw and rules,\textsuperscript{171} and other federal practice materials and authorities.\textsuperscript{172} Although the statute does not expressly require the PTO to rely on these materials, the agency recognized that “[t]his approach is consistent with the legislative history of the AIA.” Congress’s effort to provide a more efficient and cost-effective alternative to patent litigation in the federal courts is obviously well served by the PTO’s adaptation of judicial litigation procedures in the new administrative context of inter partes review.

There is ample additional evidence in the regulations and guidance to support the proposition that the PTO eschewed the APA in favor of federal litigation as the relevant procedural design baseline. Two

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\item \textsuperscript{165} See id. at 48,758.
\item \textsuperscript{166} See id. at 48,765.
\item \textsuperscript{167} See id. at 48,759–60.
\item \textsuperscript{168} See id. at 48,761–62.
\item \textsuperscript{169} For example, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are used to define what constitutes confidential information. See id. at 48,760 (citing \textit{Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1)(G)}). In addition, “[t]he types of discovery available under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure can be sought by the parties.” \textsl{Id.} at 48,761. The rules offer two options when the parties agree to mandatory initial disclosures: the “first option is modeled after Rule 26(a)(1)(A) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure” while the “second option is more extensive.” \textit{Id.} at 48,762.
\item \textsuperscript{170} See, e.g., \textit{id.} at 48,762 (citing \textit{Fed. R. Evid. 502}); \textit{id.} at 48,763 (citing \textit{Fed. R. Evid. 705}).
\item \textsuperscript{171} For example, the PTO cites Federal Circuit caselaw in its rules governing affidavits. \textit{See id.} at 48,763 (citing \textit{Rohm \& Haas Co. v. Brotech Corp.}, 127 F.3d 1089, 1092 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). For e-Discovery, the PTO has adopted the Federal Circuit’s Model Order for patent cases, “modified to reflect the differences in statutory requirements.” \textit{Id.} at 48,762.
\item \textsuperscript{172} For example, the definition of “real party-in-interest” and the standard for determining who is in “privity” with a party is drawn from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and attendant federal authorities. See \textit{id.} at 48,759 (citing \textit{Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a); Taylor v. Sturgell}, 553 U.S. 880 (2008); \textit{Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice \& Procedure} §§ 4449, 4451 (2d ed. 2011)). The Guide cites Eleventh Circuit caselaw to support its rule imposing page limits in motions, explaining that “[f]ederal courts routinely use page limits to manage motions practice as ‘[e]ffective writing is concise writing.’” 77 \textit{Fed. Reg.} at 48,763 (quoting \textit{Spaziano v. Singletary}, 36 F.3d 1028, 1031 n.2 (11th Cir. 1994)).
\item \textsuperscript{173} \textit{E.g.}, 77 \textit{Fed. Reg.} at 48,759 (speaking directly to the agency’s use of the definition of “privity” used in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
examples will suffice to show the pervasiveness of the approach. First, the *inter partes* review procedures include detailed discovery rules that mirror those applicable in federal court. The rules provide for routine discovery that can proceed without Board authorization, including the production of exhibits referenced in testimony, cross-examination of declarants, and “relevant information that is inconsistent with a position advanced during the proceeding.” Additional discovery may be obtained by the parties’ agreement or with the Board’s authorization when, as contemplated by the statute, it is “necessary in the interest of justice.” The parties may also request that the Board issue a subpoena to compel testimony. Second, *inter partes* review includes a petitions and motions practice before the PTAB that should be familiar to the experienced federal litigator. The PTO’s Trial Practice Guide offers comprehensive guidance to lawyers appearing before the PTAB, using an approach that is informed by the PTO’s pre-AIA experience in reexamination proceedings. In this regard, the agency has blended its administrative experience into the statute’s litigation-based template.

It bears emphasizing something that this discussion suggests: the PTO’s detailed rules reflect a thoughtful, sophisticated approach to procedural design. In some instances, the agency’s reasoning is supplied by the statute. One example is the “interest of justice” standard for additional discovery. In other instances, the reasoning is more generally grounded in the PTO’s efforts to fulfill the AIA’s

174. *Id.* at 48,761. The provisions governing routine discovery provide examples to help define “inconsistent statements” and to address witness expenses and document translation. *See id.* The agency also offers detailed rules and guidance governing the live testimony and cross-examination of witnesses. *See id.* at 48,762; *see also id.* app. D at 48,772.


176. *See Id.* § 24; 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,761; *see also Abbott Labs. v. Cordis Corp.*, 710 F.3d 1318, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (explaining that the AIA “demonstrates that Congress intended for subpoenas under section 24 to be made available in those proceedings in which depositions are relied upon by the PTO”). The APA’s adjudication provisions do not generally authorize ALJs to issue subpoenas, instead requiring that Congress grant the subpoena power to the individual agency via some other statute. *See 5 U.S.C. § 556(c) (2012).*

177. The regulatory procedures address everything from the small details such as page limits to important matters such as evidentiary standards and burdens of proof. *See 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,763.*

178. *See id.* For example, in explaining its rules regarding page limits in petitions, motions, and other documents, the Guide explains that “the Board’s experience is that the presentation of an overwhelming number of issues tends to detract from the argument being presented, and can cause otherwise meritorious issues to be overlooked or misapprehended.” *Id.; see also id.* (explaining that “[t]he Board has found that the practice” of deciding procedural issues during or immediately following a conference call “simplifies a proceeding by focusing the issues early, reducing costs and efforts associated with motions that are beyond the scope of the proceeding”).

mandate to complete the procedural design of inter partes review. For example, the agency’s rules governing accessibility of filings and the protection of confidential information are designed to “strike a balance between the public’s interest in maintaining a complete and understandable file history and the parties’ interest in protecting truly sensitive information.”180 Another example is found in the agency’s statement that “[r]outine discovery places the parties on a level playing field and streamlines the proceeding.”181 Some important aspects of the design are neither compelled nor contemplated by the statute. Particularly noteworthy in this regard is that the PTO has voluntarily adopted a prohibition on ex parte communications.182

B. Patent Adjudication in Doctrinal Perspective

The standard doctrinal framework for understanding agency processes is grounded in the APA, which identifies two core agency processes: “adjudication” and “rulemaking.” “Adjudication” is an “agency process for the formulation of an order,”183 while “rule making” is an “agency process for formulating, amending, or repealing a rule.”184 The APA in turn defines a “rule” as “the whole or a part of an agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy.”185 Adjudication is rendered a catch-all category by virtue of the statute’s definition of “order” as “the whole or part of a final disposition, whether affirmative, negative, injunctive, or declaratory in form, of an agency in a matter other than rule making but including licensing.”186 Both rulemaking and adjudication have “formal” and “informal” variants, depending on which APA procedures apply to the proceedings. Taken together, this statutory framework produces four categories of agency procedure:

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181. Id. at 48,761.
182. See id. at 48,758.
184. Id. § 551(5).
185. Id. § 551(4).
186. Id. § 551(6).
This is how agency procedure has long been conceptualized and how it is taught in law schools today.  

In this straightforward account, formal and informal adjudication are easy categories to define and understand. After all, “formal” adjudication simply refers to adjudicatory hearings that Congress has required by statute to be conducted in accord with the APA’s adjudication provisions, 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556, and 557. “Informal” adjudication includes all other adjudicatory hearings, which are subject to the minimum requirements of Constitutional due process and must comply with § 555 of the APA. The latter is the provision of the APA that addresses “ancillary matters.” It is not an adjudication-specific provision, although it addresses various matters that may arise in adjudication, such as representation for parties compelled to appear before an agency and the use of administrative subpoenas.  

The difficulty is that this framework ignores adjudication’s reigning principle: exceptionalism. This section argues that exceptionalism has profound upstream doctrinal consequences and has rendered the formal-informal dichotomy nearly useless as applied to adjudication. It constructs this argument in three parts, using inter partes review as its focal point. First, it asks whether inter partes review proceedings are “formal” adjudications. This question arises in several different contexts, and administrative law unsurprisingly offers several different, context-specific approaches to answering it. What is surprising is that the APA plays a different role in each approach and, as applied to inter partes review, each approach yields a different result. This outcome suggests that administrative law has failed to produce a traditional, uniform principle defining “formal” adjudication. Second, this section inquires whether the APA has succeeded, as it has in rulemaking, in providing a foundation for the development of uniform, cross-cutting minimum procedures for “informal” adjudication. Once again using inter partes review as a quintessential example, it answers in the negative. Third and finally, this section concludes that the formal-informal dichotomy should be abandoned in

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189. See id. § 555(b).

190. See id. § 555(d).

191. Indeed, “[a]s has often been pointed out, the APA’s definitions of ‘adjudication’ and ‘rulemaking’ are flawed and do not reflect actual practice.” Asimow Report, supra note 8, at 7 (citing Ronald M. Levin, The Case for (Finally) Fixing the APA’s Definition of “Rule,” 56 Admin. L. Rev. 1077 (2004)).
favor of a more realistic (and complex) classification scheme for agency adjudications.

1. “FORMAL” ADJUDICATION

To begin with what might appear to be a straightforward doctrinal question, are inter partes review proceedings “formal” adjudications? In a string of cases, the Federal Circuit has so characterized them, albeit in a conclusory manner with little analysis or explanation. For example, in Belden, Inc. v. Berk-Tek, the first in this series of cases, the Federal Circuit characterized inter partes review as a “formal” adjudicatory proceedings with no analysis or indication as to how it arrived at the conclusion. As in later, similar cases, the court explained that, because inter partes review proceedings are formal adjudication, the PTAB must comply with the APA’s adjudication provisions. In Belden, the court found no violation of the APA, and the discussion is thus properly understood to be dicta. In several other cases, however, the Federal Circuit used the characterization of the proceedings as formal adjudications to support its conclusion that the PTAB violated a party’s rights “to notice of and a fair opportunity to meet the grounds of rejection.” To date, the Federal Circuit has predominately used the formality of inter partes review proceedings to enforce this right to notice and an opportunity to be heard. The court has not considered whether the formality of inter partes review requires the agency to observe other APA requirements or entitles the PTAB’s patentability decisions to judicial deference under Chevron. Nor has it been particularly clear about its methodology for assessing the procedural formality of inter partes review.

192. See, e.g., Novartis AG v. Torrent Pharm. Ltd., 853 F.3d 1316, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2017); In re: Nuvasive, Inc., 841 F.3d 966, 971 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Genzyme Therapeutic Prods., Ltd. v. Biocare Pharm. Inc., 825 F.3d 1360, 1365–66 (Fed. Cir. 2016); SAS Inst., Inc. v. ComplementSoft, LLC, 825 F.3d 1341, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Dell Inc. v. ComplementSoft, LLC, 818 F.3d 1293, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1080 (Fed. Cir. 2015). The Federal Circuit has cited Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 154 (1999), in support of this characterization, see SAS Inst., 825 F.3d at 1351, despite the fact that the case predates the AIA’s creation of inter partes review by more than a decade and does not discuss “formal” adjudication.

193. Belden, 805 F.3d at 1080.

194. See id.

195. Dell, 818 F.3d at 1301; see also In re Nuvasive, Inc., 841 F.3d at 971–72; SAS Inst., 825 F.3d at 1351.

196. In a recent case, Aqua Products, Inc. v. Matal, a divided en banc panel of the Federal Circuit held the agency’s decisions regarding certain burdens of proof under the AIA were reviewable under Chevron. See 872 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
A broader assessment of judicial caselaw, however, reveals that the law offers four distinct approaches to determining whether an agency’s proceedings are “formal” adjudications. Each approach is designed to address the question of adjudicative formality in a particular context, for a particular purpose.

a. The De Novo APA Approach.

The first approach to defining adjudicative formality is grounded in a legal standard established by the APA: the so-called “triggering” provision of the APA’s adjudication provisions. This standard is found in Section 554(a), which provides that the APA’s adjudication provisions “appl[y] . . . in every case of adjudication required by statute to be determined on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing.” As this language suggests, the identification of proceedings that must comply with the APA’s adjudication provisions is a function fulfilled not by the APA itself, but by another statute. Thus, when an agency’s governing statute meets the standard established in Section 554(a), the agency must observe the APA’s so-called “formal” adjudication procedures. In de novo APA cases, courts have explained that Section 554 may apply even if its “magic words” (i.e., hearing “on the record”) are absent from an agency’s governing statute. Rather than taking a mechanical approach, courts engage in a more holistic interpretation of the agency’s statute and history to determine whether “Congress intended to require full agency adherence to all Section 554 components.”

The Supreme Court first applied this de novo APA approach in the 1950 case of Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, which raised the question of whether the APA’s adjudication provisions applied to deportation

199. See Portland Audubon Soc’y v. Endangered Species Comm., 984 F.3d 1534, 1540 (9th Cir. 1993); St. Louis Fuel & Supply Co., Inc. v. FERC, 890 F.2d 446, 448 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
200. See, e.g., St. Louis Fuel, 890 F.2d at 448.
201. Id. at 449; see also Lane v. USDA, 120 F.3d 106, 110 (8th Cir. 1997) (quoting W. Chi. v. United States NRC, 701 F.2d 632, 641 (7th Cir. 1983)). As this discussion suggests, the APA’s discrete procedural requirements for formal rulemaking are used to determine whether the APA applies and are also the consequences of a decision that the APA applies. This dual role appears to have created some confusion in the doctrine.
hearings. The Court began with a lengthy discussion of the APA’s purposes, highlighting the statutory goal of promoting uniformity across agencies and remedying the evil “practice of embodying in one person or agency the duties of prosecutor and judge.” Turning to the case before it, the Court stated that the deportation “hearing [is] a perfect exemplification of the practices so unanimously condemned” by Congress in enacting the APA. In *Wong Yang Sung*, the interpretive question was whether deportation hearings were “required by statute” within the meaning of Section 554(a). The key point of dispute, however, was whether this language reached hearings that, like deportation hearings, are required not by statute, but by the Constitution. The Court answered this question in the affirmative, concluding that Section 554’s “required by statute” language “exempts from that section’s application only those hearings which administrative agencies may hold by regulation, rule, custom, or special dispensation; not those held by compulsion.” The required “compulsion” could be found in a statute (as the APA expressly contemplates) or, as in *Wong Yang Sung*, in a judicial decision holding that the agency is constitutionally required to hold a hearing. It bears noting that this approach seems to accord with the accepted conceptual framework for agency proceedings, suggesting that “formal” adjudications are simply those required be conducted under 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556, and 557.

Today, the de novo APA approach to defining adjudicative formality is applied almost exclusively in the context of disputes arising under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA). EAJA is an administrative fee-shifting statute. It provides that:

> “An agency that conducts an adversary adjudication shall award, to a prevailing party other than the United States, fees and other expenses incurred by that party in connection with that proceeding, unless the adjudicative officer of the agency finds that the position of the agency was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.”

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203. *See id.* at 35.
204. *See id.* at 36–48.
205. *Id.* at 41; *see also id.* at 41–45.
206. *Id.* at 45.
207. *Id.* at 48.
208. *See id.* at 48–51.
209. *Id.* at 50.
210. *See id.*
212. 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1).
The statute further defines “[a]dversary adjudication” to mean “an adjudication under section 554” of the APA “in which the position of the United States is represented by counsel or otherwise.” 213 With respect to the first aspect of this definition, with which this Article is concerned, 214 courts have held that “[a] proceeding is ‘under’ § 554 if it is ‘subject to’ or ‘governed by’ that ‘section.’” 215 Just as the courts do not require Congress to use magic words to require APA adjudication, nor do they require Congress to use “magical passwords” to exempt an agency process from the APA. 216 This aspect of the doctrine gives effect to APA’s admonition that a “[s]ubsequent statute may not be held to supersede or modify [the APA] . . . except to the extent that it does so expressly.” 217 Breaking down Section 554’s requirements, then, courts hold that it applies if an agency is (1) required by statute to conduct (2) an adjudication (3) on the record (4) after an opportunity for a hearing. 218 If these elements are all present, a court generally will find that the Section 554 applies, absent some strong indication of contrary congressional intent.

The EAJA context is unique—and has puzzled some scholars—because the courts accord neither weight nor deference to an agency’s determination of whether its adjudicatory program is conducted “under section 554” of the APA. 219 Indeed, in these cases, the courts typically do not even consider the possibility of giving deference or weight to the agency’s interpretation. 220 This may be because EAJA functions as a waiver of sovereign immunity and the courts therefore interpret it strictly. 221 In addition, the EAJA cases do not directly implicate the question of an agency’s discretion to determine its own procedures because the cases are primarily about the payment of government funds. In this context, the agency’s organic statute is interpreted through the lens of two cross-cutting statutes: EAJA and the APA. One

213. Id. § 504(b)(1)(C).
214. This paper is not concerned with the question of adversarial adjudication, so that aspect of EAJA’s requirement is not analyzed.
215. Aageson Grain & Cattle v. USDA, 500 F.3d 1038, 1042 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129, 135 (1991)); see also, e.g., Lane v. USDA, 120 F.3d 106, 108 (8th Cir. 1997); St. Louis Fuel v. FERC, 890 F.2d 446, 450–51 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
216. Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 310 (1955); Lane, 120 F.3d at 110.
218. See, e.g., Lane 120 F.3d at 108; see also Portland Audubon Soc’y v. Endangered Species Comm., 984 F.2d 1534, 1540 (9th Cir. 1993) (applying this test and holding that the 5 U.S.C. § 557 prohibition on ex parte communications applied to proceeding required by statute conducted “in accordance with sections 556 and 557 of ‘title 5’”).
219. See Asimow Report, supra note 8, at 8.
220. See, e.g., Lane, 120 F.3d at 109.
agency’s resolution of the layered statutory interpretation question it faces (particularly if upheld by judicial decision) may have far-reaching implications for the payment of costs and fees by other agencies. As to this statutory overlay, the traditional justifications for judicial deference to an agency’s characterization of its own procedures do not apply. No individual agency has special authority or expertise to interpret the cross-cutting statutes. In addition, the Supreme Court has “h[e]ld that the meaning of ‘an adjudication under section 554’ is unambiguous in the context of EAJA.” This suggests that EAJA raises a step-one question that a court should answer de novo according to the two-step deference framework established by Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. The courts appear to carry the rigidity of the EAJA’s unambiguous language throughout the analysis, treating Section 554(a) as similarly unambiguous.

Courts applying the de novo APA approach have held that an agency’s hearings are not subject to Section 554 if there is clear evidence that Congress intended to displace the APA’s formal adjudication provisions with a comprehensive adjudication procedure tailored to meet the unique needs of the agency and its statutory mandate. The Supreme Court’s decisions in Marcello v. Bonds and Ardestani v. I.N.S., involving deportation proceedings under the Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA), are key examples. Six months after the Supreme Court’s decision in Wong Yang Sung, Congress responded by including in the Supplemental Appropriation Act of 1951 a provision stating that deportation hearings “should not be governed by” the APA’s adjudication provisions. The issue in Marcello was “whether the Congress reversed itself in the 1952 Immigration Act,” which prescribed detailed procedures for deportation hearings, but contained no express exemption from the APA’s requirements. To resolve this issue, the Court began by comparing the Immigration Act’s procedures to those established by the APA. The Court explained:

From the Immigration Act’s detailed coverage of the same subject matter dealt with in the hearing provisions of the

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222. Id. at 135.
224. E.g., Ardestani, 502 U.S. at 135 (“We hold that the meaning of “an adjudication under section 554” is unambiguous in the context of the EAJA.”).
226. See supra notes 201–09 and accompanying text.
229. See id. at 307–08.
[APA], it is clear that Congress was setting up a specialized administrative procedure applicable to deportation hearings, drawing liberally on the analogous provisions of the [APA] and adapting them to the particular needs of the deportation process.\footnote{Id. at 308.}

Furthermore, the Immigration Act contained a provision stating that “‘[t]he procedure [herein prescribed] shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for determining the deportability of an alien under this section.’”\footnote{Id. at 309 (alteration in original).} Based on the legislative history of the Act, the Court interpreted this provision as a “clear and categorical” exclusion of the APA’s applicability.\footnote{Id. at 309–10.} This was sufficient to overcome the APA’s requirement that “modifications [of the APA] must be express.”\footnote{Id. at 310; see also 5 U.S.C. § 559 (2018).}

A key example of adjudications that are “formal” from the de novo APA perspective are those conducted by the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s National Appeal Division (NAD).\footnote{See Five Points Rd. Joint Venture v. Johanns, 542 F.3d 1121 (7th Cir. 2008); Aageson Grain & Cattle v. USDA, 500 F.3d 1038 (9th Cir. 2007); Lane v. USDA, 120 F.3d 106 (8th Cir. 1997).} In \textit{Lane v. U.S. Department of Agriculture}, the Eighth Circuit carefully examined the NAD statutes, which establish detailed adjudicative procedures.\footnote{Lane, 120 F.3d at 108–10.} The USDA argued that, like deportation hearings, the NAD “statutes are a separate, comprehensive statutory scheme that contain express procedures for conducting hearings.”\footnote{Id. at 109.} For this reason, the agency argued, the proceedings are not conducted “under” Section 554 of the APA.\footnote{Id. at 110.} The Eighth Circuit rejected this argument because the NAD statutes do not: (1) contain any provision disclaiming the APA’s applicability; (2) conflict with any of the APA’s provisions; and (3) in one instance even cross-reference the APA.\footnote{Id. at 109; see also id. (“There is not an extensive adaptation of the APA, only minor variations.”).} Although the NAD statutes contain some “minor variations”\footnote{Id. at 109.} on the APA’s adjudication provisions, those variations deal primarily with subjects the APA does not address.\footnote{Id. at 109.} In addition, the court explained, the legislative history of the NAD statutes contains no suggestion that Congress intended to exempt the agency from the APA.\footnote{See id. at 110.}
Inter partes review proceedings are not “formal” proceedings under the de novo APA approach because the AIA conveys a clear congressional intent to create a specialized adjudicatory procedure tailored to suit the specific needs of patent law.\(^{242}\) The AIA’s text contains no indication that Congress contemplated that the PTAB would conduct inter partes review proceedings according to the APA’s formal adjudication provisions.\(^{243}\) Nor does the legislative history contain any such indication.\(^{244}\) In the deportation context, the Court concluded that Congress had modified the APA model of adjudication to suit the needs of deportation, and this was sufficient to support the conclusion that the APA did not apply.\(^{245}\) Although one purpose of the AIA was to transform administrative patent reexamination into an adjudicative proceeding, there is no indication that Congress defined or understood “adjudicative” from an APA perspective.\(^{246}\) Indeed, the statute and legislative history convey the clear impression that Congress viewed federal district court litigation—and not APA formal adjudication—as the relevant procedural baseline. In contrast to the USDA cases discussed above, there is no mention of the APA in the AIA or its legislative history. This makes sense if one considers that, as previously explained, Congress’s intent in the AIA was to create a more efficient, less expensive alternative to federal court litigation. The AIA’s detailed procedural provisions appear to tailor federal district court proceedings to suit the administrative patent adjudication context. And the PTO’s procedural regulations suggest that this is how the agency interpreted Congress’s mandate.\(^{247}\)

That the AIA’s inter partes review procedures omit certain key components of APA formal adjudications is further evidence that Congress did not take the APA as the relevant procedural baseline, let alone intend to require the PTAB to observe APA procedures. Two omissions from the AIA are especially notable. First, the AIA constitutes the PTAB and charges it with the responsibility for presiding


\(^{243}\) See supra Part II.A.


\(^{245}\) See Marcello, 349 U.S. at 308–10.

\(^{246}\) See Matal, Part II, supra note 244, at 620.

\(^{247}\) See supra at Part I.B.; cf. Matal, Part II, supra note 244, at 620 (explaining that the bill “gives the [PTO] discretion in prescribing regulations governing the new proceeding” and “[t]he [PTO] has made clear that it will use this discretion to convert inter partes into an adjudicative proceeding,” in a manner consistent with the bill’s intended effect” (quoting 157 CONG. REC. S1375 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl))).
over *inter partes* review proceedings. They accordingly do not share in the independence and protection that the APA offers to ALJs.\(^{250}\) This is a central feature of the APA’s adjudicatory design.\(^{251}\) Its absence from the AIA is notable, albeit not conclusive. This is because the APA itself reserves the possibility of alternative structures for adjudicators.\(^{252}\) The AIA’s second omission is perhaps more glaring: the statute contains no prohibition on ex parte communications. The APA’s prohibition on ex parte communications is a significant feature of formal adjudication.\(^{253}\) Indeed, the courts have viewed the requirement as so fundamental that they have extended it to apply in certain quasi-adjudicatory informal rulemaking proceedings.\(^{254}\) It is difficult to imagine how the matter of ex parte communications could have been wholly omitted from the AIA if Congress was tailoring the APA’s model of adjudication to suit the needs of administrative patent adjudication.

The conclusion that *inter partes* review proceedings are informal adjudications accords with the reality that, under the de novo APA approach, not all trial-like proceedings are formal adjudications.\(^{255}\) The APA’s formal procedures are often described as “trial-like.”\(^{256}\) But, as the Supreme Court has explained, “Section 554 does not merely
describe a type of agency proceeding; it also prescribes that certain procedures be followed in the adjudications that fall within its scope.  

Thus, there are agencies that adjudicate outside of the APA, i.e., informally, using procedures consistent with the APA’s formal adjudication provisions. The mere similarity between these agencies’ procedures and the procedures required under the APA does not make these adjudications formal in the de novo APA sense. In determining adjudicative formality under the de novo APA approach, the key question is whether Congress intended to require the agency to conduct its hearings under Sections 554, 556, and 557 of the APA. Or to put it another way: proceedings are formal from this perspective if the APA’s adjudication provisions are the source of applicable procedural requirements.

A final, important point flows from this analysis: for purposes of determining adjudicative formality under the de novo APA approach, only the agency’s statute matters. The agency’s procedural regulations are irrelevant. If there are components of the APA’s formal adjudication requirements that are missing in the agency’s statute, but are required by the agency’s regulations, the combined procedural reality cannot be characterized as formal under the de novo APA approach. In inter partes review, the PTO has by regulation imposed the ex parte prohibition that the AIA conspicuously lacks. This regulation is not cognizable under the de novo APA approach to defining adjudicative formality. It may be relevant, however, from the agency procedural discretion perspective, which is discussed in the next section.

b. The Compelled Formality Approach.

The second approach to determining adjudicative formality is also grounded in the APA, but the analysis is softened significantly by the familiar overlay of agency procedural discretion. In the de novo APA approach discussed above, Section 554 is viewed through the lens of EAJA, which is strictly construed as a waiver of sovereign immunity and is viewed by the courts as unambiguous. This lends significant rigidity to the analysis of, first, Section 554 and, derivatively, the agency’s governing statute. The compelled formality approach does not involve EAJA, and it is focused directly on the agency’s adjudicatory procedures. Here, the question is whether the agency is required by statute to conduct formal adjudication under the APA, even if it would prefer to adjudicate informally. In this analysis, Section 554(a) is not

258. See EEOC REPORT, supra note 133, at 5; see also supra Part II.B.
259. See supra Part II.B.1.a.
viewed as rigid or unambiguous, and the agency’s traditional authority to interpret its governing statute and own regulations is generally respected. In most instances, as a consequence, the agency’s determination of the formality (or, more commonly, informality) of its adjudicatory procedures is ordinarily given effect.

The compelled formality approach applies when, outside of the EAJA context, an agency is called upon to determine whether it is required by statute to conduct formal adjudication under the APA. This need may arise because an agency is drafting procedural regulations to govern a new adjudicatory program or when a party appearing before the agency asserts that it has been denied some procedure required by the APA. The available judicial precedent predominately involves this latter variant.

The range of circumstances in which an agency will be compelled to conduct formal adjudication is narrow. As discussed previously, the APA states that its formal adjudication provisions apply (with certain limited exceptions) to any “adjudication required by statute to be determined on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing.” Under the compelled formality approach, courts do not force an agency to adjudicate under the APA unless the agency’s governing statute says that the APA applies or requires a hearing “on the record.” Although courts have disclaimed the necessity of these “magic words,” they have required a very clear statement of congressional intent to require formal adjudication. Indeed, notwithstanding the judiciary’s protestations, the commentators have described the caselaw as taking a “magic words” approach. When an agency’s statute does

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261. See EEOC REPORT, supra note 133, at 6.


264. See § 554(a); Dominion Energy Brayton Point, LLC v. Johnson, 443 F.3d 12, 14–18 (1st Cir. 2006); Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. EPA, 873 F.2d 1477, 1482 (D.C. Cir. 1989); see also Asimow Report, supra note 8, at 7 (“The prevailing view is that the APA applies only if the statute says it applies or the statute explicitly calls for a hearing ’on the record.’”).

265. E.g., City of W. Chi. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 701 F.2d 632, 641 (7th Cir. 1983) (“Although Section 554 specifies that the governing statute must satisfy the ‘on the record’ requirement, those three magic words need not appear for a court to determine that formal hearings are required.”).

266. Id.

267. See Asimow Report, supra note 8, at 7; William S. Jordan III, Chevron and Hearing Rights: An Unintended Combination, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 249 (2009). For a time, the First Circuit held that Congress intended the APA to apply to all adjudicatory hearings involving important public policy issues. See Seacoast Anti-
not include the phrase “on the record,” courts defer to the agency’s determination of whether its statute requires formal adjudication. Although this approach has been criticized, it is consistent with the fundamental administrative law principle that an agency has primary authority and expertise to interpret the statute it is charged with administering.

Under the compelled formality approach, *inter partes* review proceedings are not formal adjudications. That is, a court would not compel the PTO to conduct *inter partes* review proceedings under the APA’s adjudication provisions. As previously noted, the AIA does not reference the APA’s adjudication provisions or contain the magic words hearing “on the record.” For the reasons set forth in the previous section, the best argument is that Congress did not intend for the PTAB to conduct *inter partes* review according to the APA’s formal adjudication provisions. That argument only strengthens when it is evaluated through the lens of agency procedural discretion. If the PTO were to conclude that *inter partes* review proceedings are not subject to the APA, a court would likely uphold the agency’s determination.

c. The Voluntary Formality Approach

The third approach to defining adjudicative formality involves the flip side of the compelled formality approach. It is applied in the relatively rare instances in which an agency that is not required by statute to formally adjudicate nonetheless chooses to voluntarily comply with the APA’s adjudication provisions. One difficulty in discussing this approach is that there is little caselaw available to define it. Agencies rarely elect to adjudicate formally. And when an agency does elect to provide more procedure than is required by statute, that decision is unlikely to be challenged in court. For one thing, parties appearing before an agency are unlikely to complain that they have been afforded *too much* procedure. Moreover, it is well-established that “[a]gencies are free to grant additional procedural rights in the exercise of their discretion.”

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268. *Pollution League v. Costle*, 572 F.2d 872, 876–77 (1st Cir. 1978). It has more recently abandoned that approach, see *Dominion Energy*, 443 F.3d at 17, although there remains a Ninth Circuit case that can be read to embrace a similar principle, see *Marathon Oil Co. v. EPA*, 564 F.2d 1253, 1263 (1977); Asimow Report, supra note 8, at 8 & n.24.

269. *Id.* at 541–42.

270. See discussion supra Section II.A.

271. See EEOC REPORT, supra note 133, at 6.

One reason an agency might voluntarily observe the APA’s adjudication provisions would be to facilitate the appointment of ALJs to preside over the hearings in lieu of non-ALJ adjudicators.\textsuperscript{273} Full compliance with the APA’s requirements is necessary in this circumstance because the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), which is charged with statutory responsibility for the selection, certification, and tenure of ALJs, has taken the position that ALJs can only be appointed to preside over hearings that are required by statute or regulation to be conducted in a manner consistent with the APA’s formal adjudication provisions.\textsuperscript{274} For purposes of this analysis, then, procedural elements in the agency’s statute \textit{and} regulations may be considered.\textsuperscript{275} Moreover, all that is required is descriptive parity between \textit{inter partes} review and APA adjudication—the more stringent requirement of demonstrating that the APA is the source of the procedural rules does not apply.

The PTO \textit{might} be able to classify \textit{inter partes} review as formal adjudication under the voluntary formality approach. There are at least two reasons for uncertainty here. First, as explained above, the strongest argument is that Congress did not intend for \textit{inter partes} review to be conducted under the APA’s adjudication provisions. This conclusion is supported by Congress’s apparent inattention to the APA and intent to tailor district court litigation for the administrative context by enacting the AIA. But the statute is not conclusive on this point. Whether the AIA requires adjudication under the APA is, rather, contestable and contested.\textsuperscript{276} This is a source of ambiguity, which could convey more flexibility on the agency. Second, whether the PTO could

\textsuperscript{273.} See generally EEOC REPORT, supra note 133 (providing EEOC with guidance as to the legal, policy, and financial considerations relevant to its determination of whether to appoint ALJs in lieu of non-ALJ adjudicators in the Federal Sector Hearings Program).

\textsuperscript{274.} See 5 U.S.C. §§ 1104(a), 1302(a), 1305, 3105, 3304, 3323(b), 3344, 4301(2)(D), 5372, and 7521 (2018); see generally Vanessa K. Burrows, Cong. Research Serv., RL34607, Administrative Law Judges: An Overview (2010) (describing the history, development, and process of hiring, appointing, evaluating, and removing federal ALJs); Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Federal Administrative Law Judges: A Focus on Our Invisible Judiciary, 33 ADMIN. L. REV. 109, 111–12 (1981) (discussing OPM’s procedures and responsibilities regarding the selection and appointment of ALJs). A recent Executive Order excepting ALJs from the competitive service has reduced OPM’s role in ALJ selection, but may allow the agency to continue to operate as a gatekeeper in the manner suggested here. See Executive Order 13843, Excepting Administrative Law Judges from the Competitive Service, 83 Fed. Reg. 32755 (July 13, 2018).

\textsuperscript{275.} See, e.g., EEOC REPORT, supra note 133, at 11–12 (discussing similar past efforts by the Social Security Administration and the Department of Labor).

\textsuperscript{276.} See, e.g., Wasserman, supra note 13, at 1981–83; see also supra at Part II.C. (discussing the Federal Circuit’s caselaw summarily characterizing \textit{inter partes} review as formal adjudication).
classify *inter partes* review as formal adjudication might depend on the purpose and context of the agency’s determination. If the agency offered the characterization to persuade a court to grant the agency’s substantive decisions *Chevron* deference, the court might be more skeptical. More to the point, if securing judicial deference was the agency’s goal, the voluntary formality approach would not apply. This is discussed further below. On the other hand, if the PTO’s goal was to support a procedural design choice that offered greater procedural protection in *inter partes* review proceedings, a court (or another agency, such as OPM) would be more likely to uphold that exercise of the agency’s procedural discretion.

Under OPM’s formulation of the voluntary formality approach, the PTO might characterize *inter partes* review as formal adjudication. Under this formulation of the approach, the PTO would need only show that the applicable procedures are consistent with the requirements of 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556, and 557. Having adopted by regulation the ex parte prohibition that is missing from the AIA, the PTO might demonstrate descriptive parity with the APA’s adjudication provisions. The wrinkle here is that Congress affirmatively chose in the AIA not to require the appointment of ALJs and instead created the alternative position of the administrative patent judge. It thus seems unlikely, as a practical matter, that PTO would ever seek to appoint ALJs. Indeed, the AIA’s administrative patent judge provisions could be read to deprive the PTO of the discretion that an adjudicating agency might ordinarily have to appoint ALJs.

As noted above, if the PTO sought to characterize *inter partes* review as “formal” adjudication for purposes of securing judicial deference to the substance of its decisions, yet another standard would apply. The next section turns to this fourth and final approach to defining adjudicative formality.

d. The Judicial Deference Approach

The fourth and final approach to determining adjudicative formality is derived from the Supreme Court’s precedents governing judicial deference to administrative decisions. One might reasonably object that this approach to defining adjudicative formality fits uneasily

277. For reasons discussed in the next section, however, it would not be necessary for the agency to prove that Congress intended AIA proceedings to be formal adjudications under the APA in order to make a compelling case for *Chevron* deference. See infra Section II.B.2.


280. See *EEOC REPORT*, supra note 133, at 23–32.
in a discussion focused on the nuts and bolts of agency procedure. After all, the judicial deference approach is derived from caselaw addressing the question of what deference, if any, the courts should give to an agency’s substantive interpretive and policymaking decisions. Here, the characterization of an agency’s procedure as “formal” or “informal” is just one component of that larger inquiry. The analysis that follows seeks to carve out the procedural component of the deference analysis for independent consideration. This will necessarily be dissatisfying to those interested in the deference analysis itself or in the broader question (which is much in dispute) of whether the courts should defer to the substance of the PTO’s patentability determinations.

In the judicial deference approach, the APA’s adjudication provisions can be relevant to characterizing the agency’s procedures, but those provisions do not drive the analysis. Recall that in the de novo APA context, Section 554 of the APA dominates and is given special rigidity by EAJA’s unambiguous waiver of sovereign immunity. In the compelled and voluntary formality approaches, the APA is still an overriding concern, but the focus both expands and softens. It expands beyond the language Section 554(a) to include a more detailed comparison between an agency’s own procedures and the minimum procedural requirements established in Sections 556 and 557. The analysis also softens by virtue of an overlay of the traditional administrative law principles recognizing an agency’s discretion to interpret its own statute and design its own procedures. In the fourth approach to adjudicative formality, these traditional principles of administrative discretion take center stage. Although the APA’s adjudication provisions can be relevant, they do not have an essential role in the analysis. This is because the approach is not directly concerned with the agency’s procedures at all. Instead, it is focused on discerning the scope of congressional delegation to the agency and is concerned with determining what, if any, deference a court should give to the agency’s substantive decisions on judicial review of agency action.

For purposes of determining the scope of judicial deference to agency action, the central question is whether “Congress intended [the agency’s decision] to carry the force of law.” This concept of “force of law” is slippery, and the Supreme Court has not provided a

282. See supra Part II.B.1.b-c.
283. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 221 (2001); see also id. at 226-27 (“We hold that administrative implementation of a particular statutory provision qualifies for Chevron deference when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.”).
definitive articulation of its meaning. The seminal cases on judicial deference, however, offer some guidance. In *Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.*, the Supreme Court held that an agency’s decision is entitled to deference when it reflects a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute that explicitly or implicitly delegates interpretive authority to the agency. Later, in *United States v. Mead Corp.*, the Court provided guidance on how to identify a “delegation of specific interpretive authority” that warrants the application of *Chevron* deference. The delegation may be either express or implicit. In addition, the “[d]elegation ... may be shown in a variety of ways, as by an agency’s power to engage in adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking, or by some other indication of a comparable congressional intent.” This language suggests the possibility of establishing a congressional delegation by reference to the procedural provisions of the agency’s governing statute. Because the focus, however, is on Congress’s intent to delegate interpretive authority to the agency, procedural elements found only in the agency’s regulations are not relevant.

Although “formal” adjudication in the sense of adjudication statutorily subjected to the APA’s adjudication provisions would presumably qualify, the *Mead* court’s definition of procedural “formality” appears to sweep more broadly. The Court elaborated:

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284. *See, e.g.*, Hickman, *Force of Law*, *supra* note 81, at 485 (“Having pronounced the force of law as the touchstone for *Chevron* deference, however, the Court has again declined to specify precisely what it means by that concept.”); Rubenstein & Gulasekaram, *supra* note 98, at 606 n.122 (“The confusion `[regarding the meaning of ‘force of law’] is partly of the Court’s own making.”); Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard W. Murphy, *Eight Things Americans Can’t Figure Out About Controlling Administrative Power*, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 5, 23 (2009) (stating that “force of law” is “one of the more pernicious phrases in American administrative law”).

285. *See* *Chevron*, 467 U.S. at 843–44.


287. *Mead* suggests that the requisite delegation may be found in provisions of an agency’s statute that addressed substantive and not procedural matters. The Court explained implicit delegation may “be apparent from the agency’s generally conferred authority and other statutory circumstances that Congress would expect the agency to be able to speak with the force of law when addressing ambiguity in the statute or fills in a space in the enacted law, even one about which Congress did not actually have an intent as to a particular result.” *Mead*, 533 U.S. at 219. This paper, however, is concerned with how *Mead* defines procedural formality, particular in connection with administrative adjudication. Thus, it does not explore the possibilities for using substantive statutory provisions to build a persuasive case for judicial deference under the standard articulated in *Mead*.

288. *Id.* at 229; *Chevron*, 467 U.S. at 844.


290. In contrast, the de novo APA and agency procedural discretion approaches discussed above in Parts II.A. and II.B., respectively, define “formal” as “conducted under the APA’s adjudication provisions,” *see* 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556, and
We have recognized a very good indicator of delegation meriting *Chevron* treatment in express congressional authorizations to engage in the process of rulemaking or adjudication that produces regulations or rulings for which deference is claimed. It is fair to assume generally that Congress contemplates administrative action with the effect of law when it provides for a *relatively formal administrative procedure* tending to foster the fairness and deliberation that should underlie a pronouncement of such force. Thus, the overwhelming number of our cases applying *Chevron* deference have reviewed the fruits of notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication.\(^{291}\)

This passage thus defines “formality” for judicial deference purposes as a “relatively formal administrative procedure tending to foster the fairness and deliberation that should underlie a pronouncement of [legal] force.”\(^{292}\) The Court states explicitly that notice-and-comment rulemaking—that is, *informal* rulemaking under the APA—meets this definition of formality.\(^{293}\) And it also suggests that “formal adjudication,” which presumably means “adjudication under the APA,” qualifies. In context, however, it does not appear that the Court means to suggest that APA adjudication is the only sufficiently formal kind of adjudication under the *Mead* standard.\(^{294}\) This reading is confirmed by the Court’s identification of certain *informal* adjudications as examples of proceedings sufficiently “formal” to merit judicial deference.\(^{295}\)

There would appear to be at least three possible ways to establish that an adjudicatory process satisfies the *Mead* standard of formality. First, if Congress has by statute required the agency to adjudicate under the APA, that would surely suffice.\(^{296}\) Thus, if a proceeding is formal

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\(^{291}\) *Mead*, 533 U.S. at 229–30 (emphasis added) (internal citation and footnote omitted).

\(^{292}\) *Id.* at 230.

\(^{293}\) *See* 5 U.S.C. § 553.

\(^{294}\) The Court’s use of the term “formal adjudication,” which traditionally means “adjudication under the APA,” is confusing because it appears here at the end of a paragraph in which the court is offering a different, more amorphous definition of formality. This is the kind of confusion that has led some academics to reject the formal-informal dichotomy in adjudication altogether. *See*, e.g., Asimow Report, *supra* note 8, at 3.

\(^{295}\) *See Mead*, 533 U.S. at 230–31.

\(^{296}\) *E.g.*, Wasserman, *supra* note 13, at 1969 (“The Mead Court further clarified that a congressional delegation of formal adjudicatory or rule-making power is generally sufficient to infer—more specifically, “a very good indicator” of—
from the de novo APA perspective, it is also formal from the judicial deference perspective. For the reasons identified above, *inter partes* review does not qualify on this basis. Second, a proceeding may be “formal” under *Mead* if Congress created a tailored adjudicatory process that is substantially similar to APA adjudication. In this formulation, the APA need not be the source of procedural law, but the statute offers a descriptive benchmark for judging adjudicative formality. This would explain, for example, the Supreme Court’s identification of deportation hearings as an example of adjudicatory proceedings that meet *Mead*’s definition of formality. 297 For the reasons set forth at the end of Section B, above, *inter partes* review proceedings may well meet *Mead*’s definition of adjudicative formality because the AIA establishes a procedure that is substantially similar to that established by the APA’s adjudication provisions. 298 Third, even in the absence of substantial similarity to the APA’s adjudication provisions, a procedure could conceivably still be characterized as a “relatively formal administrative procedure tending to foster the fairness and deliberation that should underlie a pronouncement of [legal] force.” 299 Although this standard is somewhat amorphous, the AIA’s substantially “trial-like” or “court-like” procedures would appear to meet it. 300

e. Summary and Conclusion

In summary, there are not only four distinct approaches to determining whether an adjudicatory process is “formal,” but as applied to *inter partes* review, each approach yields a different answer. The chart below summarizes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Approach</th>
<th>Question</th>
<th>APA’s Role</th>
<th>PTAB “Formal”?</th>
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<tr>
<td>De Novo</td>
<td>EAJA: “Adjudication”</td>
<td>Source of Law</td>
<td>No</td>
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297. See *Mead*, 533 U.S. at 230 n.12 (citing *INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre*, 526 U.S. 415, 423–25 (1999)). As explained in Section A of this Part, deportation hearings are not “formal” from the de novo APA perspective. See *supra* Section I.a. And yet the Supreme Court has characterized them as “formal” from the judicial deference perspective. See *supra* note 291 and accompanying text.

298. In this analysis, substantial similarity should be sufficient. Thus, the AIA’s failure to prohibit ex parte communications is not fatal to the analysis. Again, because the lodestar of this analysis is Congress’s intent to authorize the agency to speak with the force of law, the PTO’s imposition of an ex parte restriction by regulation is irrelevant.


300. See Benjamin & Rai, *supra* note 13, at 1582–90. A future draft of this article will offer a much more detailed analysis.
From the rigid, APA-centric perspective that modern courts apply only in EAJA cases, *inter partes* review proceedings are not formal adjudications. From the more flexible, APA-centric perspectives that apply to agency procedural design decisions, *inter partes* review proceedings could be characterized as either informal or formal, depending on what institution is making the decision (court vs. agency) and for what purpose. Finally, from the judicial deference perspective, *inter partes* review proceedings are formal adjudications because the AIA creates a “relatively formal administrative procedure tending to foster the fairness and deliberation that should underlie a pronouncement of [legal] force.”

This analysis suggests that—contrary to the conventional wisdom—administrative law has not generated a uniform, stable norm governing the seemingly simple question of whether an adjudicative process is “formal.”

2. “INFORMAL” ADJUDICATION

The conventional wisdom further holds that, if an adjudicatory process like *inter partes* review is not “formal,” then it must be “informal.” Is there a stable norm to be found in this second alternative? Is *inter partes* review informal adjudication and, if so, does that classification entail a clear set of minimum procedural elements?

The place to start, perhaps, is Section 555 of the APA, which is often identified as the provision that specifies the minimum procedural requirements for informal adjudication. One might interpret this to

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302. See supra Part B.
mean that Section 555 is the adjudicatory analog of Section 553, which establishes minimum procedures for informal rulemaking. But Section 555 is no such thing. In fact, the provision is not specifically devoted to adjudication at all. Rather, it addresses various “ancillary matters” that may be relevant in a variety of agency proceedings, including informal adjudications. These matters include the representation of persons compelled to appear before administrative agencies, certain due process rights in connection with agency investigations, limitations on the issuance of agency subpoenas, and requirements for agencies to provide notice and an explanation when denying certain requests for agency action. This scattershot of issues that may or may not arise in adjudication bears little resemblance to Section 553’s brief but focused articulation of the notice-and-comment rulemaking process. In additional contrast to Section 553, Section 555 has not provided an effective substrate for the judicial development of caselaw fleshing out minimum procedural requirements for informal adjudication. There is no set of uniform norms defining “informal” adjudication to be found in the APA.

Perhaps recognizing the APA’s lack of content, some have instead identified the Constitution’s Due Process Clause as the principal source of minimum procedures for informal adjudication. And to be sure, the Due Process clause does establish the absolute floor. These minimum constraints are modest, for several reasons. First, the Due
Process Clause does not reach all adjudications because it applies only when an agency’s action threatens a deprivation of life, liberty, or property.313 Second, even when the clause applies, the Supreme Court has established a highly flexible, context-specific standard for determining the minimum procedures that are required by due process.314 The courts have resisted a detailed articulation of the minimum procedures required by due process. Third, the highly flexible, context-specific nature of the due process analysis has resulted in a substantial role for the agencies themselves in designing procedures to satisfy the Constitution’s minimums.315 As a practical matter, there are many instances in which the agency may be the first and last institution to address this aspect of the procedural design. Even when the courts review the agencies’ choices, they often do so in a deferential posture. There may be good reasons for this judicial deference and the agency procedural discretion it facilitates.316 But the important point for purposes of this article is that, like Section 555 of the APA, the Due Process Clause has not provided much foundation for the judicial articulation of minimum procedures that would apply in—and define—informal adjudication. If inter partes review is properly classified as informal adjudication, the doctrinal perspective offers little in the way of clear, uniform norms or procedures that might lend that classification some useful meaning.

C. Patent Adjudication in Systemic Perspective

As the discussion above suggests, administrative law doctrine supplies little in the way of minimum procedures for agency adjudication or otherwise supply stable, uniform norms to define “formal” and “informal” adjudication. Thus, if one seeks to understand inter partes review—or any other adjudicatory program that is conducted outside the APA’s adjudication provisions317—an approach to doing so must be found elsewhere. Perhaps an obvious alternative when doctrinal analysis fails is to shift towards a comparative analysis. In the context of this Article, this boils down to examining how inter partes review compares to the many other adjudicatory programs that exist throughout the federal government. Potentially instructive comparison

313.  See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
315.  As noted above, this is an area of significant administrative constitutionalism. See supra Part I.A.
316.  See Adrian Vermeule, Deference and Due Process, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 1890, 1919 (2016).
could occur along two dimensions. First, at the level of design philosophy, by inquiring whether there are uniform, consistently applied principles that Congress and administrative agencies observe when designing adjudicatory programs. Obviously, this inquiry will be influenced by the doctrinal landscape discussed above, but it is more broadly concerned with identifying any common, system-wide principles of procedural design in adjudication. If there are such principles, did Congress and the PTO observe them in designing *inter partes* review? Second, at a more granular level, a comparative analysis could assess whether there is a core set of procedural elements that are common across non-APA adjudications. And, if so, does *inter partes* review include these common procedural elements or does it rather deviate from or embellish upon them?

At the level of design philosophy, the case study above paints a portrait of *inter partes* review as a heavily tailored process designed to suit the unique needs of patent adjudication and modeled off of judicial, rather than administrative, processes. The AIA and its implementing procedural regulations are exceptionally detailed, designed to accommodate the substantive needs of U.S. patent policy. Although the AIA’s legislative history indicates that Congress intended to “convert[] *inter partes* reexamination from an examinational to an adjudicative proceeding,” neither the legislative history nor the statutory text suggests that Congress understood “adjudicative” from an administrative perspective. To the contrary, the process created by statute and fleshed out through the PTO’s regulations appears to be “adjudicative” in a judicial sense. As recounted above, judicial procedures, practices, and concepts are pervasive throughout the statute, regulations, and guidance. The APA or other administrative conceptions of adjudication appear to be almost entirely absent from the procedural design. This account suggests that *inter partes* review is exceptional, in at least two sense. First, it is exceptional as that term is used by administrative law scholars because it is a process not designed in accord with or otherwise subject to traditional principles of administrative law. Second, *inter partes* review is exceptional in a more colloquial sense, because it is a highly tailored and unique process designed to suit the needs of patent law and policy.

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319. See *supra* Part II.A.

320. One exception, arguably, is the PTO’s adoption of a prohibition on ex parte communications, which is a hallmark of the APA’s adjudication provisions, although judicial practices also embrace such a prohibition. See Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,756, 48,758 (Aug. 14, 2012) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 42).
The exceptional nature of the *inter partes* procedural design, however, is common across many federal adjudicatory programs. Indeed, the ink was still wet on the APA when Congress first began to deviate from the statute’s procedural defaults, creating specialized adjudicatory procedures to meet the needs of individual agencies and regulatory programs. As recounted above, the Supreme Court’s decision in *Wong Yang Sung*, holding that deportation proceedings were subject to the APA’s adjudication provisions, was decided in 1950, a mere four years after the APA’s enactment. Congress acted swiftly to reverse this decision, making clear its intent that deportation proceedings should not be subject to the APA’s default rules for administrative adjudication. Unlike in the rulemaking context, this example of congressional deviation from the APA was not a one-off event. Although the courts continued for some time to apply *Wong Yang Sung*’s broader APA holding to other adjudication programs, they too eventually abandoned it in favor of the now-familiar deferential judicial doctrines. This judicial turn facilitated administrative agency avoidance of the APA’s adjudication provisions in favor of tailor-made procedures adopted via regulations, guidance, or unpublished practice. On a system-wide basis, the consequence of these congressional, judicial, and administrative acts is that, although there are hundreds of adjudication programs throughout the federal government, only a handful of agencies adjudicate according to the procedures established by the APA’s adjudication provisions. Most agencies therefore adjudicate using unique procedures that have been congressionally or administratively tailored to suit the unique needs of the particular agency or regulatory program. Paradoxically, *exceptionalism* is the dominant principle of procedural design in adjudication.

Responding to the dominance of exceptionalism in the design of adjudicatory procedures, at least one scholar has urged that the traditional formal-informal dichotomy should be rejected in the adjudication context as unhelpful and even misleading. In place of

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322. See *supra* notes 226–32 and accompanying text.
324. See Asimow Report, *supra* note 8, at 17.
325. See id. at 2–3; *Bremer*, *Designing*, *supra* note 312.
that traditional dichotomy, Professor Michael Asimow has offered an alternative classification scheme that divides agency adjudication programs into three types:

- Type A adjudications are those that are conducted in accordance with the APA’s adjudication provisions.\footnote{327. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556, 557 (2019); Asimow Report, supra note 8, at 2.} In this classification scheme, the agency’s observance of the APA may be according to any legal requirement, whether imposed by statute or regulation.\footnote{328. When imposed by the agency’s own regulations, this would be a matter of the agency’s voluntary observance of the APA. The de novo APA approach discussed above is narrower and would not recognize such agencies as engaging in “formal” adjudication under the APA. See Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 33 (1950).}

- Type B adjudications are not conducted in accord with the APA’s adjudication provisions, but do involve matters legally required to be decided following an evidentiary hearing.\footnote{329. Asimow Report, supra note 8, at 2, 10. The legal requirement for an evidentiary hearing may be imposed by statute, regulation, or executive order. See id.} An “evidentiary hearing” is “a proceeding [in] which the parties make evidentiary submissions, have an opportunity to rebut testimony and arguments made by the opposition, and to which the exclusive record principle applies.”\footnote{330. Id. at 4.} The “exclusive record principle,” confines the presiding official “to considering inputs from the parties (as well as matters officially noticed) when determining factual issues.”\footnote{331. Id. at 4, 10.}

- Type C adjudications are those neither conducted in accord with the APA’s adjudication provisions nor are otherwise subject to a legal requirement for an evidentiary hearing.\footnote{332. Based solely on the AIA, it appears that these proceedings are Type B proceedings, and that is how Professor Asimow has classified them. See id. at 2 (offering a “deep dive” analysis of PTAB procedures).}

Very few agencies conduct Type A hearings, although in those proceedings, there is substantial procedural uniformity by virtue of the agencies’ observance of the APA’s adjudication requirements.\footnote{333. See id. at 2–3; Bremer, Designing, supra note at 312, at 70–71.} As a consequence of congressional and administrative avoidance of the APA, therefore, the vast majority of adjudications are Type B or Type C adjudications. These proceedings escape the APA’s homogenizing influence and thus it is not immediately clear that even this more realistic classification scheme conveys much about the actual procedures observed in the bulk of federal adjudication programs.
Moving towards the second, more granular inquiry in the search for system-wide principles of adjudication, what do Type B and Type C programs look like? Despite broad discretion and the attraction of context-specific procedural design, do these programs share a core set of procedural characteristics? A recent, large-scale study sheds some light on the matter. This years-long study of Type A and Type B adjudication was conducted by Professor Asimow, on behalf of the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS). Type C adjudication was omitted from the study because it is such a large, varied, and obscure category that is nearly impossible to study on a large scale. While somewhat troubling, this reality is perhaps a natural consequence of the APA’s definition of adjudication, which operates as a catch-all category that includes myriad proceedings in which perhaps there is no pressing need for uniform, detailed procedures. Focusing on Type A and Type B proceedings captures the programs in which an absence of such uniform minimum procedures is likely to be most problematic, both practically and as a matter of sound administrative principle. At any rate, despite the study’s narrowed focus on Type A and Type B proceedings, it has produced a large, publicly available database of federal agency adjudication programs. This database is jointly sponsored by ACUS and Stanford Law School. It includes information about adjudicatory schemes at agencies across the federal government. Of the total schemes, 103 are Type A and 230 are Type B schemes. In addition to the database, the ACUS project is expected to produce

334. ACUS is a free-standing federal agency that studies administrative procedure and makes consensus-based recommendations for improvement to other agencies, the President, Congress, and the Judicial Conference. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 591–96 (2019).
335. See Asimow Report, supra note 8, at 2.
337. To put it another way, focusing on Type A and Type B proceedings is likely to capture the adjudications that should be subject to the APA according to the Supreme Court’s logic in Wong Yang Sung, plus perhaps a few more. See Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (9150).
several reports and recommendations, including one set of these that has already been completed.  

This extensive study has identified a number of procedural elements that are common to many (but not all) Type B adjudications. There are 20 of these elements, which are referred to as “best practices” and are divided into five categories:

1. Integrity of the decisionmaking process:
   a. Observance of the exclusive record principle.
   b. Restrictions on ex parte communications.
   c. Separation of personnel performing adversary and decisional functions.
   d. Rules governing the appropriate provision of non-adversarial, ex parte staff advice.
   e. Elimination or prevention of bias in decisionmaking.

2. Prehearing practices:
   a. Proper notice of the issues to be adjudicated.
   b. Assistance of self-represented or lay-represented parties.
   c. Encouragement and facilitation of alternative dispute resolution.
   d. Pretrial conferences.
   e. Electronic filing of documents.
   f. Discovery through mandatory disclosures and according to adjudicator order.
   g. Explanation of how subpoenas will be used, if the agency is authorized by statute to issue subpoenas.

3. Hearing practices:
   a. Use of administrative judges to conduct hearings and issue initial decisions.
   b. Use of video and telephonic conferencing to conduct all or parts of hearings.
   c. Use of written-only or “paper” hearings.
   d. Prescription of applicable evidentiary rules.
   e. Provision of an opportunity for rebuttal.

4. Post-hearing processes:
   a. Provision of written decisions.

341. See Asimow Report, supra note 8.
342. See id. at 35.
343. See id. at 19, 35.
344. See id. at 20–23.
345. See id. at 24–28.
346. See id. at 28–32.
347. See id. at 32–34.
b. Availability of higher-level reconsideration of the initial decision.

(5) Publication of a complete set of procedural regulations in the Federal Register and Code of Federal Regulations.\textsuperscript{348}

This collection of procedural elements, however, is both more detailed and less illuminating about adjudication procedures than Section 553 of the APA is about rulemaking procedures. This is because most of Professor Asimow’s procedural elements are defined in sufficient breadth to cover a wide variety of actual, possible procedures. To take just one example, there is wide diversity among the rules and practices agencies employ with respect to the use of administrative judges to conduct proceedings and issue initial decisions (procedural element 3(a) in the list above).\textsuperscript{349} As I have argued elsewhere, there are a myriad of approaches that agencies can—and do—take to defining the precise identity, position, and powers of these decisionmakers.\textsuperscript{350} Indeed, another recent ACUS study examining the status, selection, oversight, and removal of administrative judges yielded a 96-page research report.\textsuperscript{351} Similar diversity is possible within the other procedural elements that Professor Asimow’s study identifies. The consequence is that, even if these elements are relatively common across Type B proceedings, that fact reveals relatively little about administrative adjudication procedures.

Presumably to address this issue, Professor Asimow sought to shed further light on Type B adjudication procedures by subjecting ten of the 230 Type B schemes (or approximately 4.3 percent) to a careful “deep dive” examination. Each of the schemes so analyzed was assessed for observance of the twenty identified procedural elements or “best practices.” The highest rate of conformity was eighteen out of twenty

\textsuperscript{348} See id. at 34.
\textsuperscript{349} See id. at 28; Bremer, Designing, supra note 312 at 75–81.
\textsuperscript{350} See Bremer, Designing, supra note 312 at 75–81.
\textsuperscript{351} See Kent Barnett et al., Non-ALJ Adjudicators in Federal Agencies: Status Selection, Oversight, and Removal, Final Report to the Administrative Conference of the United States (Sept. 24, 2018), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Administrative%20Judges%20Final%20Report%20Corrected%20-%20%20%20%20%24%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/U6YA-W445]. This variety may extend even to the ALJs who preside over APA hearings now that OPM’s role in ALJ selection has been reduced. See also Executive Order 13843, Excepting Administrative Law Judges from the Competitive Service, 83 Fed. Reg. 32755 (July 13, 2018). The executive order raises the possibility that agencies will in the future have greater latitude to craft context-specific requirements for ALJs, such as by requiring subject matter expertise as a condition of employment. See Admin. Conf. of the U.S., Recommendation 2019-2, Agency Recruitment and Selection of Administrative Law Judges, 84 Fed. Reg. 38,930 (Aug. 8, 2019); Jack M. Beermann & Jennifer L. Mascott, Research Report on Federal Agency ALJ Hiring After Lucia and Executive Order 13843 (May 29, 2019).
(or ninety percent), while the lowest rate was seven out of twenty (or thirty-five percent). Although Professor Asimow concluded that “[a] majority of the agencies . . . studied have already adopted most of the proposed best practices in their procedural regulations, manuals, or adjudicatory decisions,” the wide range in conformity rates is striking. Coming back to the case study at the heart of this Article, the highly detailed PTAB and Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) schemes, which were subject to one of Professor Asimow’s “deep dive[s],” include only thirteen of the twenty best practices (or sixty-five percent). Of course, it is possible that “agencies might be observing these best practices without having codified them in regulations or manuals.” But this possibility only emphasizes the practical difficulties of understanding the vast and varied world of agency adjudication. Widespread variation across non-APA adjudicatory programs, combined with inconsistent documentation of procedures, makes it extremely difficult and laborious to systemically analyze the procedural landscape in administrative adjudication. Professor Asimow’s multi-year study, extensive as it is, only scratches the surface.

III. EXCEPTIONALISM AND ITS DISCONTENTS

A. Adjudication’s Exceptionalism “Norm”

As the preceding Part demonstrates, there are few principles common to all federal adjudication programs and understanding adjudicatory procedures requires hard-won agency- and program-specific expertise. All three branches of government have helped to facilitate the common use of tailored, agency- and program-specific adjudicatory procedures. The result is widespread procedural diversity in adjudication, the acceptance of which has wrought pervasive

352. See Asimow Report, supra note 8, at 35.
353. Id. at 17.
354. See id. 1, at 35.
355. See id. at 35.
356. Reflecting this reality, ACUS is currently working “to develop a comprehensive guide on Type B and Type C adjudication to be entitled Sourcebook of Adjudication Outside the Administrative Procedure Act.” Frank Massaro & Michael Asimow, Update on the Sourcebook on Federal Administrative Adjudication Outside the APA, ACUS (Jan. 17, 2018, 10:26 AM), https://www.acus.gov/newsroom/administrative-fix-blog/update-sourcebook-federal-administrative-adjudication-outside-apa [https://perma.cc/2WJ4-JRYX].
358. See, e.g., Jeffrey S. Lubbers, APA Adjudication: Is the Quest for Uniformity Failing, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 65, 65–66 (1996); Elizabeth Ayres Whiteside, Comment, Administrative Adjudications: An Overview of the Existing
upstream effects on adjudication’s overarching legal structure. One such effect is to permit the APA only a limited and variable role in defining “adjudication” and specifying its core procedural components. At a higher, doctrinal level, adjudication’s procedural diversity vitiates the formal-informal dichotomy traditionally used to explain adjudication procedures on a system-wide basis. Indeed, continued use of the dichotomy only obscures the complex reality of adjudicatory practice. It allows law students, practitioners, judges, scholars, and policymakers to labor under the misperception that adjudication, like rulemaking and judicial review, is conducted according to an established set of cross-cutting, uniform procedures.

In other words, the governing norm in adjudication is exceptionalism. Recall that “administrative exceptionalism” refers to claims that an individual agency is so unique that it should be exempted from traditional administrative law principles. In rulemaking and judicial review—fields governed by robust, uniform legal principles—government institutions and scholars have generally rejected administrative exceptionalism. In adjudication, the opposite reality prevails. Here, government institutions and scholars have consistently supported the development of tailored procedural rules designed meet individual agency and program needs. The ink was hardly dry on the APA when Congress first exempted an agency from the APA’s adjudication provisions, overriding the Supreme Court’s decision in *Wong Yang Sung* and creating tailormade rules for deportation proceedings. Since then, Congress has made the same choice for hundreds of adjudicatory programs, either by directly creating tailormade procedures or by granting the relevant agency statutory authority to do the same. The AIA is merely a recent, extreme example of this phenomenon. It is extreme because it suggests that Congress has so thoroughly embraced adjudicatory exceptionalism that it can ignore the APA when designing a new adjudication program. Over the decades, the courts have followed Congress’s lead, developing only the most modest requirements as a matter of due process, repeatedly upholding statutory deviations from the APA, and providing ample space for agencies to exercise procedural discretion in adjudication. Agencies have exercised this discretion to avoid the APA’s adjudication provisions and to tailor adjudicatory procedures to suit programmatic needs. The result is extraordinary procedural diversity. Even the common elements of Type B adjudication, though broadly defined, are not consistently observed.

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359. See infra at Part I.C.
A “norm” of exceptionalism is a contradiction in terms: it is, by
definition, rejection of cross-cutting, uniform principles of
administrative law. The Supreme Court succinctly captured the
longstanding consensus in adjudication when it observed that “[t]he
incredible variety of administrative mechanisms in this country will not
yield to any single organizing principle.”361 This sets adjudication apart
from rulemaking and judicial review, fields governed by readily
ascertainable, uniform principles applicable across all agencies. The
traditional administrative law principles that apply in these fields are
grounded in the APA, which operates as the superstatutory backbone of
the unwritten administrative constitution. As explained in Part I, the
rejection of exceptionalism in rulemaking and judicial review is both
proof and consequence of the standard narrative of administrative law.
What are the consequences of adjudication’s exceptionalism norm for
administrative law’s standard narrative?

B. Theoretical Consequences

At a minimum, the standard narrative of administrative law must
account for adjudication’s exceptionalism norm. As previously
explained, the standard narrative holds that the APA is a superstatute
that provides stable, broadly accepted principles governing the
operation of the administrative state.362 Significantly embellished by a
robust body of administrative common law, these statutory principles
perform constitutional functions in an area in which the U.S.
 Constitution has little direct application. Scholars have constructed and
defended this account of administrative law on the strength of examples
from rulemaking and judicial review.363 But the argument is stated more
broadly—it is not intended to be an account of the character and
operation of administrative law only in the realms of rulemaking and
judicial review. Rather, it is a theory that has been offered to explain
administrative law generally—i.e., to extend to all areas of
administrative law. Adjudication is a large, significant mode of agency
action that does not conform to the standard narrative. The literature
has failed to acknowledge and account for this discrepancy and that
failure alone is problematic.

Adjudication’s exceptionalism norm undermines the APA’s
superstatute character. As Part II explained, the APA has only a limited
and variable role in defining adjudication and specifying its minimum
procedures. This is both surprising and disappointing given that a core
purpose of the APA was to address “the lack of uniformity among

362. See Vermeule, supra note 32.
363. See generally Duffy, supra note 41.
agency hearing officers and the perceived procedural unfairness of agency adjudication.\textsuperscript{364} Despite this purpose, Congress has routinely exempted agencies from the APA’s adjudication provisions, courts have reduced to a minimum the mandatory reach of those provisions, and agencies have used their ample procedural discretion to avoid them.\textsuperscript{365} The result is widespread procedural diversity in an area in which the APA has not “prove[n] robust as a solution, a standard, or a norm over time,” as is expected of a superstatute.\textsuperscript{366} Indeed, adjudication’s exceptionalism norm represents a clear rejection—by Congress, courts, agencies, and scholars—of the APA as a superstatute in adjudication. Those who offer the APA as a ready example of a superstatute have not acknowledged this significant qualification.\textsuperscript{367} And given that adjudication is one of the two primary modes of agency action and was a central focus of the APA’s “fierce compromise,” the exceptionalism norm presents a broader challenge to the characterization of the APA as a superstatute.

The normative implications of adjudication’s exceptionalism norm may also extend beyond the administrative state’s superstatutory backbone to affect its small-c constitutional status. Administrative law is said to have constitutional character because it performs constitutional functions in an area in which the written or codified U.S. Constitution has minimal application.\textsuperscript{368} These functions include constituting and ordering important governmental institutions, defining the legitimate exercise of authority through those institutions, determining the government-citizen relationship, and entrenching fundamental constitutional principles. There is, of course, a vast body of law governing adjudication. As in other areas of administrative law, there are statutes, regulations, guidance documents, and judicial decisions that determine the rules of administrative adjudication. These rules surely perform constitutional functions. For example, the AIA constitutes the PTAB and determines its place within patent’s administrative structure.\textsuperscript{369} Together, the AIA and the PTO’s regulations define the relationship between the PTAB and the private citizens who appear before it. But these rules—and the small-c constitutional principles they establish—are unique to the PTAB and its patent adjudication processes. Indeed, the exceptionalism norm means that adjudication rules are nearly always agency- or program-specific.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{364} Lubbers, supra note 358, at 65.
\item \textsuperscript{365} See Gluck et al., supra note 55.
\item \textsuperscript{366} William N. Eskridge Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 Duke L.J. 1215, 1216 (2001).
\item \textsuperscript{367} See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
\item \textsuperscript{368} See supra Part I.A.
\item \textsuperscript{369} See Cohen, supra note 11, at 1223–37.
\end{itemize}
As a consequence, the small-c constitutional compromises that are established in each adjudicatory program are unique and independent from the small-c constitutional compromises that are established in the hundreds of other adjudicatory programs that exist throughout the federal government.

Although the exceptionalism norm does not deprive individual adjudication rules of their constitutional function, it ensures the systemwide development of a poorer, disuniform small-c constitution of adjudication. Uniformity is an important characteristic of a sound constitution. It ensures that similarly situated people and institutions are treated alike. In rulemaking and judicial review, the development of uniform, cross-cutting norms has been recognized as an important value of the administrative constitution. A different reality prevails in adjudication. By embracing exceptionalism, government institutions and scholars have prioritized other goals—typically program-specific, substantive regulatory goals, as in the case of patent adjudication—above the development and observance of uniform, cross-cutting principles of adjudication. In adjudication, similarly situated agencies and individuals are not treated alike—by design. In a systemwide perspective, the result is a disuniform, and therefore poorer, small-c constitution of adjudication.

Finally, there is one important constitutional characteristic that the exceptionalism norm simply negates: entrenchment. Entrenchment protects constitutional principles, ensuring the longevity of their application. The APA is entrenched in the sense that it has proven largely impervious to amendment. Traditional principles of administrative law governing rulemaking and judicial review, which are grounded in the APA, have remained remarkably stable over time. Although the APA’s adjudication provisions have not been significantly amended since the APA was adopted, they have been largely abandoned in favor of agency- and program-specific adjudication rules. The exceptionalism norm has severely cabined the APA’s adjudication provisions, preventing the development of the kind of cross-cutting

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370. See, e.g., Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347–48 (1816) (citing the “importance, and even necessity of uniformity of decisions throughout the whole United States, upon all subjects within the purview of the constitution”) (emphasis in original).

371. See, e.g., Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Measured Constitutional Steps, 71 Ind. L.J. 297, 332 (1996) (“The concern for promoting uniformity in federal constitutional law is grounded on a fairness principle: like cases should be decided alike.”). Uniformity also has pragmatic benefits, such as protecting reliance interests, preserving stability in governing norms, and promoting transparency. See id. at 332–33. These matters are addressed below in Part III.C.

372. See Bremer, Unwritten, supra note 1, at 1265.

373. Id. at 1232.
principles that a constitution would ordinarily protect against change. The resulting, tailored adjudication rules have minimal reach and are often established in regulations, guidance documents, agency decisions, and uncodified norms, all of which are more readily susceptible to change. In short, exceptionalism is fundamentally at odds with entrenchment.

C. Practical Effects

Adjudication’s exceptionalism norm also has practical implications, both positive and negative. For purposes of this discussion, it is necessary to recognize that designing appropriate procedures requires both judgment and expertise. Procedures can provide necessary, valuable protection for all manner of important private and public interests. On the other hand, procedure is not costless. It requires time, effort, personnel, and resources. While insufficient procedures can endanger important interests, excessive procedures can delay time-sensitive agency decisionmaking or even block desirable agency action. Determining how much procedure is warranted therefore requires some benefit-cost analysis. Recognizing this, constitutional due process doctrine establishes a “flexible and context-specific” approach to determining what process is required before an administrative agency takes action.374 By recognizing the need for contextual judgment in determining procedural minima, this approach also leaves room for the application of subject matter expertise in procedural decisionmaking. Indeed, Professor Adrian Vermeule has argued that, even in the constitutional due process context, courts should defer to the superior expertise of an administrative agency in making procedural decisions that are finely attuned to its unique statutory mission and the realities facing the industry it regulates.375 The argument for such deference may be stronger in areas not subject to the commands of the written constitution.

The principal benefit and animating purpose of the exceptionalism norm is that it allows the government to tailor adjudicatory procedures to suit the needs of individual agencies or regulatory programs. Freed from a strong expectation that the APA supplies the default procedures, Congress has greater latitude to statutorily tailor adjudication procedures. And by reducing the reach of cross-cutting requirements, exceptionalism expands the space available for agencies to exercise procedural discretion. There are several potential benefits of the

375. See Vermeule, supra note 316, at 1919.
tailored procedures that flourish in this environment. First, because the interests implicated in adjudication may vary across agencies and programs, tailored procedures may provide the best protection. Second, freeing agencies from the demands of the APA’s adjudication provisions and allowing them to innovate procedurally may promote efficiency in adjudication. Finally, allowing Congress and administrative agencies to tailor procedures gives the government an additional, powerful tool that can be used to achieve substantive policy goals.

Against the benefits of exceptionalism and the tailored procedures it facilitates are arrayed real costs. Exceptionalism destroys uniformity across agencies, making it difficult if not impossible for the public and even experts to understand what process is due in administrative adjudication. Ferreting out the common procedures across Type B adjudications has required more than five years of study by one of the leading scholars in administrative adjudication, assisted by a team of lawyers and other experts. This indicates a profound lack of transparency. Indeed, this Article has focused on a single adjudicatory scheme and yet required nearly ten pages to describe that scheme and another seventeen to analyze the seemingly simple question of whether the scheme is “formal” adjudication. An entire literature on patent law exceptionalism has engaged the same inquiry. For a non-lawyer citizen who must appear before an administrative agency, the process must seem opaque in the extreme. And for experts and non-experts alike, familiarity with one agency’s process is unlikely to shed much light on another agency’s process. Finally, with procedures as various and specialized as those that exist in administrative adjudication, the institutions of government may be deprived of the information necessary to assess and improve procedures. Generalist courts may not fully understand adjudicative procedures, while specialized courts such as the Federal Circuit resist the intrusion of traditional administrative law principles into areas in which they have abundant technical expertise. Congress, deprived of default procedural norms, may start from square one with every new adjudicative scheme, prioritizing substantive outcomes over procedural values and amplifying existing

376. See, e.g., Robert W. Hamilton, Rulemaking on a Record by the Food and Drug Administration, 50 Tex. L. Rev. 1132, 1148 (1972).

377. See, e.g., Bremer & Jacobs, supra note 5, at 524, 526–27; Scalia, supra note 36, at 346–47. As the late Representative John Dingell colorfully put it, “I’ll let you write the substance . . . you let me write the procedure, and I’ll screw you every time.” Regulatory Reform Act: Hearing on H.R. 2327. Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law and Governmental Regulations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 312 (1983).

378. See Bremer, Designing, supra note 312, at 83–85.

379. See Asimow Report, supra note 8.
variation. Administrative agencies, charged with responsibility for filling out the procedural design, may have little information available to guide the sound exercise of their discretion. In sum, the problems caused by exceptionalism may only breed further exceptionalism.

These harms are both independent and obscuring of the quality or sufficiency of the adjudication procedures themselves. Adjudicating agencies across government could be observing adjudication procedures that are perfectly appropriate in the circumstances, designed to be sufficiently protective of affected interests, as well as efficient. But adjudication’s exceptionalism norm prevents an assessment of whether this optimal reality prevails, particularly on a system-wide basis. Not only does the exceptionalism norm make it exceedingly difficult to study adjudication procedures, but it has prevented the development of any meaningful, cross-cutting procedural minima. Thus, even if it were possible to compile a comprehensive picture of actual adjudication procedures, there is no clear standard against which to measure them. Although adjudication has received renewed attention—and criticism—in recent years, exceptionalism makes a systemic, reliable, coherent evaluation impossible.380 This should trouble everyone.

CONCLUSION

The standard narrative holds that administrative law is a quasi-constitutional body of law with the APA as its superstatutory backbone. This narrative is intended to both explain and legitimize the modern administrative state, which is not clearly established by the written U.S. constitution. The standard narrative has been constructed on the strength of examples drawn from rulemaking and judicial review. Understandably so—in these crucial, salient areas, the narrative appears to be sound. Both rulemaking and judicial review are governed by traditional administrative law principles that are grounded in the APA and apply uniformly across all administrative agencies. These principles are readily ascertainable and broadly recognized as authoritative by Congress, the courts, the executive, and administrative agencies. Individual agencies have occasionally sought to be exempted from the traditional administrative law principles of rulemaking or judicial review, seeking different rules tailored to suit their supposedly unique

position or responsibilities. Courts and scholars have rejected these claims to administrative exceptionalism. This rejection is both proof and consequence of the standard narrative’s soundness.

One of the APA’s twin modes of agency action—adjudication—is absent from this otherwise compelling account of administrative law. Its omission is no mere oversight: adjudication is missing because it does not fit the standard narrative. Shortly after the APA’s adoption, Congress began to exempt agencies from the statute’s adjudication provisions, choosing time and again to create agency- and program-specific adjudication procedures.381 The courts have followed Congress’s lead, by interpreting the APA’s adjudication provisions to have minimal mandatory reach and by embracing a strong principle of agency procedural discretion.382 As exemplified by the AIA’s patent adjudication structures, Congress and administrative agencies have used their freedom from the APA and the judicial common law it might support to create detailed adjudication processes specialized to further substantive regulatory goals.383 The result is astounding diversity in adjudication procedures. In this substantial field, every agency is special and unique enough to warrant exemption from the APA. Here, exceptionalism is the norm.

It is time for administrative law to reckon with adjudication’s exceptionalism norm. On the level of theory, the norm sets adjudication firmly outside of administrative law’s standard narrative. It undermines the APA’s status as a superstatute and dilutes the small-c constitutional character of administrative law. Perhaps these consequences can be cabined to adjudication, requiring a qualification on the standard narrative. Or further consideration may reveal adjudication’s exceptionalism norm to be a more powerful indictment of the standard narrative’s normative power. On a practical level, the exceptionalism norm makes adjudication procedures opaque and deprives citizens and experts of a neutral baseline for evaluating the quality and sufficiency of procedures in individual adjudication programs. Systemic reform may be warranted, it cannot be unless and until adjudication’s exceptionalism norm is acknowledged and confronted.

381. See Gluck et al., supra note 55, at 1800–01, 1814.
382. See Bremer & Jacobs, supra note 19, at 523–24.
383. See Gluck et al., supra note 55.