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This brief and basically unannotated essay lays out some constitutional considerations associated with prominent (and some not so prominent) proposals for Supreme Court reform circulating among progressives. The essay has four parts, dealing successively with low-hanging fruit (about which there are few constitutional questions—though not none), statutory term limits including “bells-and-whistles” proposals for accomplishing effective term limits, jurisdiction-stripping, and Court expansion. The conclusion: proposals for Court reform raise rather deep questions about the kind of democratic self-governance system we want to have—as does resistance to such proposals (that is, saying that Court reform is a bad idea raises deep questions about the kind of democratic self-governance system we want to have and which the objector believes to be close to what we actually have).

This year marked the sixtieth anniversary of Gideon v. Wainwright, the seminal case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution guarantee a right to court-appointed counsel to indigent criminal defendants charged with serious offenses. Very few would argue with that basic proposition today. Instead, the contemporary debate is whether to recognize a “civil Gideon,” i.e. a right to court-appointed counsel for indigent civil litigants.

As unjust and counterproductive public policies go, taxing vulnerable children and families is among the worst. For years, experts have been sounding the alarm that foster care “child support”—making parents pay the state when it takes away their children—is bad family policy and fiscal policy. Importantly, critics have also pointed to the
myriad ways the practice is unlawful. New guidance from the federal government to the states provides a generational opportunity to dismantle this form of stategraft in the foster care system. In this Case Study we highlight promising legislative and administrative responses to the recent federal guidance.

In 2013, Berkeley Law’s Policy Advocacy Clinic began working with local advocates to study juvenile administrative fees. We found that these fees were a form of regressive and racially discriminatory wealth extraction often imposed unlawfully on youth and families across California. As part of a statewide campaign to abolish juvenile fees, we turned to the United States Department of Justice for help fighting these illegal and harmful practices in Sacramento County.

In California, like every other state, courts charge administrative fees to people who come into contact with the criminal legal system. As recently as 2020, California authorized over 90 different criminal administrative fees. Since 2019, a coalition of advocacy groups known as Debt Free Justice California have pushed legislation to reduce that number in half by successfully raising questions about the legal and policy rationales for wealth extraction via monetary sanctions like fees.

After decades of unabated growth in mass incarceration, the number of incarcerated adults began to decline following the Great Recession. Changes in sentencing, policing, pre-trial diversion, and the recategorization of offense levels, among other strategies, helped reduce the number of persons under carceral control. While the lifetime risks of incarceration and imprisonment have declined from all-time highs, the routine imposition of monetary sanctions (fines, fees, court costs, penalty assessments, etc.) have continued to proliferate in the criminal legal system.

The imposition of these monetary sanctions represents an immediately recognizable form of stategraft. In this essay, we argue that mass incarceration, and its attendant racial disparities in sentencing, is a form of stategraft that, in some cases, illegally transfers predominantly Black, Latine, and poor white bodies from control of oneself to control of the state. In doing so, the state appropriates the differential time and labor-power of persons under carceral control to illegally profit from racial inequality in mass incarceration and sentencing disparities.