FACILITATING TRIBAL CO-MANAGEMENT OF FEDERAL PUBLIC LANDS

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Each year Native American tribal nations enter hundreds of federal contracts worth billions of dollars to run federal Indian programs. By substituting tribal governments for federal agencies, these “self-determination contracts” have been enormously successful in improving the effective delivery of federal programs on Indian reservations. Tribal governments wish to do more, however. Tribes wish to co-manage federal public lands, including lands that lie outside their reservations, and they have a lot to offer in this area. For example, a tribe might seek to contract with the United States Fish and Wildlife Service to operate a wildlife refuge, with the National Park Service to manage a park or monument, or even with the Bureau of Reclamation to operate a federal dam. Tribes are natural partners for much of this work. Many federal units are located on lands that are, or were, tribal aboriginal lands. Although the federal government has had the legal authority to enter such contracts since 1994, federal agencies have been slow to enlist tribes in the management of federal public lands. A review of the few existing successful cases suggests that tribes confront dramatically different dynamics when seeking to contract functions with federal agencies beyond the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Indian Health Service, and other agencies providing services to Indian people. At a time when Indigenous-led conservation is crucial to addressing climate change and our national conservation goals, this Essay responds to calls by environmental advocacy organizations and tribes to examine the obstacles to tribal co-management of public lands and proposes solutions.

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INTRODUCTION

In recent years, calls for co-management of public lands by Native American tribal nations and the federal government have been increasing. To achieve ambitious conservation goals designed to mitigate the devastating effects of climate change, the federal government needs willing partners with a deep commitment to those goals. Tribal governments have long been interested in co-management of federal public lands, but obstacles have been high, fueled in part by ignorance and in part by ideological and sometimes partisan political opposition.
Federal public lands are, of course, a subject of significant contestation. To some, the very existence of federal lands is an affront to states’ rights. Presidential candidate in 2016 and later secretary of housing and urban development Ben Carson famously advocated for “returning” federal public lands to the states.¹ This statement was not well received by tribes because few of the lands in the federal public domain have ever been taken from states.² The historical record shows that all of the current federal public land base was once tribal lands,³ and much of it can be traced to specific land cessions from tribes, often pursuant to Senate-ratified treaties or presidential executive orders that were later violated.⁴

Tribes have their own strong ideological positions. The tribal nations in South Dakota have long demanded the return of the Black Hills in South Dakota, regularly renewing their request.⁵ They are so committed to the return of the land that they famously declined to accept the largest cash award for a land claim against the federal government in history.⁶

A well-known Native American author, Professor David Treuer, recently made a high profile and public call for the United States to return to tribes the most iconic public lands in the United States: the national parks.⁷ According to Treuer, “[T]here can be no better remedy for the theft of land than land” and “no lands are as spiritually significant as the


national parks.” 8 As discussed below, Congress recently returned a significant Fish and Wildlife Service refuge to a tribe in Montana. As our country continues to reckon with historical injustices, more actions may come.

In the meantime, a practical and politically viable path lies between the two extremes of giving away federal public lands to the states or returning all of these lands to the tribes. A simple path to tribal co-management already exists in federal law. It has been authorized by Congress for more than twenty-five years and requires no significant new congressional action. The time is right to refocus on this important existing pathway.

Tribes have been seeking a much more meaningful role in the management of public lands. 9 For example, tribes have sought to help manage the contested Bears Ears National Monument in Utah 10 and the Badger-Two Medicine Forest lands in Montana. 11 The arguments in favor of tribal co-management are powerful. In the public lands space, at least one conservative property-rights organization has held up tribes as better stewards of land than the U.S. Forest Service. 12 Indeed, in some ways, the claim that the federal government should engage tribal nations in the management of federal public lands is stronger than ever. 13 So-called “green groups” are calling more and more for tribal co-management to bring tribal governments to the table to help advocate for strategies to address climate change. 14

Today, tribal governments are well-situated to engage in federal public land management. Tribes often play the lead role in managing the federal trust lands within their own reservations. 15 With 44 million acres, viewed collectively, tribes are the sixth-largest owners of land in the

8.  Id.
10.  Id. at 104.
11.  Id. at 120.
13.  See generally Mills & Nie, supra note 9.
United States.16 Tribes are behind only the federal Bureau of Land Management (244.4 million acres), the U.S. Forest Service (192.9 million acres), the Fish and Wildlife Service (89.2 million acres), the National Park Service (79.9 million acres), and the state of Alaska (104.5 million acres).17 Indeed, tribes own far more land than the U.S. Department of Defense despite large military reservations across the country.18 Table 1 lists federal public landowners by agency.19

Table 1. Federal Land by Agency

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Acres</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bureau of Land Management</td>
<td>244 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Forest Service</td>
<td>193 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Park Service</td>
<td>80 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fish and Wildlife Service</td>
<td>89 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
<td>11 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other agencies</td>
<td>15–20 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND</strong></td>
<td><strong>Approximately 640 million acres</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tribes also have deep subject matter expertise. For centuries, tribes have been stewards of the land in North America. Moreover, much of the federal public land in the western United States is “ceded land,” that is, land given up by tribes in treaties when tribes simultaneously “reserved” remaining lands as perpetual homelands, commonly called “reservations.”20 In addition to an ongoing affinity for these lands, many tribes continue to possess legally recognized, off-reservation treaty rights to hunt, fish, and gather on federal public lands.21 Some federal public lands also encompass places that are sacred to tribal communities. These sacred places could be managed in a more effective and respectful manner with greater tribal involvement, reducing conflict and improving

18. See Vincent, Hanson & Bermejo, supra note 17, at 1.
19. Id.
stewardship. Tribes also have a strong desire to engage in land, wildlife, and resource management.22

Legal infrastructure already exists in federal law to support greater tribal management or co-management of federal public lands. While some modest federal appropriations could help, no major new legislation is essential to achieve substantially more progress in this area. And tribes already have a handful of agreements with federal agencies.

In the Indian Self-Determination Act of 1975,23 tribes gained the federal authority to contract for the operation of federal programs traditionally run by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) and the Indian Health Service (IHS). In the 1970s and ’80s, tribes began to contract many of the programs of the BIA and the IHS.24 In 1994 Congress further authorized tribes to contract with federal land management agencies, much as they have with the BIA and the IHS.25 To tribes, expanding the contracting regime beyond traditional tribal self-governance programs held great promise. Opportunities abound for partnerships between tribes and federal land management agencies, such as the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), the U.S. Forest Service (USFS or “Forest Service”), and even the National Park Service (NPS or “Park Service”). Not surprisingly, Indian reservations throughout the United States lie contiguous to, or at least near, many of these federal public lands. In federal treaties and executive orders, tribes “reserved” some lands while ceding contiguous lands nearby; many of the land cessions remain in federal ownership.26

Despite widespread agreement that tribes have been successful in performing functions for the BIA and the IHS and that tribal contracts have resulted in improvements in federal services,27 tribal management of public lands has been very limited. Tribes have had comparatively little success in contracting with the federal land management agencies. The contrast in sheer numbers is striking: compared to more than 600 annual contracts with the BIA and IHS in recent years, tribes have entered into fewer than a dozen contracts annually with all of the land management agencies within the Department of the Interior (DOI or “Interior”).

25. See id. at 780.
27. See Washburn, supra note 24, at 780.
combined, including the BLM, Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), and NPS. Tribes have also seen little success, so far, in contracting with the USFS under a similar regime within the Department of Agriculture. Based on the numbers alone, it is fair to conclude that the congressional initiative to encourage federal-tribal contracts related to public land management has failed. The failure of this initiative is surprising because tribal capacity for this kind of work has grown substantially since 1994 and continues to increase. Making progress would seem relatively simple.

So why has this tribal and congressional initiative failed? What is preventing the federal government from entering into agreements with tribes? What efforts can be taken to make this initiative successful? This Essay seeks to answer those questions. It first provides a brief history of the development of the applicable federal laws, identifies barriers to greater tribal management of federal public lands, and recommends ways to break down those barriers. Part I briefly summarizes the history of the tribal self-determination initiative and the expansion of these initiatives to federal land management agencies. Part II examines the existing contractual arrangements with three land management agencies and explores the details of these arrangements. Part III addresses the legal, cultural, and political obstacles that have hampered past agreements and those that could hinder future negotiations. Lastly, Part IV offers policy recommendations for future contracting agreements. Tribes can make the case that they can perform federal functions on some federal lands more competently than the federal land agencies themselves due to the comparative tribal advantages on federal public lands that lie in and adjacent to their aboriginal homelands.

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29. See The 30th Anniversary of Tribal Self-Governance: Successes in Self Governance and an Outlook for the Next 30 Years: Hearing Before the Comm. on Indian Affs. U.S. S., 115th Cong. 18 (2018) (statement of Hon. Arthur “Butch” Blazer, President, Mescalero Apache Tribe) (“From 2004-2008, only 10 TFPA contracts and agreements were awarded. These contracts and agreements covered 23,230 acres and 51.5 miles of boundary. USFS-tribal TFPA stewardship contracts have been limited in scope, focusing on hazardous fuels reduction and invasive species treatment. This disappointingly slow implementation of the TFPA continues to thwart the Act’s intent, leaving tribal forests more vulnerable to catastrophic wildfire, disease and infestation from adjacent federal public lands. TFPA partnerships should be aggressively expanded.”).
I. TRIBAL SELF-GOVERNANCE CONTRACTING WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

For more than forty years, American Indian tribal nations have contracted with the United States to operate federal programs on Indian reservations. The authorities undergirding this robust contracting regime have evolved over time.

A. The Development of Contracting with the Bureau of Indian Affairs and Indian Health Service

Following the so-called Termination Era in federal Indian policy of the 1950s, a dramatic shift occurred in federal Indian policy beginning in the 1960s. Naming credit for the Self-Determination Era goes to President Richard Nixon in light of his “Special Message on Indian Affairs” calling for a greater focus on tribal self-determination. Prior to Nixon’s address, however, the movement toward self-determination was developing momentum. John F. Kennedy’s presidential platform promised to protect tribal lands and encouraged tribal participation in economic development.30 In 1961, the BIA issued a report concluding “that placing greater emphasis on termination than on development” impeded the goal of equal citizenship and participation in the American life.31 The focus on tribal collaboration was further expanded during Lyndon Johnson’s administration. Tribes were a significant beneficiary of Johnson’s “War on Poverty.”32 Johnson’s New Society programs laid the groundwork for contracting between the federal government and tribes.33

In 1975, Congress enacted Public Law 93-638, the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (commonly referred to by its Public Law number or “ISDA”),34 which allowed tribes to petition certain federal agencies for contracts to administer federal programs that provide services to Indian people because of their status as Indians.35 Under such contracts, tribal governments step into the shoes of the federal government...
in providing federal services. These contracts are commonly called “638 contracts” for the public law number of the statute that authorized them.36 Hundreds of such contracts and funding agreements are signed each year, amounting to billions of dollars in value annually.37 The vast majority of these contracts are between tribes, or tribal consortia, on one side and the IHS or BIA on the other.38 The federal Bureau of Reclamation (“BOR” or just “Reclamation”) also has several contracts related to federal Indian water projects serving Native Americans.39

A recent Supreme Court opinion characterized this initiative as “decentraliz[ing] the provision of federal Indian benefits away from the Federal Government and toward” tribes and tribal organizations.40 Philosophically, the ISDA contracting regime can be seen, on the one hand, as tribes acting like independent government contractors that provide federal services for a fee. On the other hand, ISDA also could be viewed as treating tribes like states. Numerous federal programs, across a wide spectrum ranging from entitlement programs to environmental policy, simply provide a framework, and sometimes financing, for programs that are actually implemented by state governmental agencies.41 But the tribal self-determination regime is a little different from a state running a federal program. The congressional purpose for the Indian self-determination laws has been uniquely intended to expand tribal governmental capacities and develop qualified professionals to fill tribal

36. Following the public law number of the ISDA, 93-638, such contracts have commonly come to be known as “638 contracts.” See, e.g., STEWART WAKELING, MIRIAM JORGENSEN, SUSAN MICHAELSON & MANLEY BEGAY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., POLICING ON AMERICAN INDIAN RESERVATIONS, at vi (2001), https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/188095.pdf [https://perma.cc/2JCJ-N8NF]. In this area of federal Indian law and policy, a whole vernacular has developed around this usage. The number, “638,” has become a verb, that is, “to 638” a federal function. Id. It can also be conjugated. Id. So, for example, a tribal employee might say, “The tribe 638’ed that program in 1998.”


41. See Strommer & Osborne, supra note 37, at 73 n.445.
leadership in hopes that tribes can respond better than federal agencies to the “true needs” of their communities. Under ISDA, a tribe could apply to take over an entire federal program or a portion of a program. Moreover, tribes could begin by obtaining planning grants. When deciding whether to contract, the secretary was required to consider whether the tribe or tribal organization was capable of performing in light of factors such as equipment, bookkeeping and accounting procedures, substantive knowledge of the program, community support for the contract, adequately trained personnel, and others. These provisions forced contracting tribes to develop strong federal contracting infrastructure.

One key aspect of the law was that the secretary had little discretion. The secretary could deny the request only for specific reasons, such as whether the program could be run satisfactorily, whether trust resources would be protected, and whether the contract would cover all the necessary services. The law included some remedial components. First, if the secretary declined to enter a 638 contract, the secretary was required to “state his objections in writing,” provide a hearing, and ultimately give the tribe “practicable assistance” to help the tribe overcome the objections. The same criteria applied to the secretary of health, education, and welfare (now health and human services) for contracts with the IHS. Second, federal officials had the authority to reassume a program or activity if the tribe failed.

43. The secretary of the interior was authorized “from funds appropriated for the benefit of Indians” to “contract with or make a grant or grants to any tribal organization” for “the strengthening or improvement of tribal government (including, but not limited to, the development, improvement, and administration of planning, financial management, or merit personnel systems; the improvement of tribally funded programs or activities; or the development, construction, improvement, maintenance, preservation, or operation of tribal facilities or resources.”). Id. § 104(a)(1).
44. Contracts or grants could be awarded for “the planning, training, evaluation of other activities designed to improve the capacity of a tribal organization to enter into a contract pursuant to [the Act] and the additional costs associated with the initial years of operation under such a contract or contracts.” Id. § 104(a)(2).
45. Id. § 103(a).
46. Id. § 102(a) (allowing denial if “the service to be rendered to the Indian beneficiaries of the particular program or function to be contracted will not be satisfactory”; “adequate protection of trust resources is not assured”; or if “the proposed project or function to be contracted for cannot be properly completed or maintained by the proposed contract”).
47. Id. § 102(b).
48. Id. § 103(a)–(b).
49. Id. § 109.
Because self-determination contracting had the potential to be disruptive to the existing federal workforce at the BIA and IHS, Congress authorized the use of the Intergovernmental Personnel Act of 1970 (IPA) to help address this disruption. 50 Under the IPA, federal employees may work for non-federal entities while keeping their federal employee rights and benefits for a limited period of time. 51 An IPA assignment is generally limited to two years, with the option to extend for two more years.52 The IPA helped address concerns of federal employees about losing their seniority and benefits when a tribe takes over a federal program. While the IPA did not provide a long-term solution to the overarching problem, an IPA agreement allowed a federal employee to work temporarily for a tribe without losing federal civil service benefits, such as healthcare and retirement. 53 It was also good for tribes; a tribe could take over a federal function with no change in the personnel running the program. 54 This made implementation much easier, at least in the short run, during the transition period.

The self-determination contracting regime was a radically different approach to federal Indian policy. Despite efforts to think through implementation issues in drafting the law, frustration became apparent from the beginning due to resistance and to bureaucratic oversight. It took time for the federal agencies to adjust.

Tribes accused the BIA and IHS of obstructing the law. Tribes complained of “[i]nappropriate application of federal procurement laws and federal acquisition regulations,” leading to “excessive paperwork and unduly burdensome reporting requirements.” 55 Though tribes had wished for a reduced federal bureaucracy, federal contracting brought new scrutiny of tribal activity. Tribes seemed to feel that the old BIA had been replaced by a new “contract monitoring bureaucracy.” 56 For example, contract applications went through six layers of review. The law provided for sixty-day approval of contracts, but in practice, the review and negotiation process often took six months or longer. 57 The process involved review by the local BIA agency superintendent; then by a BIA “self-determination specialist,” who determined whether or not the tribe submitted all the required paperwork; followed by the superintendent’s

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50. Id. § 105(d).
51. Id. § 105(e).
52. 5 C.F.R. § 334.104 (2022) (specifying that under the IPA, an employee cannot work for more than four continuous years without at least a twelve-month assignment to the original agency from which the employee was assigned).
53. Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act § 105(e)–(h).
54. 5 U.S.C. §§ 3371–3372; see also Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act § 105(a)–(d).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 8.
recommendation to the Area Office for further review; and finally a recommendation to the area director. 58 If the area director approved, the contract was then returned to a different unit for funding. 59 The bureaucratic process was inefficient, cumbersome, and tedious.

BIA personnel were also accused of imposing “additional reporting requirements on tribal contractors which often are not required under applicable laws and regulations, thereby making the contracting process much more burdensome and time-consuming.” 60 BIA officials reportedly required voluminous data, such as lists of serial numbers of all law enforcement vehicles operated by the tribe or Certificates of Degree of Indian Blood for each child served by tribal Johnson-O’Malley contracts. 61 While close oversight is common in federal procurement, tribes felt that the oversight constituted harassment. 62 Tribal leaders have long complained that “BIA” actually stands for “Bossing Indians Around.” 63 To the tribal leaders, the “bossing” continued; it just had a different focus. 64

In sum, soon after the passage of the original law, tribes began agitating for better implementation and more cooperation from the BIA and IHS. 65 Despite all the complaining, the contracting was beginning to have a profound effect on federal Indian policy. As tribes developed more and more 638 contracts, tribes also lobbied Congress aggressively in the 1980s for improvements in the law. 66

Over the course of early implementation, it became apparent that features of the law were creating some obstacles and that changes in the law would help the program grow more quickly. For example, one problem was that tribes had to go through a lengthy application process each year and enter a contract for each service or program for which they wished to contract. 67 Another problem was that tribes needed significant administrative infrastructure to implement the laws, but the program did

58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 7.
61. Id.
64. See Strommer & Osborne, supra note 37, at 22 (characterizing the BIA and IHS as “reluctant partners” and claiming that “[f]ederal bureaucrats” tended to “thwart full implementation” of the self-determination laws).
65. See Kirsten Matoy Carlson, Lobbying Against the Odds, 56 Harv. J. on LEGIS. 23, 60 n.205 (2019).
66. Id. at 60 & n.205.
not fully address the costs of these needs. For example, the BIA might have a centralized personnel office (today, often called a “human resources office”) to address hiring, payroll, workers’ compensation, retirement, and other needs. When a tribe contracted to run a federal program, it would obtain funding for the immediate program, such as the salary for the principal employees performing the program, but it did not receive funding for all of these other direct or indirect costs of running the program, such as the human resources administrative expenses. The failure of the agencies to reimburse tribes for costs of program operations “resulted in a tremendous drain on tribal financial resources.”

In 1988 Congress acted on tribal concerns and sought to remedy these problems through amendments to the ISDA. Advocates for the amendments were assisted when the Arizona Republic published a series of thirty investigative articles that dealt with the misuse of funds and corruption within the BIA. If the BIA could not be trusted to run tribal programs successfully, there was a natural alternative in tribal governments; ISDA contracts made this option viable.

The 1988 Amendments addressed a number of problems. First, they provided for “contract support costs” to help tribes meet the reasonable costs of tribal governments in carrying out the activities under the contracts. Second, the amendments gave tribes the flexibility to consolidate contracts or use saved money in a succeeding year, allowing tribes the same flexibility for “carryover” funding that federal offices often need to function reliably and consistently. Consolidation of contracts also helped to make reporting requirements more manageable. Third, the 1988 Amendments expanded the contracting regime beyond the BIA and IHS, a subject that will be explored in depth in this Essay.

68. Id. at 8–9.
69. A Senate committee found that “[p]erhaps the single most serious problem with implementation of the Indian self-determination policy has been the failure of the [BIA] and the [IHS] to provide funding for the indirect costs associated with self-determination contracts.” Id. at 8.
70. Strommer & Osborne, supra note 37, at 29–32.
71. S. REP. NO. 100-274, at 1–2 (1987) (noting that the 1988 amendments were intended to “increase tribal participation in the management of Federal Indian programs” and “to remove many of the administrative and practical barriers”).
The 1988 Amendments also introduced a new “Tribal Self-Governance” pilot program. Under this new program, instead of numerous separate contracts, tribes could collect multiple functions and programs into a broader tribal compact and a funding agreement. Within the compact, tribes could “redesign programs, activities, functions or services and . . . reallocate funds for such programs, activities, functions or services.” In other words, tribes could contract for several programs but then redesign each program and shift funds between various programs within the funding agreement if needs and priorities changed during the fiscal year. This flexibility made the program much more attractive to tribes and gave tribes the ability to exercise much greater “self-determination” in providing government services. As a practical matter, the discretion the program afforded tribes provided significant opportunity for tribes to make decisions about how to prioritize the use of funding. The program was a significant step forward in moving tribes from behaving like mere contractors to having the power and authority to behave much more like governments. The shift from self-determination contracts to broader self-governance compacts made tribal governments more effective and more powerful. In this respect, the shift expanded tribal sovereignty (with federal underwriting).

Today, more than half of all federal programs are carried out by tribes instead of the federal government, with tribes contracting multiple federal programs on Indian reservations ranging from schools, hospitals, medical clinics, fire and police departments, and courts to natural resources, road construction, real estate management, and myriad other routine governmental functions serving tribal communities.
Though self-determination contracting faced early obstacles due in part to opposition within the federal agencies, Public Law 93-638 and its amendments are credited with spawning a renaissance in tribal governments in the past half century. As late as the 1960s, some tribal governments had only a single employee, such as a tribal administrator or executive director, and part-time, often-unpaid tribal leaders and legislative bodies. Today, most tribal governments have dozens or even hundreds of tribal governmental employees due to 638 contracts and related programs (and, for some tribes, due also to revenues from Indian gaming operations, which are required by law to be wholly owned by tribal governments).

From the outset, tribal self-determination programs were viewed as transformative. Early in the development of self-determination, a leading lawyer for tribes said that self-determination “programs have changed formerly passive recipients of government handouts into active initiators of social reform.” As a result of this regime, tribal governments have largely displaced the BIA and IHS in providing federal services to Indian people. Tribes are significantly involved in executing federal Indian policy and exercising discretion as to which programs should take priority in a given tribal community. This contractual scheme has simultaneously enhanced tribal sovereignty and self-determination, on the one hand, and, on the other, improved the quality of the services to Indian people. The scheme also has had the practical effect of building substantial tribal capacity in a field of some complexity: contracting with the federal government. The tribal self-determination and self-governance contracting regime is widely viewed as a successful federal Indian policy.

80. Strommer & Osborne, supra note 37, at 22 (characterizing the BIA and IHS as “reluctant partners” and claiming that “[f]ederal bureaucrats” tended to “thwart full implementation” of the self-determination laws).
81. For the roots of tribal self-determination in the 1960s “Great Society” or “War on Poverty” programs, see Washburn, supra note 24, at 793–94.
82. See generally 25 U.S.C. § 2702(1) (defining a purpose of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act as providing a basis for regulation of “gaming by an Indian tribe” and “ensur[ing] that the Indian tribe is the primary beneficiary of the gaming operation”); 25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2)(A) (“[T]he Indian tribe will have the sole proprietary interest and responsibility for the conduct of any gaming activity.”).
83. See Johnson & Hamilton, supra note 77, at 1268.
85. Strommer & Osborne, supra note 37, at 1.
86. Id. at 18, 64.
87. Id. at 74; Gross, supra note 84, at 1197.
88. S. Res. 295, 107th Cong. (2002) (“[T]his Indian self-determination policy has endured as the most successful policy of the United States in dealing with the Indian Tribes because it rejects the failed policies of termination and paternalism and recognized
B. Beyond Self-Governance: Contracting for Public Land Management

As the self-determination contracting initiative grew and improved from 1975 to the early 1990s, tribes also began to seek contracting authority beyond BIA and IHS programs. In part because of the successes with the contracting regime, Congress agreed.

Congress has enacted numerous separate laws to allow contracting in discrete areas involving other federal agencies that serve Indian communities, as well as in similarly related subjects such as schools, housing, roads and highways, energy, and jobs programs. As a result of these other programs, a number of tribes have entered contracts with the federal Departments of Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and Labor, among others. Tribes also contract for a wide range of work in which they are acting as regular government commercial contractors.

In the 1988 Amendments, Congress broadened the ISDA to allow contracts to be given for any program “for the benefit of Indians because

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89. Strommer & Osborne, supra note 37, at 38–40.
90. Id. at 34, 38.
92. For the tribal transportation program, see 23 U.S.C. § 202.
93. For the Native American Housing and Self-Determination Act, see 25 U.S.C. §§ 4101–4243.
95. Under section 8(a) of the Small Business Act of 1953, American Indian tribes are eligible to obtain federal contracts without competition in certain limited circumstances. See Nicholas M. Jones, Comment, America Cinches Its Purse Strings on Government Contracts: Navigating Section 8(a) of the Small Business Act Through a Recession Economy, 33 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 491, 499–503 (2009). The purpose of the Act is “to promote the business development of small business concerns owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals.” 15 U.S.C. § 631(f)(2)(A). In 1986 the Small Business Act was amended to permit a tribal enterprise to enter into a negotiated sole-source contract beyond traditional section 8(a) program limits. See Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-272, § 18015, 100 Stat. 82, 370–71 (“[S]ection 8(a) of [the Small Business Act] . . . is amended to read . . . ‘the term “socially and economically disadvantaged small business concern” means . . . an economically disadvantaged Indian tribe . . . .’”)(citations omitted). For a tribal business to participate in the program, it must be a small business unconditionally owned and controlled by an Indian tribe and must demonstrate potential for success. 15 U.S.C. § 637(a)(4A)(i)(II). The program promotes business development over a nine-year period, facilitates the award of sole-source and limited-competition contracts, and provides specialized training, counseling, and high-level executive support. 13 C.F.R. § 124.404(b)(1), (4) (2021). The Act requires each federal agency to set aside five percent of the total value of contracts and subcontracts for program members. 15 U.S.C. § 644(g)(1)(A)(iv).
of their status as Indians without regard to the agency or office of the Department of Health and Human Services or the Department of the Interior within which it is performed." In other words, 638 contracts would no longer be limited to the BIA or the IHS.

This expansion allowed tribes, for example, to contract for some of the important work implementing federal Indian water rights settlements for the BOR. Federal water rights settlements are financially significant, amounting to tens or hundreds of millions of dollars in infrastructure projects in tribal communities, so the Amendments were an important expansion. However, very little of the work of the other public land management agencies is considered to be “for the benefit of Indians because of their status as Indians.” Thus, the 1988 Amendments were self-limiting.

In 1994 Congress went further. It substantially increased tribal contracting authority through the passage of the Indian Self-Determination Act Amendments of 1994, which authorized the secretary of the interior to enter contracts with tribes to operate programs in other Department of the Interior agencies, such as the FWS, the BLM, the NPS, and, for more general purposes, with the BOR. In these provisions, Congress included a different limitation in the legislation: a tribe may contract for federal activities or programs that have a “special geographic, historical or cultural significance” to the tribe. These new provisions had the potential for the expansion of federal tribal contracts. Tribes no longer were limited to contracting for traditional Indian programs but could now contract for virtually any federal program at the DOI or the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) as long as the program had a geographic, historical, or cultural significance to the tribe. Since virtually all public lands in the United States were once occupied by tribal nations, the potential here seemed almost unlimited.

Ten years later, in 2004, Congress expanded contracting to the USFS, located within the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), through the Tribal Forest Protection Act (TFPA). Following a devastating wildfire

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99. Id. § 403(c).

season in 2003 that featured several fires crossing from federal lands onto neighboring tribal lands, tribes successfully sought authority to contract with federal forests to create an opportunity for those lands to be managed by tribes.101 Congress responded positively to these tribal requests. So a decade after ISDA was broadened to include other DOI agencies, Congress extended tribal contracting authority to the USFS.102

The TFPA allowed the USFS to contract with tribes to achieve certain federal land management goals, such as preventing fire, disease, or threats to trust land or restoring public lands “bordering on or adjacent to” Indian lands as long as the land possessed “a feature or circumstance unique to [the relevant] Indian tribe (including treaty rights or biological, archeological, historical, or cultural circumstances),”103 TFPA proposals are intended to be collaborative projects, with work occurring on USFS lands to achieve benefits for both the tribe and the USFS. Examples of TFPA-proposed projects include producing timber and forest products,104 forming partnerships between private industry and federal and tribal entities for restoration and risk reduction,105 reducing the threat of catastrophic fires,106 bringing communities together to support rural forest

102. Tribal Forest Protection Act § 2.
103. Id. § 2(c).
105. The Los Burros Project involved the White Mountain Apache Tribe and the Apache-Sitgreaves National Forest in eastern Arizona. It included job training for tribal members and resources for employment to address the risk of catastrophic fires. See TAMEZ, supra note 104, at 19–20.
106. The Tule River Restoration Project was proposed by the Tule River Tribe to protect, restore, and maintain the Black Mountain Giant Sequoia Grove and nearby forest areas by conducting fuels management activities. Id. at 42; INTERTRIBAL TIMBER COUNCIL, TRIBAL FOREST PROTECTION ACT: SITE VISIT REPORTS 22–24 (2012). For an example of how agencies examine the potential impacts of a TFPA-proposed project, see generally U.S. FOREST SERV., BIOLOGICAL EVALUATION FOR THE TULE RIVER RESERVATION PROTECTION PROJECT (2014), https://www.fs.usda.gov/nfs/11558/www/nepa/24409_FSPLT3_2285913.pdf [https://perma.cc/HSE7-MQ7D] (analyzing potential impacts the Tule River project would have on “sensitive species” in the area and proposing alternatives for reducing wildfire threats); U.S. FOREST SERV., RECORD OF DECISION: TULE RIVER RESERVATION PROTECTION
infrastructure and economies, and addressing large-scale forest health issues.

In 2018 Congress again expanded tribal self-determination and USFS contracting authority in the Agriculture Improvement Act (Farm Bill). The Farm Bill granted the USFS the authority, for the first time, to execute 638 agreements with tribes to undertake TFPA-specific projects and work. The bill also extended Good Neighbor Authority to tribal governments to be eligible to execute forestry management agreements with states and the USDA.

Under the Farm Bill, the new USFS 638 authority is limited to the specific projects and programs identified in the TFPA. The projects must
follow preexisting TFPA requirements, and the contracting tribe must first submit a TFPA proposal and obtain its approval before entering into a 638 agreement. In 2020 the Tulalip Tribe of Washington became the first tribe to enter into a Forest Service 638 agreement under the TFPA. In an agreement with the Mt. Baker-Snoqualmie National Forest, the tribe’s TFPA project focused on watershed restoration and included efforts to capture, relocate, and monitor beavers in the South Fork Stillaguamish watershed in Washington. The reintroduction of beavers into the watershed was intended to improve instream and riparian landscapes that support endangered salmon, which is a critical treaty resource to the Tulalip Tribe.

The TFPA and the Forest Service’s 638 authority have complementary purposes. The TFPA provides a mechanism for tribes to propose federal projects that are important to the tribe, while the 638 authority is one of the tools the tribe may use to implement a project.

II. EVALUATING THE POTENTIAL—AND THE REALITY—OF TRIBAL CONTRACTING WITH LAND MANAGEMENT AGENCIES

Tribal contracting is the easiest way to achieve tribal co-management of federal public lands. To be sure, contracts with federal land management agencies exist in a policy space beyond the traditional purpose of tribal self-determination contracting, which initially focused on enhancing tribal self-governance. But the conceptual leap is not as significant as one might think. Tribes have long viewed themselves as stewards of the land, and much of the federal public land in the western United States was specifically ceded by tribes in treaties when the tribes “reserved” smaller parcels as perpetual homelands. In many instances, tribes continue to maintain a strong affinity for ceded lands. In some cases, tribal members possess continuing “off-reservation” treaty rights to hunt, fish, and gather on those ceded lands. This Section discusses the justifications for enlisting tribes in public land management. It then

113. The project must include federal land adjacent to tribal land that either poses a threat to the trust land, is in need of restoration, is not subject to a conflicting agreement or contract, or involves various features or circumstances unique to the proposing tribe (legal, cultural, archaeological, historical, or biological). Tribal Forest Protection Act of 2004, 25 U.S.C. § 3115a(c).
115. Id.
116. See id.
117. See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 853 F.3d 946 (9th Cir. 2017).
assesses the large potential and the more modest reality of tribal contracting for public land management.

A. Why Tribal Management or Co-Management of Public Lands?

Advocates and policymakers have a variety of reasons for wishing to engage tribal governments in co-management of public lands. The most profound reason may be the claim that it is a matter of justice. While contracting with a tribe to provide services or co-manage may not be as significant a gesture as returning the lands, contracting constitutes an acknowledgement of the tribal connection to the land and a respect for tribal history and expertise. The American myth about “how the West was won” continues to rankle tribes. Much of the lands ceded by tribes were obtained by promises that were later broken. Moreover, the United States has a poor record on reparations to American Indian tribal nations. Past efforts have largely failed. The feeling among tribes that their lands were stolen remains strong, and the widespread view is that many substantial injustices have never been adequately addressed. Tribal co-management as a remedy pales in comparison to the demands of the landback movement, which advocates for the restoration of lands (and much more) to tribal nations. But co-management is a small measure of restorative justice at a time when the United States seems more willing to take seriously its responsibility to address past wrongs.

A second reason, which is more practical but related, is that a larger tribal role in land management may lessen conflicts with tribes around matters related to sacred sites and sacred places on public lands. Many


tribes have significant religious relationships with public lands, raising myriad problems for federal managers. One common issue is that tribal officials often demand protection for sacred places but are frequently unwilling to identify their locations to public lands managers who, because of federal open-records laws, are forbidden from disclosing this information. Tribes worry, reasonably, that identifying the location will have the perverse effect of alerting the public to a sacred location and draw unwanted attention and traffic to the very places they wish to protect. If a tribe is managing or co-managing land directly, without using an agent who is legally incapable of preserving secrets, the tribe may be able to provide the protection to the sacred place without disclosing their locations.

Third, it is becoming more and more clear that federal efforts to address climate change cannot succeed without engaging tribal governments as allies. Tribes have their own reasons to be interested in addressing this important threat, but the United States may be more likely to gain cooperation from tribes if it treats tribes like full partners in this important endeavor. Co-management can demonstrate such partnership.

Fourth, as will be discussed further below, tribes have a lot to offer, including traditional ecological knowledge and practices regarding resource management that have been passed down through generations. Tribes may simply be able to perform better, in some instances, than federal managers can.

122. See generally MICHAEL D. MCNALLY, Religion as Spirituality, in DEFEND THE SACRED: NATIVE AMERICAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM BEYOND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 94 (2020) (describing several such relationships).


124. See, e.g., MYLES ALLEN ET AL., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Summary for Policymakers, in GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5°C, at 3, 23 (Masson-Delmotte et al. eds., 2019) (“Strengthening the capacities for climate action of national and sub-national authorities, civil society, the private sector, Indigenous peoples, and local communities can support the implementation of ambitious actions required to limit global warming to 1.5°C . . . .”).

B. The Potential

Federal public lands managed by the BLM, Forest Service, FWS, and Park Service constitute almost one-third of the total land mass of the United States. That presents a lot of opportunities.

By now, tribes have been managing federal Indian programs for roughly forty years. Tribes have substantial expertise in public management in part because the portfolio of the BIA is broad and tribes can contract for most of the significant functions within the BIA. For example, roughly 29,000 miles of roads in the United States and more than 900 bridges are owned by the United States in trust for tribes. As a practical matter, tribes—or the BIA in close coordination with tribes—manage all of this infrastructure. Tribes maintain much of this infrastructure under 638 contracts, self-governance compacts, or so-called “G2G” government-to-government contracts between tribal governments and the U.S. Department of Transportation. 

For context, roughly a half-billion dollars are spent on tribal roads programs annually, much of it by Indian tribal governments.

Through decades of contracting with the federal government, tribes have gained significant capacity to manage federal programs and facilities. The late Cherokee humorist Will Rogers once said, “Good judgment comes from experience, and a lot of that comes from bad judgment.”


Tribes, no doubt, have made mistakes, but they have gained a lot of experience. Since 1975, tribes have developed internal controls, complied with frequent federal audits, and met the complex responsibilities associated with using federal taxpayers’ money to operate programs.\textsuperscript{131} The use by any contractor of federally appropriated money is carefully regulated, audited, and scrutinized.\textsuperscript{132} Tribes have succeeded under such scrutiny for many years.

Tough federal standards are built into the tribal contracting regimes, and tribes are meeting those standards. For example, a tribe may not become a “self-governance” tribe eligible for funding agreements with other DOI agencies unless it has three years of audits of existing Title I 638 contracts with no uncorrected significant and material audit exceptions.\textsuperscript{133} In that respect, federal law creates a graduated system in which tribes that are successful in managing their contracts are rewarded with greater flexibility. As a result, many tribes are sophisticated federal contractors, successful in meeting the myriad federal regulatory requirements related to budgeting, auditing, performance reporting, and the like.

Tribes also have experience with other significant federal infrastructure. When a well-informed American citizen thinks about federal dams, the Army Corps of Engineers is likely to come to mind, with more than 700 dams,\textsuperscript{134} or perhaps the federal BOR, with 490 dams.\textsuperscript{135} The BIA is responsible for more dams than either of these expert federal agencies. The BIA’s dam inventory includes \textit{nearly 800 dams}, 138 of which are considered high- or significant-hazard dams.\textsuperscript{136} Tribes have the theoretical opportunity to contract for construction, as well as operation and maintenance, of the BIA dams.\textsuperscript{137} Indeed, the National Monitoring

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{131} Washburn, \textit{supra} note 91, at 204, 207.
  \item \textsuperscript{132} See, e.g., ROBERT JAY DILGER & R. CORINNE BLACKFORD, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45576, \textit{AN OVERVIEW OF SMALL BUSINESS CONTRACTING} (2022).
  \item \textsuperscript{133} 25 U.S.C. § 5383(c).
  \item \textsuperscript{135} \textit{About Us – Fact Sheet}, U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION (May 6, 2021), https://www.usbr.gov/main/about/fact.html [https://perma.cc/J4N9-CHXZ].
  \item \textsuperscript{136} 2018 BUDGET JUSTIFICATIONS, supra note 127, at IA-CON-RM-4 (“BIA currently administers 138 high- or significant-hazard potential dams on 42 Indian reservations. There are over 700 additional dams on Indian reservations that are classified as low-hazard potential or are unclassified.”).
\end{itemize}
Co-Management of Federal Public Lands

Center for all BIA dams is operated by the Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes on the Flathead Reservation in western Montana pursuant to a 638 contract.\(^{138}\) One can imagine tribes lending their expertise to the BOR by contracting to perform some of these functions for BOR dams.

Evidence suggests that, in some circumstances, tribal governments manage public lands better than federal agencies. In the forestry context, for example, tribes have been found to be adept at decreasing costs, raising worker productivity, and increasing income from forest products.\(^{139}\) According to reports, “In many cases, tribal forests . . . were often found to be in better condition than neighboring federal lands.”\(^{140}\) In addition, “numerous tribes have been more effective at using their limited resources to better protect forest health, prevent catastrophic wildfires and create jobs.”\(^{141}\) The reasons are likely varied. Tribes may simply have better knowledge about neighboring lands from centuries of work on the land by many generations of tribal members. Maybe it reflects their commitment. Professional federal land managers likely are deeply committed to public lands, but they are frequently transferred around the United States as their careers develop. Consider the viewpoint from the perspective of an employee. It may be a significant sacrifice for a federal employee to move to a rural community to take an assignment at a remote Forest Service unit. But, for a person from a tribe adjacent to the unit, the location may be no sacrifice at all. In other words, tribal officials may be more committed to a particular place, and their commitment may be even more personal and more significant. It may be about far more than a career. As one commentator described tribal engagement, “[F]orest management is an expression of their cultural relationship with the land.”\(^{142}\) For many tribes, religious and cultural values may support their relationships with the forests they manage. As permanent neighbors, tribes may see themselves

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138. Id. at 76. The tribe has also successfully contracted a BIA hydroelectric power project: the BIA-owned power project is Mission Valley Power. Home, MISSION VALLEY POWER, https://missionvalleypower.org/ [https://perma.cc/ZZ5A-BN7J] (last visited Feb. 26, 2022).

139. Berry, supra note 12, at 3 (“[A]s tribal control increases relative to BIA control, worker productivity rises, costs decline, and income improves. Even the price received for reservation logs increases.”) (quoting Matthew B. Krepps, Can Tribes Manage Their Own Resources? The 638 Program and American Indian Forestry, in WHAT CAN TRIBES DO? STRATEGIES AND INSTITUTIONS IN AMERICAN INDIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 179, 179 (Stephen Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt eds., 1993)).

140. 2 THIRD INDIAN FOREST MGMT. ASSESSMENT TEAM, INTERTRIBAL TIMBER COUNCIL, AN ASSESSMENT OF INDIAN FORESTS AND FOREST MANAGEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (2013).

141. Blevins, supra note 126, at 2.

as having a longer-term role—and a more profound one—regarding the stewardship of public lands.

To be sure, a head-to-head comparison may be unfair. Values, interests, and motivations may differ between federal and tribal land managers. For example, the Forest Service is not obliged to produce income from timber sales. Instead, the management goal is to attain the combination of uses that will “best meet the needs of the American people . . . and not necessarily the combination of uses that will give the greatest dollar return or the greatest unit output.”¹⁴³ The Forest Service is funded primarily by congressional appropriations; revenue from timber sales is sent to the Treasury.¹⁴⁴ Thus, sales provide no direct benefit to the Forest Service, severing any significant link between costs and benefits. In contrast, tribes may depend on timber sales from tribal lands to sustain local governmental functions. The yields of tribal forests provide jobs and income for tribal members while enhancing the quality of life of those on the reservation. It may be important to the survival of the tribe that the forest remain healthy and offer sustenance for generations to come.

Tribes may also be more efficient. A tribal forestry expert testified that “[t]ribes are able to accomplish more in their forests with far less funding than other federal land managers. On a per-acre basis, tribes receive about one-third the funding for forest and wildfire management as the Forest Service.”¹⁴⁵ While some federal laws and regulations do not apply to tribes managing their own trust lands, tribes under contract to the Forest Service must abide by federal laws such as the National Environmental Policy Act¹⁴⁶ (NEPA) and federal management plans established under various statutes, such as the Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act¹⁴⁷ and the National Forest Management Act.¹⁴⁸ As contractors, tribes may have an incentive to accomplish more with less.

In sum, tribal governments are ready, willing, and able to engage in co-management of public lands.¹⁴⁹ Consider the fish and wildlife context

¹⁴³. 16 U.S.C. § 531(a).
¹⁴⁴. Berry, supra note 12, at 18.
¹⁴⁹. See Nat’l Cong. of Am. Indians, Gen. Assembly Res. REN-13-042, Requesting that Department of Interior and United States Fish and Wildlife Service Update its American Indian Policy to Recognize the Proper Level of Consultation and Co-Management of Natural Resources for Tribes and the General Public 2 (2013), https://www.ncai.org/attachments/Resolution_fwxUeoUEIrMHaxGvkpqFpFarGeBRoVuA
alone. While it is easy to romanticize the tribal relationship with the natural environment, there is no doubt that tribes frequently have centuries-old and symbiotic relationships with various species. Tribes have a strong track record of sustainable management of fish and wildlife, from bison on the plains, salmon in the Pacific Northwest, and caribou in Alaska to hundreds of other examples nationwide. Such relationships have endured short-term crises, such as wildfires and floods, and presumably long-term stress, such as century-long droughts. Through it all, species survived and thrived under Native stewardship. The moral case for tribes is hard to ignore, especially at a time when traditional ecological knowledge has become more important in addressing sustainability.

C. The Reality

Tribes have had tremendous success in contracting for federal “Indian Services” programs, that is, programs on Indian reservations serving Indian people. In contrast, despite the clear authorization for tribes to manage federal public lands programs, tribes have often encountered significant obstacles when seeking to move beyond traditional tribal self-governance programs. More than twenty years after Congress authorized contracting outside traditional Indian agencies, tribes have had some success with the BOR but little success with other federal agencies.

Interior is required by law to publish lists annually of the programs that are eligible for contracting and to identify existing contracts. The annual list is detailed and quite specific. The number of such contracts has increased and decreased slightly over time but has never been significant. In sum, tribal contracts with land management agencies have occurred, but they have been rare and limited in scope. During Fiscal

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152. See, e.g., List of Programs Eligible for Inclusion in Funding Agreements Negotiated with Self-Governance Tribes by Interior Bureaus Other than the Bureau of Indian Affairs and Fiscal Year 2021 Programmatic Targets, 86 Fed. Reg. 14,147, 14,147–14,152 (Mar. 12, 2021).

153. Id.

Year 2021, tribes had only ten self-governance contracts with public land management agencies at Interior, including Reclamation.\textsuperscript{155}

In late 2016, Secretary of the Interior Sally Jewell issued a secretarial order encouraging federal land managers to engage in cooperative management opportunities with tribes.\textsuperscript{156} This order reflected optimism but appears to have had no effect in producing new ISDA funding agreements. For the most recent reporting period, the BLM has two such contracts; BOR has four; the Park Service has three, discussed below; and the FWS has only one.\textsuperscript{157} None of these contracts is particularly significant, and none involves the management of a service unit or facility. None can be characterized as “co-management.”

A closer look at a few contracts can provide context and illuminate some of the problems. Consider the following examples.

1. THE NATIONAL PARK SERVICE

Consider first the National Parks. The NPS administers the National Park System, which also includes “parks, monuments, battlefields, . . . historic sites, lakeshores, seashores, [and] recreation areas.”\textsuperscript{158} The National Park System has been characterized as “America’s best idea.”\textsuperscript{159}

The most iconic public lands in the United States are national parks; think Glacier, the Grand Canyon, Yellowstone, and Yosemite. Most of these lands are aboriginal Indian lands, that is, the former homelands of Native people.\textsuperscript{160} Some iconic features on public lands figure prominently
in tribal culture and histories. Consider the San Francisco Peaks in northern Arizona or Bear Lodge in South Dakota.

The twin missions of the NPS are to conserve these iconic lands for future generations and yet also provide current visitors access to them. At the extremes, these twin missions conflict somewhat, meaning that the NPS often has a difficult job.

Of all of the federal agencies, the NPS has perhaps been the most open to federal contracting with tribes. The NPS has identified numerous parks that are proximate to tribes. In Fiscal Year 2015, tribes were eligible to seek contracts to perform up to twenty-three different

161. See Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1063–64, 1098–1102 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (discussing the religious interests in the San Francisco Peaks by the Hopi, Navajo, and other Indigenous peoples).


163. An Act to Establish a National Park Service, and for Other Purposes, Pub. L. No. 64-235, 39 Stat. 535 (codified as amended at 54 U.S.C. § 100101–104907) (detailing the National Park Service’s mission). To meet this mission, the NPS maintains the park units, protects the natural and cultural resources, and conducts a host of visitor services. The visitor services include law enforcement, park maintenance, and interpretation of geology, history, and natural and cultural resources. List of Programs Eligible for Inclusion in Fiscal Year 2013 Funding Agreements to be Negotiated with Self-Governance Tribes by Interior Bureaus Other than the Bureau of Indian Affairs, 78 Fed. Reg. 4,861, 4,862–4,865 (Jan. 23, 2013).


165. The NPS has a tribal contracting implementation policy. When considering a tribal self-governance agreement, NPS purports to consider “the proximity of an identified self-governance Tribe to a national park, monument, preserve, or recreation area and the types of programs that have components that may be suitable for administering through a self-governance funding agreement.” List of Programs Eligible for Inclusion in Funding Agreements Negotiated with Self-Governance Tribes by Interior Bureaus Other than the Bureau of Indian Affairs and Fiscal Year 2021 Programmatic Targets, 86 Fed. Reg. 14,147, 14,149 (Mar. 12, 2021). Components of programs that may be eligible for a self-governance funding agreement are “Archaeological Surveys,” “Comprehensive Management Planning,” “Cultural Resource Management Projects,” “Ethnographic Studies,” “Erosion Control,” and a range of others. Id.

166. Id. at 14,149–14,151. In New Mexico alone, for example, the NPS has identified the following areas as locations of NPS Service Units that are in close proximity to self-governance tribes: Aztec Ruins National Monument, Bandelier National Monument, Carlsbad Caverns National Park, Chaco Culture National Historic Park, and White Sands National Monument. Id. at 14,150.
activities at sixty-three different park units in the United States. Those numbers were largely unchanged in FY 2021. Yet today, tribes contract for operations at only three national parks.

\textit{a. Grand Portage Band and National Monument}

The first National Park Service unit to contract with a tribe was the Grand Portage National Monument in a contract with the Grand Portage Band of Lake Superior Chippewa. In November 1996, only two years after the enactment of the legislative amendments to the ISDA that authorized such contracts, the band requested negotiations for an annual funding agreement with the monument, which is located at the northeasternmost point of Minnesota. When the contracting initiative began, the band originally sought to “operate the Monument in all its essential aspects.” The band worried about political opposition, however, so it decided to take a "staged approach." About two years later, in February 1999, the band had a signed contract to administer the maintenance program at the monument.

In 2007 scholar Mary Ann King produced a thoughtful case study of tribal contracting and co-management, using Grand Portage as the centerpiece. King characterized Grand Portage as the “poster child” for implementation of the tribal contracting regime in the NPS and an “easy case.” Indeed, the band had been the major proponent behind the creation of the national monument. The band and the broader Minnesota

\begin{itemize}
  \item 167. List of Programs Eligible for Inclusion in Funding Agreements Negotiated with Self-Governance Tribes by Interior Bureaus Other than the Bureau of Indian Affairs and Fiscal Year 2015 Programmatic Targets, 80 Fed. Reg. 60,171, 60,173–60,174 (Oct. 5, 2015).
  \item 168. List of Programs Eligible for Inclusion in Funding Agreements Negotiated with Self-Governance Tribes by Interior Bureaus Other than the Bureau of Indian Affairs and Fiscal Year 2021 Programmatic Targets, 86 Fed. Reg. 14,147, 14,149–14,150 (Mar. 12, 2021).
  \item 169. \textit{Id.} at 14,147.
  \item 171. \textit{Id.} at 519 n.253 (quoting Letter from Norman Deschampe, Chairman, Grand Portage Reservation Tribal Council, to Pat Parker, Chief, Am. Indian Liaison Off., Nat’l Park Serv. (Nov. 5, 1996)).
  \item 172. \textit{Id.} at 519.
  \item 173. \textit{Id.} at 518.
  \item 174. \textit{Id.} at 480.
  \item 175. \textit{Id.} at 518.
\end{itemize}
Chippewa Tribe, of which the band is a member, donated much of the land to create the monument in the late 1950s.\textsuperscript{176} King reported significant, positive impacts of the agreement and offered insight into how some of the conflicts were managed. For example, because of Grand Portage’s contract, seasonal employees were able to be converted to year-round employees with benefits.\textsuperscript{177} Most of them were members of the band or related to members of the band.\textsuperscript{178} While most of the NPS workers did not object to working for the band, one wished to remain a NPS employee; he was accommodated through an Intergovernmental Personnel Act agreement, remaining a NPS employee on detail to the tribe with the understanding that upon his retirement, the position would be filled by the tribe under the contract.\textsuperscript{179}

A key advantage was shared resources. Under the arrangement between the band and the NPS, the band was able to run the maintenance department more efficiently and cost-effectively than the NPS. The band has loaned equipment to the band-operated NPS maintenance office, which would have been cost-prohibitive for the NPS to purchase.\textsuperscript{180} The band and the NPS also were able to collaborate on a water and sewer system, which benefits both governmental entities.\textsuperscript{181}

Today, the Grand Portage Band has an annual funding agreement with the NPS worth approximately $350,000 per year and the opportunity to contract for sporadic construction projects.\textsuperscript{182} The annual appropriation for the monument is in the range of $1.3 million.\textsuperscript{183} In other words, the band’s involvement with the monument is substantial and successful; it falls well short, however, of full operation of the park unit.

It is difficult to imagine a monument or park with circumstances more ideal for a robust tribal role. King summarized the advantages at Grant

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{176} Id. at 511–12. Other lands, presumably allotted lands, were obtained from individual Indians and non-Indians by purchase.
\item \textsuperscript{177} Id. at 520.
\item \textsuperscript{178} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{179} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{180} See id. at 520–21 & n.270.
\item \textsuperscript{181} Id. at 522.
\item \textsuperscript{183} 2018 Budget Justifications, supra note 127, at ONPS-Summaries-10, -35 (indicating that the Grand Portage National Monument budget for FY 2016 was $1,355,000 and included 12 FTEs and that President Trump requested a reduction to $1,274,000 for FY 2018).
\end{itemize}
Portage this way: “a responsive superintendent, favorable enabling legislation, a positive historical relationship, a patient tribe, the transfer of relatively minor decision-making authority, existing informal arrangements, and a non-premier park unit.” And yet, after having a contractual relationship with the unit for twenty-five years, the band’s role is still fairly modest, involving only a little more than one-quarter of the monument’s annual budget. The “staged approach” has not proceeded very far beyond stage one.

b. Redwoods National Park and the Yurok Tribe

Another successful but modest tribal-NPS relationship exists between the Redwoods National Park and the Yurok Tribe, which is the largest tribe in California. The Redwoods National Park lies in far northern California, partially within the Yurok Reservation, and much or all of the park is within the Yurok Tribe’s broader aboriginal territory. The park consists of about 71,000 acres of federal land and is part of a joint venture with three state parks with which it has a partnership that includes 60,000 additional acres. Much of the land is old-growth forest consisting of enormous Redwood trees for which the park is named. The iconic trees have an average age of 500 to 700 years and can grow to a height of 120 meters or more.

In 2006, the NPS agreed to work toward collaborative management with the Yurok Tribe, beginning with a modest scope. Among other activities, the Yurok Tribe has operated a youth conservation corps in

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184. King, supra note 170, at 523.
188. Id.
189. Id.
conjunction with the park and has also had some episodic work.\textsuperscript{191} An example of one project the tribe performed was removing a building and cleaning up the site of the former Redwood Hostel; it had become a public hazard and, due to its proximity to tribal cultural resources, had been unwelcome by Yurok and other tribes.\textsuperscript{192} The tribe removed the building carefully to minimize ground disturbance and foster restoration of the land.\textsuperscript{193} The Yurok Tribe also engages in air quality monitoring.\textsuperscript{194}

Funding agreements have continued for more than a decade. In 2016 the NPS signed an agreement that extended four years from fiscal year 2017 through fiscal year 2021.\textsuperscript{195} The lengthier agreement was positive because it allowed for greater continuity, but the scope of the agreement remains exceedingly modest. The total value of the contract for both functions is only $31,000 per year—\textsuperscript{196}at a park with a budget in excess of $9 million.\textsuperscript{197}

c. Sitka National Historical Park and the Sitka Tribe of Alaska

Another example of a successful, yet modest, arrangement is the arrangement between the Sitka Tribe of Alaska and the National Park Service for programs at the Sitka National Historical Park (NHP) in downtown Sitka, Alaska, in a contract signed in 2018.

The Sitka NHP has a long history. It was the first federally designated park in Alaska in 1890.\textsuperscript{198} It contains eighteen totem poles, a Tlingit fort, and the battleground for the Battle of Sitka of 1804, in which Russian trappers and hunters fought against Alaska Natives in a battle for control of the Pacific fur trade.\textsuperscript{199} “Shee Atika” (Sitka), the site of the current national park, was an established Tlingit village prior to Russian

\begin{itemize}
\item[191.] AM. INDIAN LIAISON OFF., NAT’L PARK SERV., SUMMARY NARRATIVE REPORT: CONSULTATION AND PARTNERSHIPS WITH FEDERALLY RECOGNIZED TRIBES & ANCSA CORPORATIONS 131–32 (2019) [hereinafter NPS SUMMARY NARRATIVE REPORT].
\item[192.] Id. at 71.
\item[193.] Id.
\item[194.] Id. at 134.
\item[195.] Id. at 131.
\end{itemize}
incursions in the late eighteenth century.\textsuperscript{200} It is situated within the town of Sitka, adjacent to the town’s main thoroughfare and roughly a mile away from municipal headquarters. Various Tlingit clans inhabited this region of the Alaskan panhandle for centuries, carving out their respective fishing areas and engaging in extensive trade with various Athabascan groups.\textsuperscript{201} The Sitka Tribe’s “traditional territory reflects the lands and waters historically and presently [under] the stewardship responsibility of the Sheet’ka Kwaan.”\textsuperscript{202} The park covers 113 acres, including fifty-eight acres of land and fifty-five acres of water.\textsuperscript{203}

In some contrast to the construction, maintenance, and air quality projects at Grant Portage and Redwoods, the arrangement at Sitka has been cultural in nature.\textsuperscript{204} The Sitka Tribe has co-managed the park’s “informational and orientation programs, interpretive programs, educational programs, and interpretive media.”\textsuperscript{205} In this role, tribal employees greet visitors when they enter the park, direct tours, and oversee the natural history and cultural history education programs.\textsuperscript{206} The park superintendent reported that the agreement provides “an expanded tribal perspective and expertise in interpretive and visitor services areas, [which allows] for an expanded tribal presence and diversity of tribal members working in partnership with the park.”\textsuperscript{207} It is easy to see the advantage of engaging a tribe to handle interpretive duties at a park that commemorates, in part, the work of a tribe fighting for its land against foreign invaders (a subject that is even less sensitive in a context in which the foreign invaders were not Americans).


\textsuperscript{201.} Id.

\textsuperscript{202.} Support of the Southeast Alaska Native Educators Board and Council of Traditional Scholars Recommendations, Tribal Council Resol. 94-2004 (Sitka Tribe of Alaska 2004).


\textsuperscript{205.} David Elkowitz, Annual Funding Agreement for Fiscal Year 2018 Between Sitka Tribe of Alaska and the United States National Park Service 2 (Jan. 19, 2018) (on file with author) [hereinafter Elkowitz, AFA with the Sitka Tribe].


\textsuperscript{207.} E-mail from David Elkowitz, Park Superintendent, Nat’l Park Serv. (May 2018) (on file with author); see also NPS SUMMARY NARRATIVE REPORT, supra note 191, at 82, 122–23.
The annual base funding for Sitka National Historical Park in 2018 was $2,223,000. Out of that budget, $565,000 is allocated to the interpretation and education department. The Sitka Tribe’s funding agreement with NPS for fiscal year 2018 was roughly half of that amount at $285,584.62. The funds supported six seasonal positions and three full-time, year-round positions for the Sitka Tribe. The general manager of the Sitka Tribe described the obstacles to reaching the agreement this way: “We kind of struggled through it honestly . . . there wasn’t any clear guidance in place for what to do.” The Sitka Tribe modeled its proposal on contracts for BIA programs. The agreement gave the Sitka Tribe an important role in articulating the history of the region.

In sum, the tribe’s agreement with the Sitka NHP comprised less than thirteen percent of the park’s annual budget and only about half of the interpretive programs budget. Still, in staffing alone, the contract was more significant than other parks contracts, and the substance of the contract is promising. Contracting for interpretative work on federal park lands that meet the legal requirement of a “special geographic, historical, or cultural significance” to a tribe would seem to present opportunities across the United States. Given Professor David Treuer’s compelling description of the link between tribes and national parks and the broader interest in telling history accurately and respectfully, enlisting tribes in interpretative services at parks would seem to represent a prime opportunity for improving park programming and collaboration with tribes.

The agreement includes no land-management function, however. Even the Sitka agreement confirms the thesis that tribal contracts with parks are rare, financially modest, and limited in scope.

The three contracts described above were the only NPS self-governance contracts existing with tribes as of the most recent reporting.

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209. See Elkowitz, AFA with the Sitka Tribe, supra note 205, add. B at 1–2.

210. See id.

211. Id. The contract notes that “all amounts in this Agreement are subject to appropriation by Congress and will be adjusted accordingly.” See id. at 7.

212. See Schipani, supra note 206. After completing the agreement, the Sitka Tribe signaled willingness to provide copies of its agreement to other tribes at a national conference, hoping to simplify the process so other tribes “don’t have to recreate the wheel.” Id.

213. See id.


215. See supra notes 7–8 and accompanying text.
period. These agreements can be path-marking for the Park Service. But much more can be done.

2. THE FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE

Consider next the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS). Two agreements with the FWS provide even greater insight into obstacles and challenges in contracting with tribes. Established by the Reorganization Plan No. III of 1940, FWS has a more complicated and more controversial role than that of the Parks. The congressional direction in the Fish and Wildlife Act is to ensure “the fish, shellfish, and wildlife resources of the Nation make a material contribution to our national economy and food supply . . . [and] the health, recreation, and well-being of our citizens.” Congress recognized “that such resources are a living, renewable form of national wealth that is capable of being maintained and greatly increased with proper management, but equally capable of destruction if neglected or unwisely exploited.” As a practical matter, however, one of the most significant challenges for FWS is meeting the significant demands of the Endangered Species Act.

The FWS has explicitly recognized that tribal governments wish to “manage, co-manage, or collaboratively manage fish and wildlife resources” and has asserted a commitment to enter into contracts, cooperative agreements, or grants at the request of individual tribes for fish and wildlife activities consistent with federal Indian contracting laws and the agency’s mission. Within FWS, tribes are theoretically eligible to contract for approximately eight different activities on nearly twenty different wildlife refuges or related facilities. Yet the FWS has contracted with only two tribes, and only one of these contracts apparently remains in effect. That agreement is between the Council of Athabascan

219.  Id.
221.  They include Endangered Species Programs, Education Programs, Environmental Contaminants Programs, Wetland and Habitat Conservation Restoration, Fish Hatchery Operations, and National Wildlife Refuge Operation and Maintenance. See List of Programs Eligible for Inclusion in Funding Agreements Negotiated with Self-Governance Tribes by Interior Bureaus Other than the Bureau of Indian Affairs and Fiscal Year 2016 Programmatic Targets, 81 Fed. Reg. 25,699, 25,702–25,703 (Apr. 29, 2016).
222.  Id. at 25,700.
Tribal Governments, a tribal consortium in Alaska, and the Yukon Flats Wildlife Refuge.\(^{223}\)

\textit{a. Council of Athabascan Tribal Governments Agreement with FWS for Yukon Flats}

The Yukon Flats Nation Wildlife Refuge is a vast wildlife refuge located in eastern Alaska, consisting of 8.6 million acres of undeveloped wilderness.\(^{224}\) The geography of Yukon Flats ranges from forest to wetlands and is home to many different species of wildlife and fish, including migrating shorebirds, nesting waterfowl, and resident species such as moose, muskrat, beaver, wolf, lynx, hare, marten, and others.\(^{225}\) Managed by the FWS, it covers a huge area, larger than several American states, 220 miles east to west and 120 miles north to south.\(^{226}\) It is the third largest wildlife refuge in the United States.\(^{227}\)

The refuge is also within the traditional homelands of several Alaska Native tribes\(^{228}\) that have joined to form a regional consortium of tribes known as the Council of Athabascan Tribal Governments (CATG, or “the Council”).\(^{229}\) Some of these tribal communities reside entirely within the vast refuge.\(^{230}\) In rural Alaska, the principal population is Alaska Native.\(^{231}\) In interior Alaska, many Alaska Natives live their lives much like their ancestors have for centuries. Except for some technological improvements, such as chainsaws, snowmobiles, and the like, many

\begin{itemize}
  \item \(^{223}\) \textit{Id.; The First Gathering, COUNCIL OF ATHABASCAN TRIBAL GOV’TS,}\n  \texttt{https://www.catg.org/the-first-gathering/} [https://perma.cc/6AT9-QTNJ] (last visited Feb.
  \item \(^{224}\) \textit{About the Refuge, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV.: YUKON FLATS} (July 30,
  2018), \texttt{https://www.fws.gov/refuge/Yukon_Flats/about.html}.
  \item \(^{225}\) \textit{U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE ANNUAL
  \item \(^{226}\) \textit{Welcome, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV.: YUKON FLATS} (May 4, 2019),
  \texttt{https://www.fws.gov/refuge/yukon_flats/welcome.html}.
  \item \(^{227}\) \textit{About the Refuge, supra note 224}.
  \item \(^{228}\) \textit{Department of the Interior Tribal Self-Governance Act of 2007: Hearing on
  Statement of Ben Stevens] (statement of Ben Stevens, Executive Director, Council of
  Athabascan Tribal Governments)}.
  \item \(^{229}\) \textit{About the Refuge, supra note 224}.
  \item \(^{230}\) \textit{Department of the Interior Tribal Self-Governance Act of 2007: Hearing on
  Cason, Associate Deputy Secretary, U.S. Department of the Interior)}.
  \item \(^{231}\) Eighty-two percent of the population in rural areas are Alaska Natives.
  GRETA L. GOTO, GEORGE IRVIN, SARAH SHERRY & KATIE EBERHART, FIRST ALASKANS
  INST., OUR CHOICES, OUR FUTURE (2004).\end{itemize}
Alaska Natives have traditional lifestyles, including hunting and fishing for subsistence, and many still speak traditional languages.\textsuperscript{232} Using traditional ecological knowledge is part of their daily lives.\textsuperscript{233}

Soon after passage of the 1994 law that authorized such contracts, CATG sought a contract to support operations at Yukon Flats.\textsuperscript{234} The Council and FWS had previously reached several cooperative agreements authorized under the Alaska National Interest Land Conservation Act and had a strong working relationship.\textsuperscript{235} In light of these earlier agreements, CATG already had staff organized to support refuge activities.\textsuperscript{236} In November 1998 the Council submitted a fairly ambitious proposal under the ISDA to contract with FWS for several programs at Yukon Flats,\textsuperscript{237} including “refuge operations and management, ecological services, and cultural resources and fisheries programs.”\textsuperscript{238} The FWS declined that contract because the proposal was made under Title I of the ISDA and because the services performed by the agency were not “for the benefit of Indians because of their status as Indians.”\textsuperscript{239} Discussions, however, continued.

In 2002 CATG submitted a new proposal to FWS under a more appropriate provision, Section 403(c) of Title IV of the ISDA, which includes services and functions performed by a DOI agency that are of “special geographic, historical or cultural significance” to a tribe.\textsuperscript{240} The 2002 proposal was wide-ranging. It included an array of programs such as “fish and wildlife population surveys; habitat surveys; wildlife program planning; habitation restoration; educational programs; data collection regarding water and air-quality; tagging programs for salmon and other fish; conservation law enforcement; and[] concessions and maintenance activities.”\textsuperscript{241} FWS acknowledged the “special geographic, historic and

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{232} Id. at 65; D. Roy Mitchell, IV, \textit{Alaska Native Language Preservation & Advisory Council}, \textit{Alaska Dep’t of Com.}, https://www.commerce.alaska.gov/web/dca/AKNativeLanguagePreservationAdvisoryCouncil/Languages.aspx [https://perma.cc/P6K4-R3U6] (last visited Feb. 20, 2022).
\item \textsuperscript{234} Memorandum from Geoff Strommer, Attorney, Hobbs, Straus, Dean & Walker, to Council of Athabascan Tribal Governments 1–3 (Aug. 10, 2015) (on file with the author).
\item \textsuperscript{235} Statement of Ben Stevens, supra note 228, at 36.
\item \textsuperscript{236} Memorandum from Geoff Strommer, supra note 234, at 2.
\item \textsuperscript{237} Id. at 2.
\item \textsuperscript{238} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{239} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{240} Id. at 3 (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 5363(c)).
\item \textsuperscript{241} Id.
cultural significance to CATG” but nevertheless denied the proposal.242 CATG appealed the decision, but apparently FWS never issued a final decision.243

CATG persisted in negotiations, which continued into 2003. CATG worked closely with FWS staff in Alaska to determine which programs the FWS would be willing to include in the proposal.244 By mid-2003, after nearly five years of discussions, CATG reached an agreement in principle for a funding agreement.245 Though the scope of the proposed agreement was modest, it was nevertheless controversial. Outside opposition became apparent when the proposed agreement was made available for public comment in February 2004.246 The FWS received 147 public comments, 126 of which were opposed to the agreement.247 A large number of comments in opposition were linked to another refuge issue involving tribal management related to the National Bison Range in Montana,248 suggesting that the opposition was organized and may have been based on policy concerns rather than local concerns, which is not uncommon in Alaska.249 While relatively few Americans have ever visited Alaska, it looms large in the American psyche, and many Americans have strong feelings about how it should be managed.250

Several commenters sought to block the proposed agreement, asserting that the FWS prepare an environmental impact statement under NEPA.251 The FWS rejected this suggestion because the contract was within the scope of routine operations, maintenance, and management of Yukon Flats and did not constitute a change in activities or direction from...
the longstanding, comprehensive conservation plan governing the refuge’s operations.252

Following the public comment period, the funding agreement was renegotiated to account for public comment, then signed and published in July 2004.253 After what had taken years and presumably hundreds of hours of work and negotiation, CATG successfully obtained a funding agreement. Under the contract, CATG contracted to help locate and mark public easements under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act,254 conduct environmental and educational outreach in local villages, collect data on subsistence wildlife harvest, survey moose populations, and handle logistical functions, such as equipment and facility maintenance.255 The agreement also imposed performance standards on CATG.256 The work performed under the agreement is characterized as “short-term project” work rather than long-term or ongoing management functions,257 and the value of the contract was up to $59,000 per year.258

Despite this narrow scope, opposition continued. An advocacy organization called the National Wildlife Refuge Association (NWRA) issued an “action alert.”259 The NWRA objected to the fact that the ISDA did not require competitive bidding, and the organization claimed to be worried about the cost-effectiveness of such contracting in light of the FWS’s consistent underfunding in the federal budget.260 While it admitted that contracts at “one or two refuge[s] . . . may not have a significant impact on funds,” an “increasing number” of agreements could ultimately have “considerable budget ramifications.”261 NWRA also expressed concerns about a lack of transparency in the negotiation process, complaining that the public review process was not adequate.262 The organization noted that the ISDA procedure required a ninety-day review period by Congress and could go into effect only if Congress failed to

252. Id.
253. Id. at 41,838, 41,841.
254. 43 U.S.C. § 1616(b).
255. Memorandum from Geoff Strommer, supra note 234, at 4.
256. Id.
257. E-mail from Kevin Washburn, Dean, Univ. of Iowa Coll. of L., to Sean Distor (July 17, 2016, 7:09 PM) (on file with author).
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
object within that period. The NWRA urged people to take action by
calling Congress and asking members to oppose the agreement.

No objection from Congress apparently ever came, and the agreement
went into effect soon thereafter without further objection or litigation.

CATG’s agreement was historic because it was the first tribal funding
agreement with the FWS under the 1994 amendments to the ISDA, but
it was tiny in terms of scope.

It is easy to see the value of such an arrangement. Employees of the
CATG, many of whom are likely to be Alaska Native, likely have a
comparative advantage over federal employees in functions such as data
collection regarding subsistence wildlife harvesting or outreach in very
remote villages. The population in the region is predominantly Alaska
Native. Presumably, CATG employees have better access to the
members of the community, can communicate more easily with them, and
have an intimate connection to the terrain as aboriginal homelands.

According to CATG’s legal counsel, FWS had experienced certain
challenges in performing some of the services at Yukon Flats due to
“logistical complications, costs of traveling to the villages and a general
lack of trust of outsiders.” CATG’s involvement alleviated some of
these problems. CATG’s proximity to the refuge also helped FWS
“improve the maintenance and care of USFWS facilities.”

Since 2004, the CATG’s annual agreements with FWS have
continued with a few modest increases in scope. By now, the relationship
is long-standing and presumably successful. Very recently, the CATG had
a two-year contract encompassing several different tasks worth a
cumulative total of less than $200,000 annually. The base annual budget
for the Yukon Flats National Wildlife Refuge is estimated to be around $2
million.

In sum, despite a successful, long-term tribal-federal relationship, this
cooperative initiative can best be characterized as modest, at least from a

263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Annual Funding Agreement Between Fish and Wildlife Service and Council
266. Statement of Ben Stevens, supra note 228, at 36–37.
267. See id. at 33–34.
268. Memorandum from Geoff Strommer, supra note 234, at 4.
269. Id.
270. See Amendment #1 to Fiscal Year 2016/17 Annual Funding Agreement
Between Fish and Wildlife Service and Council of Athabascan Tribal Governments (Sept.
2016) (awarding up to $5,750 for inclusion of local youth in a subsistence advisory council
meeting and $30,000 per year for a refuge information technician) (on file with author).
271. Cf. Fish & Wildlife Serv., U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Annual Narrative
Report: Calendar Year 2001, at 22 (Oct. 17, 2006) (providing that base funding for the
Yukon Flats National Wildlife Refuge was at roughly $1.5 million in 2000 and $1.7 million
in 2001) (on file with author).
financial perspective. The prospects for long-term management are evident, however, from the quality of the services performed and the close relationships that CATG has formed with rural Alaskan villages. Although the agreement remains modest, strong potential remains for CATG to enhance its work at Yukon Flats.

Indeed, the success of the FWS contract led to negotiations between CATG and the BLM. The BLM has significant lands adjacent to Yukon Flats and runs the fire protection program for federal public lands, including FWS lands. In 2005 CATG requested negotiations with the BLM for fire-related activities. 272 The BLM has its own mission, and it differs from the FWS, though it has a similar duality: multiple use and sustained yield. 273 The BLM “initially resisted [negotiating] on the grounds that fire-fighting activities have no particular significance to CATG,” but “CATG eventually was able to convince the agency that fires are part of the natural resource system in which subsistence and other cultural patterns are embedded.” 274

The obstacles with BLM were financial and legal. CATG proposed a contract that included administrative costs to run a program. 275 Despite some promising early meetings, BLM rejected CATG’s proposed budget and “kept reminding CATG that the law allowed but did not require” BLM to enter an agreement. 276 Ultimately, CATG settled for an agreement with a very narrow scope of work limited to fire training and certification for the 2006 fire season. 277 Though the agreement was signed on December 15, 2005, BLM delayed sending it to Congress until March 2006. 278 Because a contract cannot take effect until after the expiration of a ninety-day review provision in Congress, this delay meant that the contract became effective too late in the season for training, so the scope of work was reduced even further to refresher courses and observation. 279 Although CATG sought to restore the broader scope of work for the following

272. Statement of Ben Stevens, supra note 228, at 34–35.
274. Statement of Ben Stevens, supra note 228, at 37.
275. Id. at 38.
276. Id. at 35.
277. Id. at 38.
278. Id.
279. Id.
season, BLM “proposed a take-it-or-leave it $4,000 contract.”280 The contract continued, however, and CATG eventually developed a wildland fire program, working with the BLM/Alaska Fire Service. As part of the program, CATG tested and trained emergency firefighters in several Alaska Native villages in the Upper Yukon Region of BLM in Alaska.281

CATG’s agreement on firefighting marked the BLM’s first contract with a tribal organization under Title IV of the ISDA.282 CATG’s experience is instructive. After years of cooperation and ISDA contracting, CATG has successful relationships with the FWS and the BLM. Neither of those relationships, however, could be characterized as “land management,” and CATG’s roles with both, though they have grown, remain quite modest. The CATG has served an important ancillary role but cannot be said to be “co-managing.”

b. The National Bison Range and the Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes

The National Bison Range (NBR) provides a particularly fraught case study of the various challenges tribes face in trying to contract federal programs outside the BIA or IHS. Partly because the NBR is located entirely within the exterior boundaries of an Indian reservation, numerous commentators have identified it for years as a leading candidate for tribal management283 or even restoration to tribal ownership.284 Congress

280. Id.
281. See id.
282. See id. at 37.
283. See Erin Patrick Lyons, “Give Me a Home Where the Buffalo Roam”:: The Case in Favor of the Management-Function Transfer of the National Bison Range to the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Nation, 8 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 711 (2005); Robin Saha & Jennifer Hill-Hart, Federal-Tribal Comanagement of the National Bison Range: The Challenge of Advancing Indigenous Rights Through Collaborative Natural Resource Management in Montana, in MAPPING INDIGENOUS PRESENCE: NORTH SCANDINAVIAN AND NORTH AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES 143, 178 (Kathryn W. Shanley & Bjørg Evjen eds., 2015) (“The Tribes’ reputation as outstanding resource managers and their ability to utilize significant political connections, public relations, lobby prowess, legal expertise, and financial resources have enabled the Tribes to establish themselves firmly as legitimate comanagers . . . .”); Brian Upton, Returning to a Tribal Self-Governance Partnership at the National Bison Range Complex: Historical, Legal, and Global Perspectives, 35 PUB. LAND & RES. L. REV. 5 (2014) (“The basis for this [Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes]-FWS collaboration at the Range has deep roots in both history and law.”).
284. On February 8, 2016, the Missoulian published an article stating, “[T]he U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service entered into discussions late last week that could lead to the agency supporting legislation to transfer the National Bison Range to the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes.” Vince Devlin, FWS Will Consider Transferring National Bison Range to Local Indian Tribes, MISSOULIAN (Feb. 7, 2017), https://missoulian.com/news/local/fws-will-consider-transferring-national-bison-range-to-local-indian-tribes/article_b2533abc-91f4-5555-9be2-14a991550f05.html
recently restored the NBR to the local tribe. The journey, however, is instructive.

Tribes are fond of reminding other Americans that all of North America once constituted Native American lands and that such lands were managed sustainably by tribes for centuries before Europeans arrived. For tribes, the American bison is perhaps the most tragic and compelling example of comparative wildlife management. Well before Columbus arrived, herds of tens of thousands of the majestic creatures thrived on the Great Plains. For centuries, bison coexisted with tribal nations, whose members harvested them for food, apparel, housing, and other resources. Bison continued to thrive well into the nineteenth century, but by the turn of the twentieth century, Americans had wreaked decimation. A bison population once estimated conservatively at 30 million—but possibly up to 100 million—was reduced to mere thousands.

Bison were so closely associated with American Indians that U.S. Army soldiers viewed them as inseparable. Officer George Armstrong Custer once famously pretended with soldiers and a foreign dignitary that an attack on a herd of buffalo was an attack on enemy “redskins.” U.S. soldiers killed buffalo to eliminate them as a food source for tribes and perhaps simply to break the spirit of Plains Indians; army soldiers killed thousands indiscriminately and left carcasses to rot on the plains.

Bison are currently in the midst of a renaissance driven partially by American Indian tribes and Canadian First Nations with the signing of the international Northern Tribes Buffalo Treaty in September 2014. Several tribes have developed bison herds, including some tribes that may not have traditionally hunted bison for subsistence for centuries.

[https://perma.cc/6B9C-4QC6]. The newspaper also noted that this instance “signaled the first time FWS has actually considered” “ced[ing] control of the refuge to the tribes.” Id.


287. Id.


289. Id.

290. Id. at 316–17.


Because of the Bison’s symbolic importance, Congress recently named American bison the national mammal of the United States. Tribes and tribal leaders were instrumental in the passage of this symbolic legislation.

The stewardship of bison by the United States in the nineteenth century is deeply embarrassing to many Americans, and it parallels our country’s treatment of American Indian tribes. The bison episode is one of the reasons that tribal assertions of the right to engage in land and wildlife management feel like a moral imperative.

The Flathead Reservation in western Montana is home to both the NBR and the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes (CSKT or “Salish and Kootenai”) of the Flathead Indian Reservation. Early in the twentieth century, the reservation was subjected to federal allotment, rendering it heavily “checkerboarded.” As a result, many non-Indian-owned fee parcels are located within the reservation. The CSKT is one of the most land-acquisitive tribes in the country, having made a significant effort to repurchase non-Indian interests in land within its reservation and restore reservation land to tribal ownership.

Until recently, the NBR, a wildlife refuge, was managed by the FWS. The NBR was originally created to protect bison; the bison range is located in the heart of the reservation, situated in a beautiful landscape of rolling hills near the Mission Mountains. On the range, approximately 300 to 400 bison roam freely over 18,500 acres of refuge land.


Because of the increasing demands on FWS budget resources, particularly as it relates to endangered species, the agency has been forced to prioritize its work carefully. Bison are exceedingly important to Indian tribes but are no longer in need of FWS protection. Today, under the Endangered Species Act, bison are considered threatened, not endangered.299

The Salish and Kootenai have been interested in operating the NBR for several years. An agreement between the FWS and CSKT was signed in 2004,300 shortly after the CATG agreement in Alaska. However, FWS soon ended the NBR contract amid complaints related to the quality of the tribe’s performance under the agreement.301

Based on significant reporting in the news; pleadings and a decision in a reported case; and several law review articles discussing the issue, the relationship at the NBR was dysfunctional from the very beginning.302 Tribal employees “reported that they experienced a lot of tension, as well as a lack of communication and cooperation from much of the USFWS staff.”303 Scholars and a Montana journalist accused the FWS of applying “a different standard to evaluate the Tribes than it did for its [own] employees.”304 In 2006 several federal employees filed a grievance with the FWS regional director alleging a hostile work environment.305 The regional director found that a “chronic and pervasive workplace problem . . . existed at the NBR.”306 The annual funding agreement between the tribe and FWS officially ended.307

299. 50 C.F.R. § 17.11(h) (2020) (listing bison as a threatened species).
301. Id. at 105–06. In 2006 FWS compiled a report, which found that under the tribe’s funding agreement “only 41% of the activities performed by the CSKT . . . were rated as successful.” Id. at 105. FWS ended the agreement later that year. Id. at 106. The tribe’s performance in the Biology Program was rated as poor, as “9 out of 26 required activities were rated as unsuccessful, with 6 more rated as needs improvement.” Id. at 105.
305. Reed, 744 F. Supp. 2d at 106.
306. Id.
307. Id.
In January 2007, the tribe appealed FWS’s decision.\textsuperscript{308} The tribe contended that “the allegations were made by FWS employees who opposed the [agreement] and had a motive to make the CSKT look bad.”\textsuperscript{309} The tribe argued that FWS terminated the agreement without prior notice and without notifying CSKT of the alleged deficiencies or giving them an opportunity to respond.\textsuperscript{310} Some individuals were also critical of local FWS staff for “being hostile towards the CSKT.”\textsuperscript{311}

After the termination of the first agreement, the deputy secretary of the interior wrote a memorandum to FWS and BIA officials “expressing disappointment with the way the first AFA was terminated.”\textsuperscript{312} The deputy secretary declined to disturb the termination of the AFA but explained that DOI officials “would immediately reestablish a working relationship with the CSKT.”\textsuperscript{313} Negotiations began in January 2008, and a new agreement was reached in June 2008 that called for “the CSKT to be more involved in management of the NBRC than under the 2005 AFA.”\textsuperscript{314}

The second agreement took effect in 2009 but was soon the subject of litigation. A federal employees’ advocacy group, Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility (PEER), filed a lawsuit under NEPA to challenge the agreement for failure to conduct an environmental review.\textsuperscript{315} The lawsuit was filed by PEER, but two different groups of plaintiffs were involved: a group of former FWS employees and a group that included a local rancher who lived eight miles from the bison range.\textsuperscript{316} To establish standing, the rancher claimed that under tribal management, “fences have not been maintained and weeds have been mismanaged, causing the health and beauty of the range to decline and thereby reducing his enjoyment of it.”\textsuperscript{317}

The court found that plaintiffs had standing and that the 2009 agreement violated NEPA because the CSKT and FWS did not complete an environmental assessment.\textsuperscript{318} The environmental analysis was not completed prior to the second contract because FWS believed that a “programmatic” categorical exclusion applied; such an exclusion had been invoked in 2004 prior to the approval of the 2005 contract, leading the FWS to believe that no review was necessary.\textsuperscript{319} According to the court,
however, NEPA “requires that the agency contemporaneously invoke a categorical exclusion with respect to each action it undertakes.” The FWS had failed to consider whether there were “extraordinary circumstances” that might make the categorical exclusion inapplicable. The court held that “[t]he agency’s failure to explain its application of a categorical exclusion, in light of substantial evidence in the record of past performance problems by the CSKT, is arbitrary and capricious.” The court set aside the agreement.

PEER continued to advocate against tribal management of the NBR. It cited a number of concerns leading to its opposition, including the loss of federal jobs, the fear of mismanagement, and a fear of setting a precedent. PEER claimed that eighteen other wildlife refuges in eight states were eligible for tribal contracting and that these units made up eighty percent of the refuge lands in the United States. The group raised similar worries about national parks. To PEER, like the NWRA in the Yukon Flats case, the existing contract might have been just the tip of the iceberg: the organization worried that tribal co-management might spread.

In early 2016 FWS entered into discussions to support legislation to transfer the refuge to CSKT. PEER again filed suit. These discussions were sparked by an inability to come to another funding agreement allowing the tribe to co-manage and jointly operate NBR. The tribal

320. Id.
321. Id. at 116.
322. Id. at 118.
323. Id. at 118–20.
325. Id.; see Saha & Hill-Hart, supra note 283, at 155.
329. Scott, supra note 327.
331. Scott, supra note 327.
leaders argued that the return of the range to the tribe was in the “best interest of the bison, the tribes and the state of Montana.” Soon thereafter, early in the Trump administration, Montana Congressman Ryan Zinke was nominated and confirmed to be the secretary of the interior. One of Zinke’s early actions as secretary was to halt plans for the transfer.

Although PEER and other opponents of tribal management of the NBR won some of the battles, they ultimately lost the war. Congress enacted legislation returning full ownership of the NBR to the tribe, effective in June 2021. The controversy is now settled.

III. EXPLAINING THE PRACTICAL OBSTACLES TO EXPANDED TRIBAL CO-MANAGEMENT

Each year, tribes enter hundreds of contracts with the BIA and IHS and just a handful of contracts with other federal land management agencies. What explains this difference? A variety of factors from public choice theory and the preferences of interest groups, such as federal employees, are likely involved, but some of the obstacles are set forth in the governing law.
A. Differences in the Legal Regime Governing Indian Services Contracts and Public Land Management Contracts

Tribes see two primary legal obstacles to additional contracting, one related to discretion on the federal side and the other related to costs on the tribal side.

1. MANDATORY VERSUS DISCRETIONARY CONTRACTING

Perhaps the most profound difference in the contracting regimes is that ISDA generally mandates that the IHS and BIA negotiate and enter contracts with interested tribes for programs “for the benefit of Indians because of their status as Indians.”338 Such programs represent nearly all of the programs in the BIA, IHS, and Bureau of Indian Education.339 Negotiating such “Indian service” contracts is mandatory, and contracts must be entered by the federal agencies absent a very limited set of good reasons.340

In contrast, while ISDA allows contracts for public land management, entering negotiations and such contracts is discretionary with the land management agencies.341 As to all non-Indian service contracts, Interior “may . . . also include other programs . . . which are of special geographic, historical, or cultural significance to the participating Indian tribe requesting a compact.”342 Although the law requires each agency to identify potentially contractible programs by activity and unit (location) and provide notice by publishing the list annually, the law creates no other mandate.343

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338. See 25 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(1)(E); Gross, supra note 84, at 1223–24 (“Congress may have realized that mandatory contracting could realistically extend only to recognized tribal governments, since automatic contracting for every Indian group applying could produce intractable conflicts, and therefore retained the previous discretionary format for nontribal Indian groups. Thus, it is arguable that Congress intended to forge a two-tiered approach: a class of mandatory contracts (those requested by tribes) and a class of discretionary contracts (those subject to reasonable standards established by the Bureau).”).


340. 25 U.S.C. § 5301(a)(1); see id. § 5321(a)(2).

341. “The Department has interpreted this subsection as granting the government discretion to fund programs ‘that may coincidentally benefit Indians but that are national in scope and [are] not by definition “programs for the benefit of Indians because of their status as Indians.”’” Hoopa Valley Indian Tribe v. Ryan, 415 F.3d 986, 990 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing 65 Fed. Reg. 78,688, 78,695 (Jan. 16, 2001)).


Tribes have asked Congress to make contracting mandatory for these non-Indian-service programs. Indeed, provisions to require negotiations by non-BIA agencies at Interior have been proposed in Congress and produced hearings, but ultimately Congress has not enacted them. Congress most recently explicitly declined to enact such a mandate in 2020. In other words, the political will to force other agencies to contract with tribes simply has not existed. As evident from the act of Congress returning the Bison Range to CSKT, the political will may be changing in some ways, but Congress explicitly declined to create a mandate for non-BIA programs when it recently enacted updates to the contracting regime to streamline some of the processes at Interior.

Courts have tended to narrowly interpret the phrase “for the benefit of Indians because of their status as Indians.” For example, in Hoopa Valley Indian Tribe v. Ryan, a tribe sued the BOR for failing to give the tribe the opportunity to negotiate for a role implementing the Trinity River Restoration Program, which was designed to restore salmon and steelhead trout to the Trinity River. The court recognized that the fisheries restoration program was designed in part to fulfill the federal trust responsibility to the Hoopa and Yurok Tribes. The court also held, however, that restoring the fishery was designed to benefit other users as well. The court declined to require the BOR to contract with Hoopa for any of the fishery program functions. In this case, the Ninth Circuit recognized that the program, at least in part, existed for their benefit but also recognized that the program was not “proposed ‘for the benefit of Indians because of their status as Indians.’” This narrow interpretation is an additional obstacle to contracting under the ISDA.

344. See, e.g., Navajo Nation v. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 325 F.3d 1133, 1134–36 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
347. PROGRESS for Indian Tribes Act § 101(a).
348. See Navajo Nation, 325 F.3d at 1135, 1138 (concluding that the Temporary Aid to Needy Families program was a “pass-through program that funnels federal money to states for state-run welfare programs” and was not “a federal program designed specifically to benefit Indians”).
349. 415 F.3d 986 (9th Cir. 2005).
350. See id. at 987–88 (explaining the statutory scheme).
351. Id. at 988–89.
352. Id. at 992.
353. Id. at 993.
354. Id. at 992 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 450f(a)(1)(E)).
The legal rule itself and its narrow interpretation place tribes in a difficult position. Tribes wishing to contract are in the role of supplicant to the federal agency. This position requires a different strategy. To gain such contracts, tribes must persuade federal land management agencies that they can bring more to the task and be more successful than the federal agency. For example, the tribe may need to demonstrate that it can manage lands to a higher standard than the federal agency can or that it can meet the task more economically or more efficiently. Tribal management might also reflect some other value important to the federal government. For example, the tribe may be able to provide more jobs than the federal agency can provide for the same resource allocation, improving the regional economy.

2. CONTRACT SUPPORT COSTS

Another key difference between contracts with BIA or IHS and contracts with other agencies is the provision of “contract support costs.” When a tribe enters a contract with either the BIA or IHS, the ISDA requires the agency to provide the contracting tribe with funds equivalent to those that the secretary “would have otherwise provided for his direct operation of the programs.” In other words, in the normal operation of a federal program, an agency has other expenditures involved in running the program that may not implicate specific program funds. For example, the federal government may have costs associated with hiring personnel or with providing employee benefits that would ordinarily be borne by the federal government but may not be allocated directly from program funds. To account for such expenses, the ISDA entitles tribes to an additional percentage of program funds, which varies by tribe and location, to account for other costs that the federal government would have borne in providing the same services. This amount, akin to “indirect costs” or “facility and administrative costs” allocation in university research grants, is due to tribes along with the program funds.

The Supreme Court has required the government to pay such costs even if Congress has not appropriated adequate funding, so tribes can now count on this funding in Indian services contracts. These costs are significant. Contract support costs sometimes have a separate line item in

357. This issue has reached the Supreme Court in two cases in the last twenty years. See Alexander Tallchief Skibine, The Supreme Court’s Last 30 Years of Federal Indian Law: Looking for Equilibrium or Supremacy?, 8 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 277, 317 (2018) (discussing the two cases).
federal appropriations; for example, this line amounted to $277 million in the enacted congressional appropriation for FY 2016.\textsuperscript{359}

The law authorizing other DOI agencies or the USFS to contract with tribes, however, makes no provision for contract support costs.\textsuperscript{360} Thus, contracts with other agencies are less lucrative and more burdensome on tribes than contracts with DOI or IHS. Because contract support costs represent the ordinary and routine costs of operating, every government must bear them. For a tribe contracting with a non-BIA or non-IHS federal agency, the tribe must meet those expenses in other ways.

In sum, contracts with land management agencies are more costly to the tribe than Indian services contracts. As a practical matter, this makes contracts with these agencies less. A potential reform that could make a difference would be to authorize the award of at least a modest amount of indirect costs, just as the federal government might award to a university in a research grant.

\textbf{B. Cultural and Political Obstacles to Tribal Co-Management}

Tribes face additional obstacles related to agency culture, tribal expectations, and even the political dynamics at the agency, as well as within interest groups and Congress. These are discussed below.

1. AGENCY CULTURAL OBSTACLES IN THE FEDERAL-TRIBAL RELATIONSHIP

In addition to the powerful effects of the legal regime, obstacles to tribes seeking to contract non-Indian federal programs may come from political and cultural realities on both sides of the contracting equation. For a variety of reasons, federal officials may be unwilling to engage in serious discussions about such contracts. First, federal opposition may be rooted in ignorance about tribal success in running federal Indian programs. Second, some managers measure their value in the number of employees within their direct purview, so some opposition may be rooted in simple protectionism or fears of diminished power and authority. A tribal contract may, of course, result in the loss of federal jobs.\textsuperscript{361} Third, a tribal contract sometimes means the loss of some quantum of control.\textsuperscript{362} Moreover, tribal officials often can express indignation and contempt

\begin{footnotes}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{359} See 2018 BUDGET JUSTIFICATIONS, \textit{supra} note 127, at IA-ST-2, -6.
\item \textsuperscript{362} See id.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotes}
toward their federal counterparts. They developed the indignation honestly; the federal government has repeatedly failed to live up to its own stated values in dealings with Indian tribes. But indignity and contempt can undermine the success of one in a supplicant role.

As noted above, even in the BIA and IHS, contracting began slowly. The tribal experience with those agencies can offer wisdom beyond the self-governance context. In the BIA and IHS contexts, Indian tribes learned important lessons about the best ways to work with agencies to transition to tribal contracts. One insight is that the federal government is not monolithic; cultures of different federal agencies vary dramatically.

2. BIA CULTURE

The BIA and IHS presented different obstacles and different challenges, in part due to their different cultures and missions. The BIA preexisted the Department of the Interior. It was moved from the War Department when Interior was established in 1849. As late as the 1950s, the BIA was responsible for virtually every public service activity in Indian country that would be expected of a state or local government outside of Indian country. In 1955, the IHS was moved from the BIA and to what is now the HHS. The rest of the functions, however, have remained with the BIA or another closely related offshoot at Interior, the Bureau of Indian Education.

Despite the loss of healthcare, the BIA’s functions run the gamut from roads and highways, education, law enforcement and public safety, and dams and irrigation systems to social work, social services and child welfare, and housing and land management, to name a few of the larger subjects. Most of these responsibilities continue today, except that tribes

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363. See, e.g., Washburn, supra note 361 (discussing how the federal Indian country criminal justice regime fails to meet federal constitutional norms).

364. For more on this subject in another context, see Kevin K. Washburn, Agency Conflict and Culture: Federal Implementation of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act by the National Indian Gaming Commission, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and the Department of Justice, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 303 (2010).


366. See id.

367. Id. at 3, 8.


have contracted for many of them. The exceedingly broad scope of the BIA’s responsibilities can be humbling for the agency. The agency has a wide range of missions and such limited funding that the BIA can be challenged to perform any single mission well. With such wide responsibility, perfection is, in some ways, impossible. Thus, it has not been a surprise when a tribe, which can pick and choose which programs to contract, believes that it can perform a particular program more effectively. Under the ISDA, the tribe can choose the easiest or most important functions. This leaves the BIA in the position of being the “provider of last resort.”

Criticism of the BIA, which has probably existed as long as the BIA, tends to come with the role. In two centuries of working with tribes and bearing the legacy of the injustices committed by the United States, BIA employees have experienced a good deal of criticism, much of it unrelated to their own performance. Before the current era, which is focused so heavily on tribal self-governance, BIA officials exercised wide authority on Indian reservations. Since the nineteenth century, BIA officials and Indian agents have sometimes displayed incompetence and sometimes corruption. As a result, some of the feelings toward the BIA reflect long-simmering resentment. For the regular BIA employee working in good faith to meet the important (and extensive) responsibilities of the federal government with limited resources, the job—and the criticism—can be difficult. In general, though, BIA employees have learned to accept the criticism gracefully and continue serving tribes.

BIA opposition to tribal contracting, which was quite significant at the beginning of the Self-Determination Era, created additional resentment. The BIA opposition has moderated somewhat over time but continues to pose practical and logistical challenges to BIA managers. Thus, although BIA employees are not quite indifferent to whether or not contracting occurs, they have made peace with the ISDA’s requirements.


372. Consider a BIA employee who supports work for three different tribes. If a tribe wishes to contract that function, the tribe presumably is entitled to one-third of an employee. A BIA manager will need to figure out how to reconfigure work so that the other two-thirds of the work can be accomplished for the other two tribes.
3. IHS CULTURE

The IHS is considered even more oppositional when tribes seek to enter a 638 contract. In contrast to the BIA, the IHS is responsible for only two major subject areas, but they are important: healthcare and public health. These missions are exceedingly important, especially for a population with high levels of poverty and poor health outcomes. The public servants at the IHS performing most of the components of these missions are necessarily highly trained professionals who have spent years in education specializing in a field of medicine or public health. Most of them likely could earn higher salaries doing similar work in a different place. Moreover, unlike in the wide variety of social and infrastructure programs reflected in the BIA’s portfolio, there is more likely to be one “right” way to proceed, reflected in a standard of care. Moreover, the IHS staff may have a very personal relationship with individual tribal members—as patients—that is quite different from the BIA staff members’ relationships with the communities they serve. This, too, poses challenges in the transition to tribal contracting.

For all of these reasons, a doctor or other employee of the IHS may be more inclined to chafe at criticism. In addition, a medical professional, who chose the profession because they wished to help people in a very personal way and indeed save lives, may not welcome a tribal contract proposal that says, in effect, “We don’t want your help.” In some ways, objections to tribal contracting within the IHS thus have sometimes seemed more entrenched than at the BIA.

4. CULTURAL OBSTACLES MORE GENERALLY

A broader problem is common to both agencies. While “disruption” is a powerful force in economic markets, “disruption” is rarely welcome to those who are disrupted. A new tribal contract will sometimes disrupt, and frequently will displace, existing federal workers. BIA officials who negotiated early tribal self-determination contracts were sometimes negotiating the termination of their own employment. Not surprisingly, under those circumstances, enthusiasm within the BIA for self-

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determination contracts was sometimes limited, and it has taken decades for the culture to embrace self-determination more fully.\textsuperscript{376}

As demonstrated elsewhere,\textsuperscript{377} the self-determination approach works better in part because of the greater accountability that a tribal official is likely to face as compared to a federal official. A tribal official may feel the need to be much more responsive to the local community. A federal employee can always ask for a transfer if the accountability begins to cause stress. That may not be an option to a tribal employee who is working in their home community. Moreover, relieving a poorly performing tribal employee of their duties may be easier than removing a career federal employee with strong civil service protections.

These oppositional dynamics are likely to exist elsewhere, too. In the National Bison Range context, one significant group in opposition to a tribal contract was composed of members of the existing federal workforce.\textsuperscript{378} Especially in rural areas of the United States, where tribes tend to be located, a federal job is a tremendous personal asset. Those employees may oppose any disruption. Thus, in proposing to contract a federal program, a tribe must be very thoughtful about how to treat existing federal employees fairly.

In sum, the two primary federal agencies that contract with tribes have somewhat different cultures that impact the agencies’ efforts to contract with tribes. If these two agencies, which have been contracting with tribes since 1975, have somewhat different approaches, driven in part by their different agency cultures, one can imagine that the NPS, the FWS, and the BLM may well have different approaches and present different dynamics. Differences between these other agencies and the BIA or IHS mean tribes will face different challenges and need to use different strategies to approach these other agencies.

5. \textsc{Internal Tribal Obstacles to Contracting and Overcoming Them}

Just as the culture of federal agencies and the actions of federal officials can pose obstacles, actions by tribal officials can present challenges as well. Some of the obstacles can be observed in the early years of contracting for Indian affairs and Indian health functions. By all


accounts, the BIA and the IHS were initially reluctant to begin contracting widely with tribes. It was primarily the law’s mandate to contract that forced these agencies to negotiate. Because no such mandate exists with other federal agencies, tribes must adopt a different strategy. Tribes have sometimes failed to recognize that a different strategy is needed to win a contract with an agency that has discretion.

Although these other agencies also share the trust responsibility of the United States to Indian tribes, tribes have not always been successful when they have made this federal trust responsibility the central point of their argument for a contract. A tribe may fail to understand the agency’s unique mission and may assume, incorrectly, that the general federal trust responsibility toward Indian tribes will trump the very specific statutory missions assigned by Congress to agencies in their organic statutes. Indeed, while tribes have a fairly obvious comparative advantage in serving their own people, they may have to work harder to prove that they have a comparative advantage over BLM staff, for example, in managing BLM land and serving the broader American public. If tribes are more thoughtful in understanding the needs of federal agencies and articulating their strengths within the context of those needs, they may be more successful in obtaining contracts.

Consider a tribe that is interested in managing a federal wildlife refuge. One can imagine a tribe seeking to obtain such a contract to develop tourism and increase tribal employment. In light of the federal trust responsibility and the socioeconomic challenges facing so many tribes, an initiative to facilitate tribal jobs and economic development on or near the reservation would seem to be compelling justification for a tribal contract, at least to a tribe.

Imagine how such an argument might sound to a FWS official. Neither tourism nor full tribal employment is a key part of the FWS mission, at least not directly. While FWS officials likely are sympathetic to the idea of increasing tribal employment, the FWS is not tasked with a jobs program for Indian tribes. It has a different mission. Moreover, wildlife refuges often exist to provide sanctuary to wildlife to protect them from human predation and encroachment. Tourism may be anathema to that approach. To a FWS official, a request that discusses tourism may very well offend the official’s sense of purpose for the particular unit at issue and may well be tone-deaf to that official’s needs.

In other words, tribes must use more strategic thinking in negotiations with federal agencies. A tribal representative must think about the mission that they would be undertaking in contracting to run a federal park unit or wildlife refuge. A tribe can be most successful in establishing a productive

379. Delaney, supra note 79, at 329.
380. See, e.g., Hoopa Valley Indian Tribe v. Ryan, 415 F.3d 986, 992 (9th Cir. 2005).
relationship with a federal agency if the tribe first makes a serious effort to understand the agency’s mission and the specific purpose of the project or facility for which the tribe seeks to contract.

Because many tribes have experience managing lands and resources, tribes have a lot to offer if they can approach these discussions thoughtfully. For this reason, starting with modest contracts may create an opportunity to build trust and develop a shared understanding of missions and goals.

6. POLITICAL OBSTACLES

Another potential obstacle is the complicated political dynamic between Congress, agency leadership, interest groups, and advocacy organizations. Public choice theory would suggest that the political dynamics likely have real ramifications.

In the area of Indian affairs and Indian health, the largest advocacy organization is the National Congress of American Indians, composed of the majority of the federally recognized tribal nations in the United States.381 Other advocacy groups include organizations advocating for specific subject areas, such as the National Indian Child Welfare Association advocating for Native American children; or regional tribal consortia, such as the Affiliated Tribes of Northwest Indians, the Rocky Mountain Tribal Leadership Council, and the United South and Eastern Tribes. All of these groups are likely to be generally supportive of tribes wishing to contract for federal Indian services functions and other federal functions.

In the context of other agencies, however, the political dynamics are likely to be more complicated than in the Indian affairs functions. Consider the political context faced by federal officials. The assistant secretary for Indian Affairs (AS-IA) and the director of the BIA have Indian tribes as their primary constituents and are accountable to tribes in multiple ways. The U.S. Senate committee that reviews the nominee’s background—in the first instance in the confirmation process—and decides whether to forward the AS-IA nominee for consideration by the full Senate is the Committee on Indian Affairs.382 An AS-IA would face difficulty obtaining Senate confirmation to the position without support from tribes and the tribal organizations mentioned above. Moreover, the AS-IA and the BIA director attend countless national and regional tribal meetings where they face scrutiny for their work and are forced to answer publicly to Indian


382. See, e.g., Nomination of Tara MacLean Sweeney of Alaska to Be Assistant Secretary, Indian Affairs, U.S. Department of Interior: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affs., 115th Cong. (2018).
These officials work elbow to elbow with tribal leaders on boards, commissions, and committees, such as the Tribal-Interior Budget Council. These officials often come from Indian country and may well be returning to Indian country when they complete their service as a federal political appointee. As a result of these sympathies and pressures, they feel it is their duty to serve Indian country constituents well. They are thus, in some ways, accountable to Indian country.

Likewise, the assistant secretary for FWS and the director of the FWS are presidentially appointed and Senate-confirmed officials. But they go through a different committee, the Committee on Environment and Public Works. Both officials face scrutiny and must develop relationships with constituency groups. Their constituents, however, are quite different from the ones faced by federal Indian policy officials.

Moreover, senators from this committee will have a different focus from their colleagues on the Indian Affairs committee. Senators may, for example, consult wildlife advocacy organizations such as Audubon, the National Wildlife Federation, and others. Senators may also consult industry groups with interests at stake. In this context, the voices of industry groups and “green groups” may have more force than tribal voices. Indeed, Indian tribal officials may not have played any significant role in those confirmations.

The same dynamic will reappear in the congressional appropriations process and in the legislative process for most substantive laws important to these agencies. Moreover, while the FWS director will also routinely attend some regional and national meetings of constituent groups, few tribal officials attend such meetings. Tribes are likely to have less success in this area because they are strangers to these forums.

Unlike the tribes and tribal organizations to whom the Indian Affairs staff feels accountable, the FWS has a wide diversity of different constituent and partner organizations, ranging from local affinity or “friends” groups to national advocacy groups. The FWS has worked with some of these groups for decades, and some comprise key national

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constituencies, such as the Audubon Society, Defenders of Wildlife, Ducks Unlimited, the National Wildlife Federation, the Natural Resources Defense Council, the Nature Conservancy, the Sierra Club, the Wildlife Conservation Society, and even the Humane Society of the United States. The FWS also has regular opponents, such as the Center for Biological Diversity, which frequently litigates with the agency.\textsuperscript{387} The FWS also has a relationship with its state counterparts, individually and collectively, through the Association of Fish and Wildlife Agencies.\textsuperscript{388} In sum, the FWS has numerous well-funded and widely supported constituency groups, as well as state agencies and groups that are keenly interested in FWS work; none of them has as its primary mission the promotion of tribal self-government. Despite being a sister agency of the BIA at the Department of the Interior, the FWS occupies a political ecosystem very different from that of the BIA and has a far different position vis-à-vis tribes. Put more bluntly, in many of the informal ways that political accountability manifests, FWS officials are politically accountable to a community entirely different from tribes.

To take the FWS example even further, consider that a wildlife advocacy group may be reluctant to see an important federal function taken from the agency with which it works routinely and understands well and instead turned over to a tribal government with whom it has had very little contact. Such an advocacy organization might be concerned that a tribal government will be less responsive and less accountable to the advocacy group. Indeed, at times, a tribal group and an advocacy group have found themselves directly at odds over a specific local issue.\textsuperscript{389} Moreover, even outside the context of the Bison Range and the opposition from PEER, tribes and environmental groups have clashed on issues related to application of the National Environmental Policy Act; tribes sometimes bristle at having to follow NEPA processes for tribal decisions under federal programs.\textsuperscript{390}


\textsuperscript{389} See Frank Sturges, No Road to Change: The Weakness of an Advocacy Strategy Based on Agency Policy Change, 50 ENV’T L. REP. 10319 (2020). For example, in Alaska, a community sought to build a road through the Izembek National Wildlife Refuge to improve access to a nearby airport for medical care and other important needs. \textit{Id.} The community, which was home to several Alaska Natives and two Alaska Native tribes, felt that the road was crucial for emergency medical transportation; numerous environmental and wildlife groups opposed the road, arguing that it would be devastating to the wildlife refuge. \textit{Id.} at 10320.

\textsuperscript{390} See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 112-427, at 5 (2012). In the House Report on the HEARTH Act, Congress authorized tribes to approve leases of federal Indian lands owned by tribes but required tribes to use environmental processes “consistent with” NEPA in
To overcome the obstacles posed by these public choice realities, tribes must be cognizant of the political context agency leadership faces. Tribes must develop the trust of the various advocacy and affinity groups that comprise the constituencies that care about a particular program or unit for which the tribes wish to contract.

Fortunately, tribes have compelling stories to tell advocacy groups in this regard. A tribe often brings not just expertise, but greater resources to the task than the federal agency has allocated. For example, after contracting with the IHS for healthcare in 1994 and improving the delivery of healthcare services to the Chickasaw people, the Chickasaw Nation decided to fund a new hospital. It invested more than $150 million of tribal funds, developed from gaming and other tribal economic enterprises, to build and open the Chickasaw National Medical Center in 2010. Although the Chickasaw Nation continued operating the program using personnel and operational funding from the IHS, it made a much greater contribution to the facility than the IHS would have been willing or able to make. In part, this tribal funding reflected the tribe’s self-interested commitment to the success of a program that it had contracted, an investment that the tribe likely would not have been willing to make if it had not first contracted the program and developed a deep political commitment to ownership of the program. Following the lead of the Chickasaw Nation, other tribes in Oklahoma followed suit, investing millions of dollars to improve healthcare in their communities.

The lesson is that a tribe engaging in a federal program may be willing to bring its own resources to the endeavor. As a result, the mission of the federal public land unit may be served better by the tribe than by the federal government. In light of the recent successful initiatives to develop “public-private partnerships” to help address serious infrastructure...
projects in the national parks, a “public-public” partnership between a federal agency and a tribal government may be fruitful.

In sum, tribes face obstacles in working with agencies, some made by the agencies, some of tribes’ own making, and some simply because of the political dynamics in Congress and at the agencies. Success requires considering these very real dynamics.

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING CONTRACTING TO CO-MANAGE PUBLIC LANDS

Tribal self-determination contracting and so-called self-governance compacting has expanded deliberately and steadily since 1975. One of the challenges tribes face is that roughly a dozen federal laws seek to accomplish the same result in various agencies—that is, contracts between tribes and the federal government. Each works differently. Rube Goldberg could not have devised a more complicated system than Uncle Sam for supporting tribal self-determination and self-governance.

One lesson of the experiences with the Council of Athabascan Tribal Governments at Yukon Flats in Alaska and the Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes at the National Bison Range in Montana is that some of the most significant obstacles to tribal success may be political. Political obstacles may well require political solutions. Tribes should work to enlist allies within the key advocacy and affinity groups. Tribes need to engage in regional and national meetings and engage and become a voice in the key subject matter areas. Tribes must build trust with potential opponents. Tribes that can build trust are much more likely to be successful obtaining cooperative management agreements or other contracts to run programs near their reservations.

Tribal governments must make the case to the public land management agencies that they can meet the agency’s mission better than the agency can itself. Tribes that can bring their own traditional knowledge and possibly their own financial resources to projects should make that commitment clear at the outset. Indeed, a tribe that can bring additional

396. See Roels, supra note 376, at 3.
resources may find that the investment is fruitful in providing jobs to tribal members and greater coordination with tribal activities.

Federal land managers should realize, though, that even a tribe that does not immediately bring resources other than traditional knowledge and expertise may nevertheless be an important ally in other ways and may bring additional resources as the tribal commitment grows over time.

A number of federal policy changes could make a difference as well. While a congressional amendment to ISDA making contracting mandatory outside the Indian services context is unlikely in the near term, federal political actors in the executive branch have some options that may assist in encouraging more tribal co-management. To address the lack of a mandate, federal political actors should incentivize contracts between tribes and land management agencies in the following ways:

First, Interior should ask Congress for funding for modest tribal planning grants to help tribes prepare to make successful proposals for contracts with land management agencies. Interior should award such contracts based on simple applications without onerous requirements.

Second, Interior and other agencies should encourage federal managers to negotiate with tribes by rewarding superintendents and regional directors who enter into negotiations for contracts with tribes and recognizing those who successfully enter into contracts. By making partnerships with tribes a federal priority, such efforts could be included as part of performance plans and evaluations for regional directors. While not every park, refuge, or BLM unit meets the qualifications required of a “special geographic, historical or cultural significance” to a nearby tribe, each geographic region of each agency likely includes at least some tribes, and opportunities likely exist somewhat within each region.

Third, Interior agencies already are required to publish a list of federal programs and facilities that are subject to potential contracting.\(^{398}\) That list has hardly changed since its initial publication despite greater sophistication by tribes and new public lands units being developed. Each agency should be directed to go through the list anew and take a fresh look. Some units, which would seem to be glaringly obvious, are omitted from the list.\(^{399}\) Agencies should schedule tribal consultations, perhaps by region, on the scope of the list. Ultimately, agencies should be encouraged to expand the list by identifying additional units and additional functions that could be added to the list.

Fourth, in a similar vein, agencies with successful existing contracts should be encouraged to expand the scope of such contracts, and the


\(^{399}\) One example is the Apostle Islands National Lakeshore in Wisconsin, adjacent to the Red Cliff and Bad River Indian Reservations. See ROBERT H. KELLER & MICHAEL F. TUREK, AMERICAN INDIANS & NATIONAL PARKS 3–16 (1998).
superintendents of those units and regional directors should be rewarded for successfully working with tribes to do so.

Fifth, to develop longer-term partnerships, agencies should seek to move beyond one-year agreements as early as possible in the contractual relationship to provide continuity and stability. Some agencies have begun to execute two-year agreements (or longer), and this extension is a positive development. Two-year agreements make sense because they reflect the limit of federal budget authority (for many agencies, money appropriated in one year generally can be used that year and carried over to the following fiscal year\textsuperscript{400}). For mature relationships between tribes and agencies, agencies could be encouraged to enter long-term arrangements, such as five-year contracts, which have automatic adjustments if fiscal conditions change. For example, if appropriations for the specific facility increase, the tribe’s contract can be enhanced by a like amount. If appropriations decrease, the tribal contract could share the cut. While longer contracts would assist with certainty and continuity, such a contract is not a straitjacket. Tribes generally have the authority under the law to retrocede a function or program back to the federal government\textsuperscript{401} and, likewise, an agency has the ability to reassume a program if the tribe is failing to meet obligations\textsuperscript{402}.

Sixth, Intergovernmental Personnel Act agreements are a key tool to help existing federal employees and thus lower the stakes of contracting. Since such agreements can be reimbursable through the contract, IPAs are largely revenue neutral. Tribes need the ability to offer existing federal employees jobs with the new program, either as tribal employees or through an IPA, so that the employee can keep the federal job and benefits and yet work on the tribal contract. Retaining existing personnel is wise for reasons beyond the political dynamic. Existing personnel have experience running the program and may be able to provide a smoother transition to tribal management. As federal employees retire or move on to other opportunities, a tribal employee can fill those positions. The opposition among incumbent federal employees suggests that federal employees may not fully understand the special provisions that allow much longer IPA agreements in the tribal contracting context.

Seventh, federal agencies often are extraordinarily modest about the scope of their authority, especially when it involves releasing federal resources. Moreover, most of the improvements in the tribal self-determination contracting regime have come from Congress. Oversight by members of Congress can communicate to agencies that Congress is

\textsuperscript{400}. JAMES V. SATURNO, BILL HENIFF JR. & MEGAN S. LYNCH, CONG. RSC. SERV., R42388, THE CONGRESSIONAL APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS: AN INTRODUCTION (2016).


\textsuperscript{402}. Id. § 1000.301.
supportive and interested in expanding tribal contracting. At oversight hearings in the key House and Senate committees, chairs and members should be encouraged to inquire publicly about the success of tribal contracting initiatives.

CONCLUSION

At a time when all nations must work together to address the effects of climate change, federal co-management with tribal nations can bring new tools, new expertise, and new players to bear on the federal conservation agenda. Tribal co-management can be achieved in many ways, but a good way to start is to use existing mechanisms that Congress already has authorized.

Tribal contracts with federal land management agencies, though modest, appear to be working well. When tribes manage public land, they bring a long-standing and deep commitment and stewardship. They also have strong resources to bring to bear, including traditional ecological knowledge developed over centuries.

Strong potential exists to develop many more such contracts and relationships. Now is a good time to take a fresh look at the existing tribal contracting program on public lands and work to breathe new life into it.